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Summary
The law regarding the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for
impeaching the accused's testimony is still undeveloped. This work discusses three of the
options available to South African courts and the difficulties inherent in each. The first is to
follow the approach of the Supreme Court of the United States. The American approach
regarding the exclusion of evidence from the case in chief is strict. Courts are not bestowed
with a discretion to admit unconstitutionally obtained evidence: Unless one of the accepted
exceptions exist, a court must exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence in order to deter
unconstitutional behaviour by the authorities. Deterrence of unconstitutional police behaviour
is however no longer considered controlling when cross-examining the accused.
Unconstitutionally obtained evidence - both real and testimonial communications - is
therefore admissible for impeachment purposes despite being excluded from the case in chief.
The rationale is to prevent the accused giving perjurious testimony in the face of the
prosecution's inability to impeach the accused's veracity in the usual manner. The application
of the American approach in South Africa has however already been rejected in S v
Makhathini.1
The second possibility is for South African courts to follow the position of the Supreme
Court of Canada in R v Calder.2 The admissibility of impeachment evidence in Canada - as
with evidence in chief - is based on the effect of its admission of the repute of the
administration of justice. However, evidence excluded from the case in chief will only in very
rare circumstances be admitted in cross-examination of the accused.
Finally, the option suggested by this thesis, is to continue the trend started by s 35(5) of
the South African Constitution, which has already been applied with great success in cases
where the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the case in chief is in issue.
Section 35(5), like the Canadian s 24(2) it bears some resemblance to, gives courts a
discretion to exclude unconstitutionally obtained evidence on the basis of unfairness to the
accused or the effect admission will have on the administration of justice. It is submitted in
this thesis that, because of the interlocutory nature of a ruling on admissibility, this approach
adapts easily to the admission of limited purpose evidence such as impeachment evidence: If
the admission of the unconstitutionally obtained evidence, regardless of whether it was
ID 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97.
2 (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
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previously excluded from the case in chief, renders the trial unfair or would otherwise be
detrimental to the administration of justice it must be excluded.
Opsomming
Die reg in verband met die toelaatbaarheid van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis vir 'n
geloofwaardigheidsaanval op die beskuldigde is nog in 'n vroee stadium van ontwikkeling.
Hierdie tesis bespreek drie moontlikhede beskikbaar aan Suid-Afrikaanse howe en die
probleme inherent aan elkeen. Die eerste is om die posisie van die Amerikaanse
Hooggeregshof te volg. Die Amerikaanse posisie betreffende die toelaatbaarheid van
getuienis tydens die staat se saak is streng. Howe het geen diskresie om ongrondwetlik
verkree getuienis toe te laat nie: Behalwe in gevalle waar aanvaarde uitsonderings bestaan,
moet 'n hof dus ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis uitsluit om ongrondwetlike optrede deur die
owerhede te voorkom. Voorkoming van ongrondwetlike optrede aan die kant van die polisie
is egter nie meer die beherende oorweging wanneer die beskuldigde in kruis-ondervraging
geneem word nie. Ongrondwetlik verkree getuienins - beide reel en verklarend van aard - is
gevolglik toelaatbaar vir doeleindes van 'n geloofwaardigheidsaanval, ten spyte daarvan dat
dit moontlik ontoelaatbaar was tydens die staat se saak. Die rede is om te voorkom dat die
beskuldigde meinedige getuienis lewer terwyl die staat verhoed word om the bekuldigde se
geloofwaardigheid op die gewone manier te toets. Hierdie posisie is egter al verwerp in S v
Makhathini. 3
Die tweede moontlikheid is om die posisie soos uitgele deur die Hooggeregshof van
Kanada, in R v Calder 4 te volg. In Kanada word die toelaatbaarheid van getuienis rakende
geloofwaardigheid - sowel as getuienis rakende skuld - bepaal deur die invloed wat die
toelating daarvan op die reputasie van die regspleging het. Getuienis wat ontoelaatbaar is
tydens die staat se saak sal egter slegs in baie beperkte omstandighed toegalaat word tydens
kruisondervraging van die beskuldigde.
Laastens, die opsie wat voorgestel word deur hierdie tesis, is om voort te gaan met die
patroon wat ontwikkel is deur art. 35(5) van die Grondwet van Suid-Afrika, wat alreeds met
groot sukses toegepas is in sake waar die toelaatbaarheid van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis
in die staat se saak ter sprake was. Artikel 35(5), soos Kanada se art 24(2) waarmee dit tot 'n
3 D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97.
4 (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
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mate ooreenstem, gee howe 'n diskresie om ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis uit te sluit op
grond van onregverdigheid teenoor die beskuldigde of indien die toelating daarvan 'n
negatiewe invloed op die regspleging sal he. Omdat 'n beslissing oor die toelaatbaarheid van
getuienis tussenstyds van aard is, pas dit goed aan by die verdere ondersoek na die
toelaatbaarheid van getuienis wat slegs VIr 'n beperkte doel aangebied word: Indien die
toelating van ongrondwetlik verkree getuienis, ongeag of dit voorheen uitgesluit was uit die
staat se saak, die verhoor onregverdig maak of die regspleging negatiefbeinvloed, moet sulke
getuienis uitgesluit word.
v
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[Penal law] is the law on which men place their ultimate reliance for protection against all
the deepest injuries that human conduct can inflict on individuals and institutions. By the
same token, penal law governs the strongest force that we permit official agencies to bring to
bear on individuals. Its promise as an instrument of safety is matched only by its power to
destroy. If penal law is weak or ineffective, basic human interests are in jeopardy. If it is
harsh or arbitrary in its impact, it works a gross injustice on those caught within its toils. The
law that carries such responsibilities should surely be as rational and just as law can be.
Nowhere in the entire legal field is more at stake for the community and the individual
- Wechsler "The Challenge ofa Model Penal Code" 1952 Harvard LR 1097, 1098
FORLIEZEL
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1 1 INTRODUCTION
"Murder trial five freed as judge condemns police bugging abuse"."
Newspaper headlines like these will always evoke a wide variety of responses. On the one
hand, there is exasperation when an (factually guilty) accused escapes punishment because of
a "technicality"." On the other hand, such headlines demonstrate that the same
"technicalities,,7 guarantee that intrusions on the basic rights and freedoms of the community
will not be tolerated, especially when committed by the authorities. These two viewpoints
illustrate the divergent considerations that need to be balanced in a criminal prosecution. It is
important to protect accused persons against violations of their basic rights, regardless of who
the violators are. At the same time, community interest demands that factually guilty persons
be brought to justice. However, it is in the community's long-term interest not to have
criminals brought to justice at all costs, as this would endanger the community's interest in
protecting the basic rights of all its members, whether innocent or accusedt
A number of remedies are available to accused persons who were the victims of such
violations, the most extreme of which is the exclusion of the evidence so obtained. This
remedy may render all evidence resulting from a violation of basic rights inadmissible at a
criminal trial. In many cases, the evidence at issue had either been obtained during an illegal
search and/or seizure," or compelled from the suspect's own mouth.l" Often, the last-
mentioned kind of evidence is the most damaging to the accused's case, if not downright
5 The Times (UK) (2002-01-30) 1.
6 As an ordinary member of the public understands it. See S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W) 657G.
7 See n 6 supra.
s Once a person's guilt is established, certain rights may be infringed upon. For instance, the right to freedom of
movement may be infringed by putting such a person in jail. However, any person - especially an accused
person - must be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
9 A violation of the right to privacy.
10 A violation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
11
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OiAPTERONE INTRODUCTION
damning. This thesis will focus on violations of both the right to privacy and the privilege
against (compelled) self-incrimination, as well as the nature of the resulting evidence.
The exclusion of evidence obtained in an illegal manner has two direct consequences.
First, it serves as a trial-remedy for the accused whose rights have been infringed by illegal
police conduct. It is often acknowledged that the primary rationale for exclusion is the
equalising effect it has upon the balance of power between a government-funded prosecution
that has a police force at its disposal, and accused persons, who have limited means and little
knowledge of the law.
The second consequence of excluding evidence is the disciplining effect it has on police
behaviour. By breaking the rules, they run the risk of having the fruit of their unconstitutional
behaviour excluded in court. I I Disciplining police for misbehaviour also serves to deter
future misconduct. 12 The disciplining, or deterrence, effect is especially popular in the United
States, where it is often held that the deterrence of official misconduct is the primary rationale
for the strict exclusionary rule applied by the Supreme Court.i ' Consequently, the effect that
exclusion of improperly obtained evidence has on the repute of the judicial system is only
considered after the deterrence requirement has been satisfied. The Supreme Court clearly
demonstrated this way of thinking in Harris v New Yorkl4 and the subsequent cases dealing
with impeachment by means of improperly obtained evidence. 15
In Canada, matters are somewhat different. The Canadian Supreme Court has held that
deterrence or disciplining of official misbehaviour is not a motivation for the exclusion of
evidence.l" However, the Supreme Court has implied the existence of a disciplinary function
by holding that admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence could create the
impression that the judiciary condones official misconduct. 17
In the United States, the exclusion of evidence has been controversial since 1914, when
the Supreme Court first started using it in all federal trials as a constitutionally required
I I Van Rooyen "Lead-in Paper: The Investigation and Prosecution of Crime" 1975 Acta Juridica 70 refers to the
rules governing police behaviour as the "primary rules" and the exclusionary sanction, which merely enforces
these rules, as the "secondary rule".
12 See S v Makhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97. This case is discussed in § 4 2 2 infra.
13 Dressler Understanding Criminal Procedure 3 ed (2002) 381; United States v Janis 428 US 433 (1976).
14401 US 222 (1971).
15 Riddell v Rhay 404 US 974 (1971); Oregon v Hass 420 US 714 (1975); United States v Havens 446 US 620
(1980). See § 1 2 & ch 3 infra.
16 R v Collins (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC).
17 R v Burlingham (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC), also cited as (1995) 97 CCC (3d) 385 (SCC); Stuart Charter
Justice in Canadian Criminal Law 2 ed (1996) 488.
12
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G-iAPrER ONE INTRODUCTION
remedy to protect the accused's right to privacy.l'' In 1961, the Supreme Court applied the
exclusionary rule to state prosecutions.i" Notwithstanding the numerous compelling grounds
for the exclusion of evidence, the exclusionary rule is not free from criticism. It is criticised
mainly for detracting from the real purpose of the trial, namely the determination of the guilt
or innocence of the accused.i" Opponents of exclusion suggest that other (non-trial) remedies,
such as a civil claim for compensation, should be sufficient to remedy any rights violation. A
claim for compensation is after all the main remedy available to innocent persons whose
rights have been violated, but never end up in the dock.
The law in South Africa regarding the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is still in comparative infancy." The enactment of the interirrr ' and present"
Constitutions has created the opportunity, and the need, for development in this important
field of procedural law. To date, the courts have only had a few opportunities to interpret s 35
of the Constitution, which deals with the rights of "arrested, detained and accused" persons.
Prior to constitutionalisation, South African courts generally adhered to the common law
tradition in terms of which the admissibility of evidence depended on relevance rather than
the lawfulness of its procurement.i"
Since the enactment of the Constitution, courts are no longer allowed to distance
themselves from the actions of other law enforcement agencies. Section 35(5) requires the
exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence "if the admission of that evidence would
render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the administration of justice". It follows
that relevance or "trustworthiness't'" of evidence alone will not be sufficient to ensure its
admission. Section 35(5) requires more, even something altogether different: When deciding
the admissibility of evidence, courts may no longer ignore illegal methods of evidence
gathering employed by police officers. The "disciplinary function of the Court" has already
18 Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914).
19 Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961). However, the first attempt to enforce the exclusionary rule on state
prosecutions had already been made in Wolfv Colorado 338 US 25 (1949).
20 This is one way of looking at it. Another view, more tolerant of exclusion, is that the main purpose of the trial
is to ensure that justice is done, to the accused as well as society. See § 4 2 2 2 6 infra.
21 S v Makhathini supra.
22 Act 200 of 1993.
23 Act 108 of 1996. Hereafter the "Constitution".
24 See § 1 4 infra. Relevance is still the requirement for admission of evidence. Section 35(5) of the Constitution
only added to the relevance requirement. See also § 4 2 2 2 2 infra.
25 "Trustworthiness" was the requirement used by the US Supreme Court in Harris v New York 401 US 222
(1971) to justify the admission of previously excluded evidence to impeach the credibility of the accused. This
term was also used in Oregon v Hass supra. Ironically, this creates the impression that the prosecution is trying
to prove that the accused is dishonest in court by proving that he was honest, or trustworthy, when making the
statement at issue! See however § 3 3 1 3 infra.
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been recognised as a valid consideration when applying s 35(5) of the Constitution.26 As in
the United States, the aim is not to discipline individual law enforcement officers; rather the
intention is to prevent violations of basic rights on an institutional level. This also means that
regardless of the individual police officer's efforts to act reasonably, in good faith and in
accordance with departmental guidelines, evidence must still be excluded when the
departmental guidelines are in violation of the accused's rights." Another consideration is
that due process can never be ignored "in the light of a bill of rights ... which places
important constitutional limitations upon official power".28 Due process in a constitutional
system is the ever-present, ever vigilant and over-arching value against which the whole
criminal prosecution must be measured.
Ultimately, the thesis aims to analyse the issues surrounding the impeachment of an
accused's credibility by means of previously excluded evidence. To put this into context, the
general principles governing the exclusion of evidence in the United States and Canada are
discussed in Chapter Two.
Chapter Two comprises a comparative study of United States and Canadian jurisprudence.
The features of the respective exclusionary regimes are compared and comments made upon
the differences. Throughout, references and comparisons are made to the South African
position. However, one must bear in mind differences between the three legal systems under
discussion. These include the lack of a jury, consisting of laypersons, as sole trier of fact in
South Africa, which instead employs (lay or expert) assessors who decide on the facts
together with the presiding judicial officer. This difference, which has far-reaching
consequences for the effective adjudication of limited purpose evidence, such as
impeachment, is discussed in Chapters Four and Five.
The development of the exclusionary rule in the United States will be the starting point. It
IS important to note that the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is
"constitutionally required'<" in the United States, hence the exclusionary rule. The US
Supreme Court consequently interprets alleged violations of the United States Constitution
narrowly in order to escape the strict requirements of the rule. For this reason, the Supreme
Court has created numerous exceptions to the exclusionary rule. Notwithstanding the
26 SvMphala 19981 SACR388 (W)400b.
27 A good example is S v Soci 1998 2 SACR 275 (E), where a standard form, drafted by the legal advisers of the
SAPS, contained a material oversight regarding the accused's right to consult counsel before a pointing out.
28 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles a/Evidence 2ed (2002) 176.
29 Mapp v Ohio supra 648, citing Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States 251 US 385 (1920) 392. Even though
it is only ''judicially implied".
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differences in approach, much can be learned from the considerable experience of the US
Supreme Court in dealing with unconstitutionally obtained evidence and its use for
impeachment. The exceptions developed by the Supreme Court are useful when considering
which factors ought to be relevant when the discretion to exclude is exercised by South
African courts.
Landmark decisions of the US Supreme Court are examined. The development of the
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule as a constitutionally required remedy is studied with
reference to some decisions of the Supreme Court, notably Mapp v Ohio/" In this case, the
court made the exclusionary rule mandatory in state prosecutions. The intention of the court
was to complete the "halting but seemingly inexorable,,3) process started in Weeks v United
States.32 Instead, the Mapp judgment sparked a debate that rages to this day about the
constitutionality of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule.33
Shortly after its judgment in Mapp, the US Supreme Court held that exclusion is also a
constitutionally required remedy for violations of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. The first cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with exclusion as a remedy
for Fifth Amendment violations were Massiah v United States34 and Escobedo v Illinois/"
These two cases were followed by the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Miranda v
Arizona." In Miranda, the Supreme Court combined four appeals from various states in an
attempt to clarify its findings in Massiah and Escobedo. The Supreme Court held that
exclusion is constitutionally required where certain procedural safeguards protecting the
privilege against self-incrimination were not in place. As part of the procedural safeguards
put into place to secure the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the Supreme Court
extended the right to counsel to the pre-trial phase."
Because of the mandatory nature of the (Mapp) exclusionary rule, the US Supreme Court
has since the creation of the rule, carved out exceptions to it. For example, an exception has
been found in cases when officers acted upon a warrant that they believed to be valid, but
30367 US 643 (1961).
31 Elkins v United States 364 US 218 (1960) 219.
32232 US 383 (1914).
33 See for example United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974); Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole
v Scott 524 US 357 (1998).
34377 US 201 (1964).
35378 US 478 (1964).
36384 US 436 (1966).
37 This is a separate right from the 6th Amendment right to trial counsel. See n 154 infra.
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which later appeared to be invalid through someone else's mistake.38 Another exception is the
"inevitable discovery" exception.i" It means that, but for the illegal manner in which
evidence was discovered, it would inevitably have been discovered through legal means.40
Because s 35(5) of the Constitution (of South Africa) gives courts a discretion to exclude
unconstitutionally obtained evidence, there is no need to create exceptions. However, these
exceptions are useful as guidelines when the admissibility of evidence in a South African
context is considered.
As far as the so-called "Miranda-rights" are concerned, s 35(1) of the Constitution creates
similar rights for "arrested" persons. However, one may rightfully ask what is to be done with
statements made by a person prior to arrest, but at a stage when he is already the subject of a
police investigation." As in Fourth Amendment cases, the US Supreme Court has created
exceptions to the Miranda requirements, when warnings are not necessary.Y
Canadian case law, with its discretionary approach to exclusion of evidence, is useful to
put into context the particular way in which the US Supreme Court deals with
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Furthermore, s 35(5) of the South African Constitution
was to some extent modelled on s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.43
Therefore, case law dealing with discretionary exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is a useful indicator of how s 35(5) of our Constitution should be applied. It is
particularly useful to see which considerations are of importance to the Supreme Court of
Canada when exercising its discretion. A comparison between Canadian and American law,
especially with a view to the differences between the principles regarding exclusion, should
be useful in identifying the possibilities for development in South Africa.
38 United States vLeon 468 US 897 (1984); Arizona v Evans 514 US 1 (1995).
39 Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984). This exception forms part of the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree" doctrine.
See § 2 2 2 4 3 infra.
40 See Scott JA for the minority in Pillay v S 2004 (2) BCLR 158 (SCA) 196.
41 Escobedo Illinois 378 US 478 (1964); S vMakhathini supra; S v Orrie CPD 14-10-2004 Case no SS 32/2003;
S v Sebejan 1997 (8) BCLR 1086 (W) 10961-J; S v Ndlovu 1997 (12) BCLR 1785 (N); S v Van der Merwe 1998
(1) SACR 194 (0); Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 631.
But see S v Langa 1998 (1) SACR 21 (T); S v Mthethwa 2004 (1) SACR 449 (E). In Mthethwa the court
declined to follow Sebejan, but nonetheless held that a suspect was entitled to be cautioned before being
questioned by the police. In this regard, see also nn 443 & 501 infra.
42 See § 2 2 3 3 infra.
43 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. Hereinafter "Canadian Charter" or "Charter".
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12 STANDING
In the United States it is important that any person claiming exclusion must show that his
own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by government action. This is known as
"standing". In South Africa, s 38 of the Constitution lists the circumstances in which a claim
under the Bill of Rights may be made.
However, the Supreme Court of Appeal in S v M,44 when ruling on the admissibility of a
letter that was obtained from a defence witness, noted: "The constitutional rights of the
appellant [accused] could not conceivably have been infringed no matter how it came into
possession of the authorities'Y'' This might indicate that the Supreme Court of Appeals takes
the view that admission of evidence "would [only] render the trial unfair or otherwise be
detrimental to the administration of justice" if that evidence had been "obtained in a manner
that violates any right in the Bill of Rights" of the accused. Similarly, in S v Naido046 the
court asked the question: "Was the evidence obtained ... in a manner that violates any right, of
the accused, in the bill of rights?,,47 This approach bears a striking resemblance to the
standing requirement in the United States.
1 3 IMPEACHMENT
The loss of important evidence because of official misconduct can be severely detrimental
to the prosecution's case. Moreover, conventional wisdom and indeed some earlier decisions
of the US Supreme Court suggest that once evidence is excluded, it "shall not be used at
all".48 However, in Harris v New York49 the US Supreme Court held that under certain
conditions, evidence excluded from the case-in-chief might still be used for collateral
purposes, such as impeaching the accused's credibility. 50 In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Canada held in R v Calder51 that once evidence is excluded, it is indeed excluded for all
44 2003 (1) SA 341 (SCA).
45 S vM 2003 (1) SA 341 (SCA) 362E.
46 (1998) 1 All SA 189 (D).
47 S v Naidoo (1998) 1 All SA 189 (D) 229. Emphasis added.
48 Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States supra 392, as cited in Mapp v Ohio supra 648. The judgment in
Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) can also be understood in this way, but this was specifically denied in
Harris v New York supra.
49 Supra.
50 An example of the US Supreme Court not only interpreting the violation of the basic rights narrowly, but also
the application of the exclusionary rule. See text following n 29 supra.
51 (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
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purposes. Previously excluded evidence will only III "very special circumstances'<' be
admitted to impeach the accused.
The term "impeachment" for purposes of the thesis has a very specific meaning, which
should be clearly defined. The Oxford Dictionary" provides three possible definitions for
"impeach] ment]":
"1 Brit. charge with a crime against the State, especially treason. 2 US charge (the holder
of a public office) with misconduct. 3 call in question, disparage (a person's integrity
etc.) ... impeachment n".
In the United States, the term "impeachment" may have a further meaning. In federal
prosecutions and certain state prosecutions, the prosecution may require suspects, witnesses
or any other persons whose testimony is believed to be useful, to appear before a so-called
"grand jury". In this context, requiring a person to testify before a grand jury is sometimes
referred to as "impeaching" a person to appear before a grand jury. Grand jury proceedings
form part of the pre-trial phase of a prosecution and therefore most trial rights do not apply.
This is not the meaning given to "impeachment" in this thesis. As grand jury proceedings fall
outside the scope of the thesis, further discussion of these proceedings are not necessary.
The meaning of the term "impeachment", as used in the thesis is closely related to the
third definition put forward in the Oxford Dictionary: Calling into question or disparaging,
for example, a person's integrity. In the thesis, however, "impeach", or "impeachment"
specifically refers to calling into question the credibility of, or discrediting the accused. The
thesis is concerned only with the credibility of the accused and not with that of witnesses. 54
In Harris v New York." the US Supreme Court held by a majority of 5-4 that "[t]he shield
provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense,
free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances'V" Writing for the
majority, Burger CJ held that the only requirement for the admission of previously excluded
evidence was that its "trustworthiness'Y' satisfies the legal standard. This holding was
52 R v Calder (1996) 46 CR (4th) l33 (SCC) § 35. La Forest J, in a separate opinion, agreed with the majority
(per Sopinka 1) in general, but could not imagine any such "special circumstances".
53 Allen (Ed) Concise Oxford Dictionary of Current English 8 ed (1990).
54 The impeachment exception does not apply to defence witnesses. See James v Illinois 493 US 307 (1990).
55 Supra.
56 Harris v New York supra 226.
57 Harris v New York supra 224. See n 25 supra.
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confirmed some months later in Riddell v Rhay,58 when the Supreme Court denied an
application for a writ of certiorariF' again amid strong criticism from the minority.
According to Douglas J, writing for the minority in Riddell, this case illustrated the
benefits reaped by the prosecution when police interrogators "deliberately or otherwise,,6o
ignored the restrictions placed upon them by Miranda. When testifying in his own defence,
the accused stated that his finger was not on the trigger of the rifle he was carrying. However,
in an inadmissible statement to the police, properly excluded from the prosecution's case-in-
chief, he had admitted that he "cocked the hammer and pulled the trigger". By admitting the
statement, even for the limited purpose of attacking the accused's credibility, the prosecution
was able to prove that the accused was lying about his finger not being on the trigger. 6I It
follows that even if the contents of the statement were not made available to the jury, proof
that the accused lied is often also proof of the truth - and the accused's guilt.
The Canadian Supreme Court, on the other hand, held in R v Calder62 that once
unconstitutionally obtained evidence is excluded, it should remain so for the full duration of
the trial and for all purposes. Writing for the majority, Sopinka J held that the focus should
not be on the purpose for which admission of the evidence is sought, but rather on the effect
that admission of evidence will have on the repute of the administration of justice. Citing R v
Adams." he held that in order to reverse an earlier exclusion, there has to be a material
change of circumstances to justify such a decision. The change of the purpose for which the
admission of the evidence was sought was not a sufficiently material change. 64
On the face of it, the position in Canada, as laid out in Calder, is the opposite of the US
Supreme Court's judgment in Harris. A comparative study between these conflicting
positions is useful to suggest possibilities regarding impeachment in South African courts.
Impeachment of the accused's credibility by means of earlier excluded evidence is
investigated in detail. It is suggested that the South African position should favour that of the
Canadian Supreme Court, but not blindly follow it, keeping in mind the differences between
the two jurisdictions.
58404 US 974 (1971).
59 Without going into a detailed definition, this means that the Supreme Court declined an application to review
the records of the case.
60 Riddell v Rhay supra 974.
61 After all, there were only two possibilities: Either his finger was on the trigger or it was not.
62 Supra.
63 (1995) 4 SCR 707 (SCC).
64 But see § 4 I 2 & ch 5 infra.
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The study gives an account of the development, to date, of the exclusionary rule in the
United States and discretionary exclusion in Canada. Furthermore, the different approaches
to the use of inadmissible evidence to impeach the credibility of the accused are identified.
Lastly, an attempt is made to identify guidelines that can assist in solving present'" and
future66 problems concerning the interpretation of s 35(5), with the focus on impeachment.
14 HISTORY
In order to put into context the discussion of the discretionary approach adopted by the
courts since constitutionalisation, some matters should be mentioned about the way things
were before the Constitution. Even in the years leading up to the Constitution, it was obvious
that a change was taking place in the courts' thinking.
Since the nineties, but especially since the enactment of the interim Constitution.i" the
focus started to shift towards protection of fundamental rights such as privacy of a person. In
S v Hammer68 this was alluded to by the Cape High Court. A letter, written by a minor in
police custody to his mother and legal guardian, was intercepted and read by the police. The
letter was then forwarded' to the Attorney-General and never given to the mother. An
application for exclusion was made, based on two grounds, the second of which was that the
admission of the evidence of the letter would be a violation of the accused's fundamental
right to privacy, as entrenched in the interim Constitution. The court excluded the letter on
the first ground of the application, namely that "otherwise admissible evidence" should be
excluded "where the rules of admissibility would operate unfairly against the accused and
thereby conflict with public policy".69
In excluding the evidence on the first ground, Farlam J felt it unnecessary to deal with the
second ground of the application. He did however have the following to say in reaction to the
prosecution's contention that the accused gave up his right to privacy:
"Waiver is never presumed. A party relying on waiver must show that the party who is
alleged to have waived decided with full knowledge of his or her right, to abandon it,
65 See ch 4.
66 See ch 5.
67 The Interim Constitution does not contain a section equivalent to s 35(5) of the Constitution.
68 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C).
69 S v Hammer 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C) 497 b.
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either expressly (which did not happen here) or by conduct plainly inconsistent with an
intention to enforce it".70
The judge was satisfied that the accused's conduct did not constitute a Waiver.
Additionally, he emphasised "that I have a discretion to exclude evidence which has been
illegally or improperly obtained"." The position that courts had a discretion to exclude
evidence under the interim Constitution was confirmed after enactment of the Constitution in
S v Shongwe/"
A few years earlier, this had not yet been the case. In S v Net,73 the private
communications of the accused were also intercepted in an unlawful manner. Van der Walt J
held that the two grounds for exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence were:
"[D]at 'n beskuldigde nie verplig kan word om getuienis teen homself te verskaf nie en
die keersy daarvan, dat getuienis wat onder dwang bekom is van 'n beskuldigde nie teen
hom gebruik kan word nie. Dit is die algemene benadering"."
According to the Judge, the only remedy available to the accused for the alleged breach of
his privacy was a private law action for damages. The (alleged) violation of the accused's
privacy had no bearing on the admissibility of the evidence that resulted from the violation.P
However, in some earlier judgments, courts have considered various possibilities of
dealing with unlawfully obtained evidence, including discretionary exclusion. In S v
Mushimba.i" the then Appellate Division courted with this idea. Rumpff CJ stated:
"Daar is verskillende uitsprake in ons eie reg en in die Engelse reg wat nie op 'n
vasomskrewe beginsel wys nie, en die moontlikheid van 'n diskresionere bevoegdheid
van die Hof is waarskynlik nie uitgesluit nie". 77
It is clear that the opinions of our courts regarding the admissibility of unlawfully obtained
evidence did not suddenly change with the enactment of s 35(5) of the Constitution. Nor did
the change only occur once the Constitution came into force. The change in position is a
gradual process that has started some years before constitutionalisation. This trend is by no
70S v Hammer supra 498a-b.
71 S v Hammer supra 498e-f Emphasis added. See S v Forbes 1970 (2) 594 (C).
72 1998 (2) SASV 321 (TPA).
73 1987 (4) SA 950 (WPA).
74 S v Nel1987 (4) SA 950 (WPA) 9531-1.
75 S v Nel supra 954D-E.
76 1977 (2) SA 829 (A).
77 S v Mushimba 1977 (2) SA 829 (A) 840F.
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means complete, and with a justiciable Constitution to support it, it should lead to a body of
law that strikes a balance between the various conflicting values involved in a criminal trial.
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2 1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to give an overview of the development of the exclusionary
sanction as a trial remedy. The general principles, as applied in the United States and Canada
are evaluated and the similarities pointed out. Additionally, the exceptions created by the US
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Supreme Court are compared with the vanous considerations taken into account by the
Canadian Supreme Court when exercising its discretion to exclude.
At the end of this chapter it should be clear that the considerations taken into account by
courts in the United States when carving out exceptions to the exclusionary rule are not that
different from those taken into account by Canadian courts when exercising the discretion to
exclude. These general principles and considerations are reflected upon in Chapter Three,
where impeachment by means of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is examined.
22 THE UNITED STATES: THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
"The movement towards the rule of exclusion has been halting but seemingly
inexorable".78
2 2 1 INTRODUCTION
Exclusion as a remedy for violations of constitutional rights is not explicitly mandated in
the United States Constitution as it is in s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter and s 35(5) of the
South African Constitution. Furthermore, implementation of exclusion as a "constitutionally
required" remedy was done in a rather piecemeal fashion. Violations of the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy were the first to be remedied by exclusion. After many attempts,
the first being as early as in 1914,79 the Supreme Court, in Mapp v Ohio,80 finally held that
exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of the right to privacy was mandated by the
Fourth Amendment.
A few years later, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination
was protected in the same manner. This happened after a series of cases that concluded with
the Supreme Court's judgment in Miranda v Arizona." In Miranda, exclusion was held to be
a constitutional remedy for violations of the privilege against self-incrimination, specifically
in cases of custodial interrogation.
There are many similarities between the two exclusionary rules. Most evident is their
common rationale - to prevent infringements of the basic rights of the community. In other
78 Elkins v United States 364 US 218 (1960) 219.
79 Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914).
80367 US 643 (1961).
81 384 US 436 (1966). As with exclusion under the 4th Amendment, the Supreme Court sparked a debate that
rages to this day, instead of bringing closure to the matter. See § 323 8 infra.
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words, to deter official misconduct. 82 The Supreme Court has also drawn numerous analogies
between the two rules during their development'" and subsequent application. Despite this, it
is important to bear in mind that they are inherently two different remedies that are applicable
to two different basic rights under different circumstances. Moreover, subsequent rulings
regarding their constitutional origin have had different outcomes.t"
2 2 2 EXCLUSION AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
2 2 2 1 The text
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized".
The Fourth Amendment is very clear on what is included in the right to privacy. It also
indicates that violation of the community's right to their "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" can occur through either a "search" or a "seizure". It further foresees the possibility
that searches and seizures can occur either with or without warrants and makes provision for
their lawful execution.V And infringements upon the right to privacy may be justified by
showing reasonableness.i? However, the text makes no mention of an appropriate remedy in
the event of a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
82 Exclusion in South Africa is similarly part of the courts' disciplinary function, aimed at inducing legislatures
and government agents to respect the rights and freedoms set out in the Bill of Rights. See S v Mphala 1998 (1)
SACR 388 (WLD).
83 Most notably, Black J (concurring) in Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961) 662: "[W]hen the Fourth
Amendment's ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth
Amendment's ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies
but actually requires the exclusionary rule".
84 United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974) seems to have de-constitutionalised exclusion as a remedy for
4th Amendment violations. See also Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v Scott 524 US 357 (1998). In
turn, after almost following 4th Amendment exclusion in losing its constitutional pedigree, the 5th Amendment
(Miranda) exclusionary rule had its constitutional origin reaffIrmed in Dickerson v United States 530 US 428
(2000).
85 The Supreme Court considers the reasonableness requirement of warrantless searches and seizures to be at
least as strict as, if not the equivalent to, the probable cause requirement of warrant searches. Consider the
following by Black J (concurring) in Mapp v Ohio supra: "In [Rochin v California 342 US 165 (1952)], three
police officers, acting with neither a judicial warrant nor probable cause, entered Rochin's home for the
Eurpose of conducting a search ... " Emphasis added.
6 The 5thAmendment makes no provision for reasonableness. The right to privacy as it is formulated in s 14 of
the SA Constitution also does not contain a reasonableness provision, which means that any infringements
thereupon must be justified in terms of s 36, or dealt with in terms of s 35(5).
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2222 Mapp v Ohio
In 1961, the Supreme Court finally recognised that exclusion of evidence is "an essential
ingredient'<" of the Fourth Amendment right to privacy. Although not replacing any of the
other possible (civil) remedies, it became the primary (trial) remedy for violations of the
Fourth Amendment.
In Mapp v Ohio88 police officers investigating a recent bombing, sought to enter the
accused's house in order to find and question a suspect whom they believed to be hiding
there. In addition, they believed that a large amount of policy paraphernalia was hidden in the
home. When the officers demanded entrance, the accused telephoned her attorney and on his
advice refused to admit them without a search warrant.
Later, the police returned to the house, still without a warrant. This time, they forcibly
entered. Meanwhile, the accused's attorney arrived, but the police denied him access into the
house and refused to let him see his client.
The accused was forcibly taken to her bedroom, where the officers searched her
belongings. Later, the rest of the house was thoroughly searched. Nobody, nor any evidence
regarding the bombing, was found. However, "obscene materials" were found and seized.
The trial court convicted the accused for possession of these materials.
22221 The trend
Wolf v Colorado89 recognised the enforceability of the right to privacy against states, but
not yet with the remedy of exclusion. 90 Since then, many states have adopted the exclusionary
rule as the remedy for violations of Fourth Amendment rights; "because the other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions ... ',91 The
failure of other remedies to protect the Fourth Amendment has been recognised by the
Supreme Court since Wolf92
87 Mapp v Ohio supra 657.
88 Supra.
89 338 US 25 (1949).
90 Partly on the facts and partly because the court felt that other remedies were available to enforce this right.
91 People v Cahan 44 Cal2d 434 (1955) 445.
92 Irvine v California 347 US 128 (1954) 137.
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The trend at the time of Mapp v Ohio" was definitely towards reading exclusion into the
Fourth Amendment. A year earlier, in 1960, the Supreme Court widened the strict standing
requirements for challenging unconstitutional searches and seizures." Later in the same year,
the court added momentum to the trend by finally rejecting the so-called "silver platter"
doctrine.f This meant that the prosecution in a federal trial could no longer rely on evidence
obtained illegally by state officials. The Supreme Court arrived at this conclusion because the
purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it".96
The implication of this holding was that unconstitutionally obtained evidence became
inadmissible in a federal court, regardless of its source.
Mapp v Ohio97 finally ended the double standards whereby evidence constitutionally
inadmissible in federal courts, was still admissible in state courts. The Supreme Court held
that not only should the right to privacy be applicable to the states through the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." but it should be enforceable by the same sanction of
exclusion as against the Federal Government.99 To do otherwise, it held, would be to
recognise the right to privacy without securing its effective enjoyment.i" Part of the court's
reasoning was that it had not hesitated in earlier decisions to enforce equally against federal
and state courts other rights, like the right to a fair trial which includes the right not to be
convicted by use of a coerced confession (without regard to its reliability). The same should
apply to what is "tantamount to coerced testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of
goods, papers, effects, documents, etc".IOI Moreover, the court held:
"The philosophy of each Amendment and of each freedom is complementary to,
although not dependent upon, that of the other in its sphere of influence - the very least
93 Supra.
94 Jones v United States 362 US 257 (1960). The court held that anyone who was "legitimately on the premises"
at the time of the search or seizure could challenge the use of such evidence. However, the standing requirement
has since been narrowed. See Rakas v Illinois 439 US 128 (1978).
95 Elkins v United States supra. The reverse of the "silver platter" doctrine, where state prosecutors used
evidence illegally obtained by federal agents, had earlier been rejected in Rhea v United States 350 US 214
(1956).
96 Elkins v United States supra 217. See also Mapp v Ohio supra 656.
97 Supra.
98 This was as far as the Supreme Court was willing to go in Wolf v Colorado 338 US 25 (1949).
99 Any remedy that is constitutionally required is binding on the states through the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. For more on how the 14thAmendment incorporates the Bill of Rights see Dressler Understanding
Criminal Procedure 3ed (2002) ch 3.
JOO Mapp v Ohio supra 656.
JOJ Mapp v Ohio supra 656. However, see § 22 I supra. This argument seems to imply that, like in Canada, the
distinction should rather be between conscripted and non-conscripted evidence. See §§ 2 3 2 1 1 & 2 3 2 I 2
infra.
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that together they assure in either sphere IS that no man IS to be convicted on
unconstitutional evidence". 102
22222 Judicial integrity103
Finally, the court in Mapp considered what was referred to in Elkins v United Statesl04 as
the "imperative of judicial integrity".105 This rationale had already been acknowledged by the
Supreme Court in Weeks v United States,106 although not explicitly in "integrity" terms.l'"
According to Clark J, for the majority in Mapp:
"However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a
technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law
proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring
effectiveness". 108
He continued that "[o]ur decision, founded in reason and truth, gives ... to the courts, that
judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice". 109In reaction to criticism
that "[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered", he stated that in some
cases "this will undoubtedly be the result".IIO He continued however: "The criminal goes
free, ifhe must, but it is the law that sets him free". III
Although the "judicial integrity" argument featured prominently in Mapp, it has since lost
ground to the deterrence rationale to the point of irrelevance. Only five years later, the
Supreme Court held:
"This rationale [judicial integrity], however, is really an assimilation of the more specific
rationales [deterrence and trustworthiness], and does not in their absence provide an
independent basis for excluding challenged evidence".112
The Supreme Court has since Mapp also held that "while it is quite true that courts are not
to be participants in 'dirty business', neither are they to be ethereal vestal virgins of another
102 Mapp v Ohio supra 657. However, in §§ 3 2 3 & 324 infra it is illustrated why analogies between the 4th&
5thAmendments should, at the most, be used sparingly.
103See also § 4 2 2 26 infra.
104 364 US 218 (1960).
105 Elkins v United States supra 222, as quoted in Mapp v Ohio supra 659.
106 232 US 383 (1914).
107Dressler Criminal Procedure 381.
108 Mapp v Ohio supra 658, citing Miller v United States 357 US 301 (1958) 313.
109 Mapp v Ohio supra 660.
110 Mapp v Ohio supra 659, quoting Cardozo J in People v Defore 242 NY 21 (1926) 587.
IIIMapp v Ohio supra 659.
112 Michigan v Tucker 417 US 433 (1974) 451.
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world".113If there were any doubt left, the Supreme Court held in United States v Janis I 14
that deterrence is the "'prime purpose' of the rule, if not the sole one" ."5
2223 Is exclusion really constitutionally mandated?
Much has been said in criticism of the ruling in Mapp v Ohio1l6 - possibly, none as fierce
as that of its own minority. The minority based their criticism on the argument that when
deciding whether any right or remedy is required by the Constitution, its desirability, costs
and even its effectiveness in achieving secondary goals should be irrelevant. The only
relevant factor should be whether it is required by the Constitution. In other words, if the
Constitution requires exclusion of unlawfully obtained evidence, it must be excluded
regardless of the consequences. The minority did not believe that the Constitution requires
such a remedy. Consequently, the minority did not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
empowered the Supreme Court to require enforcement of the right to privacy by the states in
the same way it would in a federal prosecution - by excluding the impugned evidence.
Although not overruling the holding of the majority in Mapp v Ohio, the Supreme Court
has since overruled the constitutional reasoning of Mapp. Speaking for a majority of six
members in United States v Calandral :' Powell J described the exclusionary rule as "a
judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through
its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party aggrieved't.i'" This
suggested that exclusion was no longer regarded as constitutionally required, but merely a
judicially implied remedy aimed at deterring official misconduct. Although the Supreme
Court has not gone so far as to acknowledge explicitly what was implied in Calandra, it has
since ventured that ''the rule is prudential rather than constitutionally mandated ...,,1l9
113 Rehnquist J (as he then was), for the minority in California v Minjares 443 US 916 (1979) 924.
114428 US 433 (i976).
115 United States vJanis 428 US 433 (1976) 446.
116 Supra.
117 414 US 338 (1974). This case concerned the admissibility of unconstitutionally seized evidence in grand jury
proceedings, which, strictly speaking, falls outside the ambit of the current work. See § 1 3 supra. Nonetheless,
the judgment had important consequences for the exclusionary rule "designed" by the Supreme Court in Mapp v
Ohio supra.
118 United States v Calandra supra 348.
119 Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v Scott supra 363. This has implications for the application of
the exclusionary rule in the states. If it is not constitutionally required, but merely judicially implied as part of
the Supreme Court's supervisory function over federal proceedings, the states, and indeed Congress, would be
free to create their own remedies. See, however, the Supreme Court's arguments to the contrary in Dickerson v
United States supra.
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2 2 2 4 Exceptions: When unconstitutionally obtained real evidence will not be
excluded
22241 General'20
It is clear that the strict exclusionary rule adopted by the Supreme Court in Mapp v Ohiol21
leaves a court no choice but to exclude evidence once it finds that a violation of a right has
occurred. In order to avoid the effects of such a strict rule, the Supreme Court can do one of
two things: Either employ a narrow interpretation of basic rights whenever the admissibility
of evidence is at issue,122 or restrict the application of the exclusionary rule when the
deterrence rationale will not be served or has adequately been served.123 In any event, the
exclusionary rule has little or no application in ordinary civil suitsl24 or hearings of an
administrative kind.125 In criminal proceedings of a non-trial nature, the exclusionary rule is
similarly not applicable. 126
In criminal trials, when the exclusionary rule does apply, the Supreme Court has allowed
some exceptions. This means that although factually a violation occurred, the evidence
resulting from that violation is admissible. Although impeachment is often referred to as
another exception to the exclusionary rule, it should be noted that it does not prevent
exclusion of evidence like other exceptions. Impeachment in the sense that it is understood in
this work only becomes relevant once the evidence in question had already been excluded, or
should have been.
22242 Goodfaith
In United States v Leonl27 and Massachusetts v Sheppard,128 the Supreme Court held that
if the warrant (which should at least be facially valid) authorising the search were later found
120 See generally Dressler Criminal Procedure § 21 5.
121 Supra. .
122 This is almost as dangerous as condoning police infringements upon constitutional rights, since the effect is
that basic rights are effectively restricted in their application. InMapp v Ohio supra 647, the court, citing Boyd v
United States 116 US 616 (1886) 635 held that "constitutional provisions for the security of person and property
should be liberally construed".
123 United States v Calandra supra.
124 TT • d ST·unite tates v Jams supra.
125 INS v Lopez-Mendoza 468 US 1032 (1976).
126 United States v Calandra supra; Giordenello v United States 357 US 480 (1958); United States v McCroy
930 F 2d 63 DC Dir (1991); Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole v Scott supra; 18 USCA § 3142 f
(2000).
127468 US 897 (1984).
128468 US 981 (1984). A companion case of Leon.
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to be invalid, evidence resulting from the search would not be excluded if the executing
officers had acted in good faith.129 The Supreme Court applied an objective test to determine
if the warrant was executed in good faith - "whether a reasonably well trained officer would
have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization". 130All relevant
considerations are to be taken into account when deciding what the knowledge of a
"reasonably well trained" officer would have been in the circumstances, including the
subjective knowledge of the executing officer.
The judgment is based on the distinction between so-called "good faith" law enforcement
and "bad faith" law enforcement. The court argued that the results of "bad faith" law
enforcement should be excluded, and rightfully SO.13I However, it serves no purpose to
exclude evidence obtained through police activities that can objectively be seen as reasonable
law enforcement.F' In other words, it is counter-productive to deter certain behaviour if any
reasonable police officer would have acted in the same way under the circumstances.
22243 Fruit of the poisonous tree
It is clear that evidence obtained during illegal police activities IS inadmissible at a
criminal trial, unless an exception applies. Evidence that is causally linked to the illegal
conduct is taintedl33 - the so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree" - and must also be excluded.
However, the causal connection between the poisonous tree and its fruit can "become so
attenuated as to dissipate the taint".134 How far must the fruit fall from the tree to remove the
taint? In this regard, there is a distinction between direct evidence, which is inadmissible, and
derivative evidence, which may be admissible.
As a threshold matter, the "independent source doctrine" determines whether the
impugned evidence fall within the scope of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Evidence
129 Ironically, despite the exclusionary rule being mandatory in state prosecutions, the "good faith" exception is
not. In fact, it has been rejected in many states. See Dorsey v State 761 A 2d 807 (Del 2000); Gary v State 422
SE 2d 426 (Ga 1992).
130 United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) 923.
131 If looked at from a deterrence perspective.
132 See also Mkhize v S (2000) JOL 6155 (W).
133 In Canada, the focus is on the temporal link between the Charter violation and the evidence is question. See §
233 infra.
134 Nardone v United States 308 US 338 (1939) 341.
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derived from an independent source is not causally linked to the illegal conduct and normally
admissible in court. 135
Evidence not obtained from an independent source, but that would inevitably have been
discovered through legal means, had it not been for the illegal conduct, is also admissible.136
The ratio being that community interest requires that the prosecution should not be put in a
worse position than it would have been in had the police acted lawfully.137 Simply put,
exclusion in a situation like this would not serve the deterrence rationale.
Finally, the causal connection can become so attenuated that exclusion would serve no
(deterrent) purpose.l " In determining whether the connection has become too attenuated, a
court should determine each case on its facts and take into account all relevant
circumstances.P" Moreover, the nature of the secondary evidence does make a difference to
the gravity of the taint.140 This means that courts have a discretion to exclude derivative
evidence - and the factors relevant to the discretion bear a striking resemblance to those
relevant to the discretion in Canada.141
223 MIRANDA vARiZONA AND THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
"Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our national culture".142
2231 General
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution contains numerous, seemingly
unrelated commands, "probably [the US Constitution's] most schizophrenic amendment't.i'
135 Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States 251 US 385 (1920); Nix v Williams 467 US 431 (1984).
136 Nix v Williams supra. This case dealt with a violation of the 6th Amendment, but the fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree analysis applies in the same manner to the 4th Amendment and the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. See however, § 2 2 3 3 3 infra for a discussion of the fruit of the poisonous tree in cases of
Miranda violations.
137 In contrast, see the text accompanying n 211 infra.
138 Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 (1963).
139 Including temporal proximity, intervening events and whether the police acted deliberately rather than
unintentionally. See §§ 2 3 22 & 2 3 3 infra. See also Murray v United States 487 US 533 (1988).
140 In United States v Ceccolini 435 US 268 (1978) the Supreme Court held that a witness' testimony is more
likely to be free of taint than real evidence. The majority probably had in mind that the independent conduct of a
witness could break the chain of causality or cause the dissipation of the taint in another way. According to the
minority, this amounts to no more than "judicial double counting" of the free will factor.
141 See generally § 2 3 infra.
142 Rehnquist CJ in Dickerson v United States supra 443.
143 Schulhofer "Some Kind Words for the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination" 1991 Val U LR 311.
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Among other things, it holds that "[n]o person shall be ... compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself ... " Like the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment is silent
about the appropriate remedy for violations of any of its commands. The privilege against
self-incrimination, however, specifically forbids the use of any compelled self-incriminatory
evidence in a criminal trial. In other words, the use of such evidence in itself constitutes a
violation of the Constitution. And, unlike the Fourth Amendment, infringements cannot be
justified by showing reasonableness.
2232 Miranda vArizona
In Massiah v United States144 and Escobedo v Illinois,145 the Supreme Court extended the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel to the pre-trial and pre-indictment phases, respectively.
This led to the decision in Miranda v Arizona.V" However, instead of settling the Sixth
Amendment right-to-counsel issue, the Supreme Court created a different right to counsel as
a means of protecting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.l'" After Miranda,
the Supreme Court held that the motivation for the Escobedo decision was "not to vindicate
the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, 'to guarantee full effectuation of
the privilege against self-incrimination ... ",148 Hereby the court seemed to approve the
Miranda court's shift in focus from the right-to-counsel to the privilege against self-
incrimination.
Traditionally, the confessions obtained in the four cases before the Miranda court would
have been deemed voluntary.i " but the Supreme Court was concerned about the protection of
the accused's Fifth Amendment right not to be witnesses against themselves. They all found
themselves in unfamiliar, police dominated surroundings, confronted with menacing
interrogation methods, the sole purpose of which was to enforce the will of the interrogator
on his subject. This might not have been through physical intimidation, but the court was of
144 377 US 201 (1964).
145378 US 478 (1964).
146 Supra.
147 Throughout this work, it is illustrated that there is considerable disagreement within the US Supreme Court
whether the rights identified in Miranda are in fact constitutional rights. In South Africa, rights essentially
similar to those identified in Miranda are included in s 35 of the Constitution, effectively preventing any dispute
as to their constitutionality and consequently simplifying the inquiry whether constitutional rights had in fact
been violated. See ch 4 infra.
148 Kirby v Illinois 406 US 682 (1972) 689, citing Johnson v New Jersey 384 US 719 (1966) 733, in which the
Escobedo judgement was restricted to its facts.
149 See §§ 2 2 3 2 & 3 23 8 2 infra. The Supreme Court applies the new (bright-line) standard only to Miranda
violations and reverts to the traditional voluntariness standard for impeachment purposes. See Harris v New
York 401 US 222 (1971); Dickerson v United States supra.
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the opinion that the psychological pressures exerted on the suspects were nonetheless equally
coercive. The Supreme Court was concerned about the lack of procedural safeguards to
ensure that the statements were indeed the product of free choice.
The essence of the Miranda judgment is as follows: No statement by the accused, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, may be used against him in court if such a statement resulted
from a custodial interrogation, unless the prosecution can show the use of effective
procedural safeguards to secure the accused's privilege against compelled self-incrimination
as guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment.
In Escobedo, the Supreme Court held that the right to counsell50 attaches when the
adversarial process begins. According to the Supreme Court's holding in that case, the
adversarial process begins as soon as the "focus" of an investigation is on a suspect and the
purpose of the interrogation is to get a confession. The Miranda court equated "focus" to
custodial interrogation.l"
Although not constitutionally required as such, the procedural safeguards, as rmrumum
requirements ensure the protection of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination,
which is constitutionally required. The Miranda judgment left the possibility for the states
and Congress to devise their own means of ensuring the protection of the privilege against
self-incrimination. The Supreme Court however made it clear that without procedural
safeguards that are at least equally effective as the measures they proposed, any interrogation
is inherently coercive.152
The procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court focus on two issues. First, it
requires that before any interrogation, the police inform the accused of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, and the consequences of waiving it.IS3 The second aim of the
procedural safeguards laid down by the Supreme Court, is to ensure that the accused is
continually and effectively able to exercise his privilege throughout the potentially extended
and coercive interrogation process. This was achieved by creating a right for the accused to
150 At the time, the court seemed to refer to the 6th Amendment right, but in Kirby v Illinois supra, the court held
that the focus was on the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination instead.
151 In South Africa the position is similar. See n 41 supra. In S vMakhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97,
Hurt J held that even before as suspect is formally arrested, he must be informed of his rights before he is
questioned.
152 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) 458, 467, 468, 524. In United States v Patane 159 L Ed 2d 667
(2004) § 2, the court went so far as to say that Miranda created a generally rebuttable presumption of coercion.
153 These rights are deemed so important, that no ex post Jacto assessment of the accused's actual knowledge
will be made; no amount of circumstantial evidence of the accused's knowledge at the relevant time will relieve
the police of this simple duty.
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consult with counsel before and during the interrogation process.l'" As with the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the accused has a right to appointed counsel if he is indigent.15s
Therefore, interrogators have a duty to inform the accused of both the right to confer with,
and have counsel appointed if necessary.
The decision in Miranda was intended to affect only in-custody interrogations, and not to
frustrate traditional crime investigation methods. Custody is a situation where "there is a
formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal
arrest".IS6 And, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position
would have understood his situation".157 It follows that Miranda does not cover on-the-scene
questioning of bystanders or "stop-and- frisk" seizures of persons.I58 The impact of the
restriction of movement on the person subjected thereto is so brief that a reasonable person
would not believe that he is in custody. I59
Furthermore, Miranda is only aimed at interrogations. In Rhode Island v Innisl60 and
Brewer v Williams I61 the Supreme Court held that interrogation could be something other
than the express questioning of a suspect. It can be "any words or actions on the part of the
police ... that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response
from the suspect',.162 The test is objective: Should the officer have known that the suspect
might perceive his actions or comments as an interrogation, or not?
Nevertheless, any subjective knowledge that the interrogating officer had of the suspect's
particular vulnerabilities also play a role. In Brewer, police officers were transporting the
accused from one town to another. They agreed with accused's counsel that they would not
interrogate the accused during the journey. However, during the journey one of the officers
had a lengthy conversation with the accused about various topics, including the crime. He
played on certain "weaknesses" in the accused's personality when he referred to the crime
154 Since this "right" to counsel is essentially a separate right from the 6th Amendment right to counsel, it
follows that if an accused asserts his 6th Amendment right to counsel, he does not by implication assert his
Miranda right to counselor vice versa.
155 The 6th Amendment right to appointed counsel for indigents was confmned in Gideon v Wainwright 372 US
335 (1963). The same reasons for supplying indigents with trial-counsel at government expense should apply
when the right to counsel is extended to the pre-trial phase.
156 California v Beheler 463 US 1121 (1983) 1125, citing Oregon v Mathiason 429 US 492 (1977) 495.
157 Berkemer vMcCarty 468 US 420 (1984) 442.
158 Terry v Ohio 392 US 1 (1968). The Supreme Court allowed the police to conduct a "stop-and-frisk" of a
person on a lesser ground than probable cause. For a stop-and-frisk, the police need only a reasonable suspicion
that criminal activity is afoot.
159 United States v Mendenhall 446 US 544 (1980).
160 446 US 291 (1980).
161 430 US 387 (1977). The so-called "christian-burial-speech" case.
162 Rhode Island v Innis 446 US 291 (1980) 301. Emphasis added.
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and the possibility that the victim's body might not be found in time for a "Christian"
burial.l'" The accused responded with incriminating statements and led the officers to the
body. The Supreme Court regarded this as an interrogation. Consequently, the evidence was
inadmissible.
Lastly, Miranda is not applicable if the accused spontaneously confesses. In Colorado v
Connelly,l64 the accused, suffering from chronic schizophrenia, responded to "the voice of
God" ordering him to confess or commit suicide. He subsequently approached a police
officer and confessed to a murder. The Supreme Court held that there was no external
compulsion on him to confess and therefore no Miranda warnings were necessary.l'" It
follows that if the accused is unaware that he is talking to a government agent he can not be
under any compulsion to speak either. 166
2233 Exceptions: When Miranda warnings are not required
22331 Public safety
In New York v Quarlesl'" the accused, a rape suspect, was arrested in a grocery store.
Noticing that the suspect had an empty shoulder holster and without issuing Miranda
warnings, one of the officers asked the suspect where he had hidden the gun. The suspect
replied, "the gun is over there", I68and pointed to some empty cartons in the store. The police
subsequently retrieved the weapon where the accused had said it would be.
The Supreme Court admitted the statement about the gun and the gun itself, because the
police "were confronted with the immediate necessity,,169 of finding the weapon. As long as
its whereabouts were unknown, it posed a threat to the safety of the public and the officers
involved.l"" The exigency must require "immediate action by the officers beyond the normal
need expeditiously to solve a serious crime".171 The subjective motivations of the
163 The officer knew the accused to be a deeply religious man and a recent escapee from a mental hospital.
164 479 US 157 (1986).
165 But see R v Harper (1994) 92 CCC (3d) 423 (SCC).
166 Illinois v Perkins 496 US 292 (1990). See § 2 2 3 3 2 infra.
167467 US 649 (1984).
168 New York v Quarles 467 US 649 (1984) 652.
169 New York v Quarles supra 657.
170 New York v Quarles supra 657 stated: "[A]n accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might
later come upon it".
171 New York v Quarles supra 659, distinguishing on the facts from Orozco v Texas 394 US 324 (1969); Rhode
Island v Innis supra.
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interrogating officer are not relevant - the questions must objectively be prompted by a
concern for public safety.
Although the exception reduces the necessary clarity of the Miranda requirements.lf the
Supreme Court believed that police "can and will distinguish almost instinctively between
questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public and questions
designed solely to elicit testimonial evidence from a suspect". 173
22332 Covert custodial interrogation
It was explained above that the existence of an interrogation or its "functional equivalent"
depends on the perceptions of the suspect. Therefore, if the suspect is unaware that he is
speaking to a police officer, there can be no perception on the part of the suspect that an
interrogation is taking place. This is the essence of the Supreme Court's ruling in Illinois v
Perkins. 174
The accused, who was in jail for another crime, admitted committing a murder and gave
details of the crime to another "inmate", who was in fact an undercover police officer
instructed to gather information from the accused. The Supreme Court held that "Miranda
warnings are not required when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a law
enforcement officer and gives a voluntary statement".175 It follows that if the suspect believes
that he is talking to a cellmate, there is no "interrogation" and therefore no danger of
coercion, even though he is in custody. 176
22333 Fruit of the poisonous tree
Even though the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine applies to violations of the privilege
against self-incrimination'{' - in other words, when statements where not voluntary - there is
no such doctrine applicable to violations of Miranda. 178 Therefore, as long as the traditional
172 See Scalia J for the minority in Dickerson v United States supra 463-464.
173 New York v Quarles supra 658-659. Even if the police do not, or cannot make the distinction, the necessity of
the particular questions in the relevant situation would still be judged objectively afterwards.
174 496 US 292 (1990). See also Rothman v R (1981) 1 SCR 640 (SCC).
175 Illinois v Perkins supra 294.
176 In other words, a "covert" interrogation is not the functional equivalent of an interrogation. See § 2 2 3 2
supra.
177 In much the same way as with violations of the 4th Amendment.
178 Dressler Criminal Procedure 503; Mirfield Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (1997)
336.
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voluntariness requirement is adhered to, the prosecution may call a witness whose identity is
the direct result of an unwamed statement.l/" tender the physical fruits of suspect's unwamed
statements'f" and even introduce an accused's own post-Miranda admission that resulted
from an earlier violation of Miranda.181
This is apparently the result of the Supreme Court's subsequent reluctance to treat the
Miranda judgment as a constitutional judgmentY Considering the (partial) confirmation of
the constitutional status of Miranda v Arizonal83 in Dickerson v United States I84the Supreme
Court should reconsider its no-fruit stance. However, the Supreme Court has thus far shied
away from any such notion.185
2 2 4 WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In Johnson v Zerbst,186 the Supreme Court held that a constitutional right is waived only
when there is "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or
privilege".187 This ruling is divisible into three elements. First, it must be shown that actual
relinquishment or abandonment of the relevant constitutional right has taken place. I88 A court
will not make assumptions. Second, the relinquishment must be "voluntary in the sense that it
was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception".189 Third, the holder of the right must be aware of the nature of the right, and the
primary consequences of giving it up.
However, the Supreme Court held in New York v nur? that "[w]hat suffices for a waiver
depends on the nature of the right at issue".191 The distinction seems to be drawn between
ordinary constitutional rights and constitutional rights that enhance the reliability of the
179M, hi 'T'. kIC tgan V 1UC er supra.
180 United States v Patane supra.
181 Oregon v Elstad 470 US 298 (1985). See also S v Manuel 1997 (2) SACR 505 (C).
182 The judgment in New York v Quarles supra was similarly based on the premise that the Miranda judgment
was of a non-constitutional nature.
183 Supra.
184 530 US 428 (2000). See § 3 2 3 8 infra.
185 Dressler Criminal Procedure 503.
186304 US 458 (1938).
187 Johnson v Zerbst supra 464. The position in SA is the same. In S v Mphala supra 39ge, the court held that
informed waiver cannot take place when the accused is not informed of obviously relevant facts - in this case
that counsel had already been retained for the accused by a family member. But see Moran v Burbine 475 US
412 (1986).
188 See Brewer v Williams 430 US 387 (1977) 404.
189 Moran v Burbine supra 421. See S v Mphala supra.
190 528 US 110 (2000).
191 New York v Hill 528 US 110 (2000) 114.
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outcome of the trial.l92 The Supreme Court "ha[s] been unyielding in [its] insistence that a
defendant's waiver of his trial rights cannot be given effect unless it is 'knowing' and
'intelligent'v.l'" In other words, before the Supreme Court will accept as valid an alleged
waiver of a trial right, all the requirements of Johnson v Zerbst194 must be satisfied. Mere
consent will not do. For other constitutional rights, such as the right to privacy, consent will,
in fact, do - consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment.
It follows that despite Johnson v Zerbst, the Supreme Court applies different requirements
for waiver of trial rights as opposed to other constitutional rights. Therefore, any analogies
drawn between trial rights and non-trial rights should be done with the utmost
. . 195CIrcumspect! on.
2 3 CANADA: SECTION 24(2) OF THE CHARTER
"Section 24(2) of the Charter has rejected extreme answers. No longer is all evidence
admissible, regardless of the means by which it was obtained. Nor, on the other hand, is
all improperly obtained evidence inadmissible".196
2 3 1 INTRODUCTION
Prior to enactment of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the admissibility of
evidence was governed by the common law. This meant, generally, that if evidence was
relevant, it was admissible. The Charter did not wholly change this position - admissibility of
evidence is still determined by its relevance, except when "evidence was obtained in a
manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms" guaranteed by the Charter. The
admissibility of evidence obtained in such a manner must be decided in accordance with s
24(2) of the Charter. Unconstitutionally obtained evidence must, however, still be relevant to
be admissible. 197
192 See §§ 3 222 & 42222 infra.
193 Illinois v Rodriguez 497 US 177 (1990) 183. Emphasis added.
194 Supra.
1951t is submitted that the US Supreme Court draws such analogies too easily. See n 192 supra & § 3 2 infra.
196 R v Collins (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC) § 16, quoting Seaton JA in R v Collins (1983) 5 CCC (3d) 141 (BC
CA) 149.
197 In South Africa the position is the same. See §§ 4 1 1; 4 2 1 & 5 5 2 infra.
39
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OW>TERTwo EXCLUSION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
In companson to the United States, the application of the discretionary approach in
Canada takes into account, as considerations, many of the exceptions created by the US
Supreme Court. For instance, a Canadian court may consider exigent circumstances such as
the eminent destruction of evidence when determining whether a warrantless police entry into
a home should render the resulting evidence inadmissible. Similarly, although the focus
differs somewhat, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine determines whether evidence is
tainted by illegal police conduct.
It was mentioned above that the text of s 24(2) served as a model for the wording of s
35(5) of the Constitution of South Africa. It is suggested that the application ofs 24(2) by the
Canadian Supreme Court could be helpful to South African courts in the interpretation of s
35(5). One should however be watchful not to blindly follow the Canadian interpretation.
Rather, learn from the difficulties encountered by the Canadian courts and apply s 35(5) in a
South African context - the discretion is flexible enough.
2311 The text
"Where, in proceedings under subsection (I), a court concludes that evidence was
obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by this
Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to all the
circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute't.v"
In their interpretation, courts generally substitute "would" in the English text with the less
onerous "could". This interpretation is more in accordance with the French version of s 24(2),
which is the preferred of the two versions, because it better protects the right to a fair trial. 199
2312 The theory
Generally, it is understood that courts have a discretion to exclude unlawfully obtained
evidence. However, once a court concludes that admission of the impugned evidence could
bring the administration of justice into disrepute/oo it has no choice but to exclude it.201 The
198 Emphasis added.
199 R v Collins supra § 43.
200 See § 2 3 1 1 supra.
201 Similarly in South Africa.
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discretion lies therefore only in the determination of whether, "having regard to all
circumstances", the administration of justice could be brought into disrepute.
If one compares the above to the exclusionary rule of the United States, this much is
evident - in principle at least: The starting point of the approach followed by each of these
countries is the direct opposite of the other. Courts in the United States exclude unlawfully
obtained evidence regardless of its effect on the administration of justice. Generally, the US
Supreme Court would only consider exceptions to the rule once its primary purpose
(deterrence) has been accomplished and the effect of exclusion on the administration of
justice could be negative.
2 3 2 THE PRACTICE: R V COLLINS
In R v Collins,202 the Supreme Court reduced the discretion to three questions, the answers
to which determine the admissibility of evidence.
2321 Trial fairness
If the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence results in an unfair trial it is
excluded. In these cases, the seriousness of the violation and the possible negative effect of
exclusion on the administration of justice are rarely taken into account.i'" The question
whether unlawfully obtained evidence detract from the fairness of the trial is usually
concerned with the distinction between conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence. This
distinction is not based on the distinction between testimonial communications and real
evidence, as is the case in the United States204 and South Africa. Rather, Canadian courts
distinguish between situations where the accused was conscripted to provide the evidence
against himself, whether real or a testimonial, and situations where evidence was obtained
without cajoling the accused into providing it.
The nature of the right infringed upon is also important in this inquiry, since violations of
certain rights would most certainly detract from the fairness of the trial, whereas other rights
very rarely have anything to do with ensuring a fair trial. It is submitted however, that this
202 (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC).
203 R v Stillman (1997) 1 SCR 607 (SCC) § 72.
204 See n 101 supra and the text accompanying it.
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distinction is neglected in favour of the distinction between conscriptive and non-conscriptive
evidence - a trend that South African courts must not follow.
23211 Conscriptive evidence
Any evidence that could not have been obtained without the unconstitutional participation
of the accused is conscriptive evidence.i'" Subject to rare exceptions, conscriptive evidence is
considered to have an adverse effect on the fairness of the trial and must be excluded.i'" Any
kind ·of evidence can be conscripted from the accused - testimonial communications,
derivative (real) evidence'" and even bodily samples.i'" All that has to be shown for
evidence to be deemed conscriptive is that it was obtained without the necessary legal
authority and the involuntary participation of the accused.209
In R v Burlingham210 the accused was unconstitutionally compelled to reveal the
whereabouts of the murder weapon (a gun) at the bottom of a frozen lake. Supreme Court
applied the distinction between conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence to the derivative
(real) evidence that resulted from this compelled pointing out by the accused. The court came
to the conclusion that the accused was unconstitutionally conscripted to incriminate himself
by revealing the whereabouts of the gun. Consequently, not only the evidence of the pointing
out, but also the gun itself, was ruled inadmissible for being in violation of the principle
against self-incrimination. The rationale behind this ruling was that the prosecution should
not be put in a better position than it would have been had the government shouldered the
entire load of proving the accused's guilt.211
In R v Stillman212 the Supreme Court went further and applied the distinction to bodily
samples taken from a murder suspect. The bodily samples in question were obtained from the
accused with neither his consent nor any legal authority":' and while he was in police
custody. The court emphasised that what is known as real evidence does not automatically
205 Bradley (Ed) Criminal Procedure: A Worldwide Study (1999) 64.
206 R v Cook (1998) 2 SCR 597 (SCC).
207 R v Burlingham (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC). Testimonial communications, which include pointings out,
often leads to real evidence, such as the gun in Burlingham.
208 R v Stillman supra; R v Legere (1988) 89 NBR (2d) 361 (CA).
209 R v Stillman supra § 76.
210 (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC).
2Il See, in contrast, the text accompanying n 137 supra.
212 (1997) 1 SCR 607 (SCC).
213 The court ruled that the common law did not authorise the seizures of the bodily samples as an "incident" of
the arrest, which would have made it lawful. And at the time of the seizures no statutory authority existed for the
police's actions.
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fall into the "non-conscriptive" category. The following passage clearly illustrates the court's
reasomng:
"There is on occasion a misconception that 'real' evidence, referring to anything which is
tangible and exists as an independent entity, is always admissible. It is for this reason that
blood, hair samples or the identity of the accused are often readily, yet incorrectly,
classified as 'real evidence existing independently of the Charter breach'. It is true that
all of these examples 'exist' quite independently of a Charter breach. Yet, it is key to their
classification that they do not necessarily exist in a useable form. For example, in the
absence ofa valid statutory authority or the accused's consent to take bodily samples, the
independent existence of the bodily evidence is of no use to the prosecution since there is
no lawful means of obtaining it.214
Cory J, for the majority, continued:
"Evidence will be conscriptive when an accused, in violation of his Charter rights, is
compelled to incriminate himself at the behest of the state by means of a statement, the
use of the body or the production of bodily samples ... It is the compelled statements or
the conscripted use of bodily substances obtained in violation of Charter rights which
may render a trial unfair ... When the rule against self-incrimination first emerged, there
was a very real concern that a confession sometimes obtained by torture or threats could
well be unreliable ... It is only in recent times that the compelled use of the body of the
accused has been considered. Yet, it cannot be forgotten that in Collins, supra, Lamer J.
astutely observed that 'the situation is very different with respect to cases where, after a
violation of the Charter, the accused is conscripted against himself through a confession
or other evidence emanatingfrom him".2J5
It is evident that the Canadian Supreme Court adheres to a wider notion of self-
incrimination than in the United States, or South Africa.i'" But, as indicated in § 3 22 below,
the US Supreme Court has applied the idea of self-incrimination to the Fourth Amendment
through various analogies with the Fifth Amendment. This should be avoided in South
Africa.
Occasionally, the behaviour of the accused also has an influence upon the admissibility of
conscriptive evidence. On rare occasions, conscriptive evidence has been admitted when the
214 R v Stillman supra § 76. Emphasis added.
215 R v Stillman supra §§ 80-82, citing R v Collins supra § 37. Emphasis added.
216 Hence the Supreme Court's use of the term "principle against self-incrimination" rather than "privilege
against self-incrimination".
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accused was abusive.i!" too intoxicated to exercise the right to counsel' " or would inevitably
have confessed even ifprovided with warnings as to the right to counsel.i'"
23212 Non-conscriptive evidence
It follows that non-conscriptive evidence is evidence, testimonial or real, that is obtainable
without the unconstitutional assistance of the accused. Moreover, according to R v
Stillman,220 the evidence in question has to exist
"independently of the Charter breach in a form useable by the state ... Therefore, it may
be more accurate to describe evidence found without any participation of the accused ...
simply as non-conscriptive evidence; its status as 'real' evidence, simpliciter, is
irrelevant to the s. 24(2) inquiry".221
Non-conscriptive evidence is generally considered to have no negative effect on the
fairness of the trial.222 Therefore, when the challenged evidence is classified as non-
conscriptive, the inquiry turns to the seriousness of the Charter violation and possible adverse
effects that the exclusion of the evidence could have on the repute of the administration of
justice.
R v Evani23 is a good example of a case where, despite a Charter violation, evidence was
classified as "non-conscriptive". Police officers arbitrarily knocked on the door of the
accused's home. When the accused opened the door, the police smelled dagga and proceeded
to search the home. The police seized 41 plants and other drug paraphernalia. Clearly the
evidence seized was real in nature and existed independently of the violation, in a form
useable by the prosecution, despite the illegal search. When it was established that the
discovery of the evidence happened without the participation of the accused, the evidence
was classified as "non-conscriptive". As a result, its admission would not have resulted in an
unfair trial. The court then proceeded to consider the seriousness of the violation and the
effect of exclusion on the repute of the administration of justice.
217 R v Tremblay (1987) 60 CR (3d) 59 (SCC).
218 R vMohl (1989) 69 CR (3d) 399 (SCC).
219 R v Harper supra. The accused spontaneously declared "I'm the guy you want". See also Colorado v
Connelly 479 US 157 (1986).
220 Supra.
221 R v Stillman supra § 77.
222 Similarly, in South Africa real evidence is seldom considered to have a negative effect on the fairness of the
trial. See § 4 2 1 2 infra.
223 (1996) 1 SCR 8 (SCC).
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However, the problem with this approach is that the analysis focuses too much on the fact
that evidence must be in a form useable by the state, and too little on whether it is capable of
being discovered without the assistance of the accused. A statement, or pointing out, is the
only kind of evidence that truly cannot be obtained without the accused's cooperation. Even
in his ruling for the majority in Stillman, Cory J indicated that the Canadian Supreme Court
still heavily relies on the "independent existence" requirement to support the distinction
between conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence, with no mention that it must exist in a
usable form:
"[T]he situation is very different with respect to cases where, after a violation of the
Charter, the accused is conscripted against himself through a confession or other
evidence emanating from him. The use of such evidence would render the trial unfair, for
it did not exist prior to the violation".224
Evidence that exist independent of the violation, like bodily samples, can be made into a
form useable by the state. Especially with the changes in the Canadian criminal code effected
since Stillman that now allow for the taking of DNA samples under certain circumstances.
Like with searches or seizures of any other place or kind of evidence, DNA samples may be
taken after a judicial officer has been satisfied that reasonable and probable grounds exist and
that the procedure is not excessively intrusive. There is an even greater likeness between the
seizure of bodily samples and other searches and seizures. In the words of the Canadian
Supreme Court:
"The taking of the dental impressions, hair samples and buccal swabs from the accused
also contravened the appellant's [the accused] s. 7 Charter right to security of the person.
The taking of the bodily samples was highly intrusive. It violated the sanctity of the body
which is essential to the maintenance of human dignity. It was the ultimate invasion of
the appellant's privacy".225
Therefore, like with all other cases involving invasions of privacy, the admissibility of
unconstitutionally seized bodily samples should not tum on the question of self-incrimination
or even faimess.226 Rather, the focus should be on the seriousness of the violation and the
effect that exclusion would have on the repute of the administration of justice.227
224 R v Stillman supra § 82, quoting R v Collins supra § 37.
225 R v Stillman supra § 51.
226 Assuming that the Supreme Court only excludes evidence on the basis of fairness if it determines that the
evidence in question was conscripted from the accused.
227 But surely, a particularly serious violation could also render the trial unfair?
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2 3 2 2 Seriousness of the Charter violation
When a court is satisfied that admission of the impugned evidence would not render the
trial unfair, the approach towards the question of admissibility changes dramatically.
Compared to the virtually automatic exclusion of conscriptive evidence.i'" exclusion of non-
conscriptive evidence is far from automatic. The enquiry then proceeds to determining the
seriousness of the Charter violation.
In determining the seriousness of the violation, courts will take into account whether
police violated the Charter intentionally or by mistake. A contention that police could have
obtained the evidence without violating the Charter is mostly considered an aggravation of
the violation. It follows that the inevitable discovery rule and the independent source doctrine
as applied in the United States is not applicable to the same extent when the seriousness of
the violation is considered in Canadian courtS.229 Serious violations of the Charter, warranting
exclusion, have been found in cases when drugs were seized by a chokehold to prevent them
from being swallowed=" and when drugs were seized after an unconstitutional and intrusive
rectal search.231
23221 Goodfaith
The good faith of an officer is taken into account when the seriousness of the violation is
determined. Good faith is more widely defined than in the United States and includes reliance
upon legislation, warrants, policy directives, prior cases, legal advice and accepted practices
later found to be unconstitutional or defective.232 Moreover, violations of Charter rights
occurring due to exigent circumstances are not considered serious enough to warrant
exclusion, much like in the US. For instance, the Supreme Court has admitted drugs seized
228 Bradley Criminal Procedure 65; Gorham "Eight Plus Twenty-Four Two Equals Zero-Point-Five" 2003 CR
(Canada) 258.
229 See § 2 2 2 4 3 supra.
230 R v Collins supra.
231 R v Greffe (1990) 55 CCC (3d) 161 (SCC). A rectal search was performed on the accused after he was
arrested for an outstanding traffic violation.
232 R v Sieben (1987) 32 CCC (3d) 574 (SCC); R v Hamill (1987) 33 CCC (3d) 110 (SCC); R v Duarte (1990)
53 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC); R v Wong (1990) 60 CCC (3d) 460 (SCC); R v Thomson (1990) 59 CCC (3d) 225 (SCC);
R v Generoux (1992) 70 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC); R v Grant (1993) 84 CCC (3d) 173 (SCC). In other words, systemic
deterrence of Charter violations is not such a priority as in the US and South Africa.
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after a warrantless entry by police officers into a house in order to prevent the drugs from
being destroyed.r"
2323 The effect of exclusion
Although this is not done when fairness of the trial is at stake, courts take into account the
effect that excluding the evidence could have on the repute of the administration of justice.
Considerations such as the seriousness of the criminal charge, the importance of the
challenged evidence to the prosecution's case and the reactions of reasonable people are
taken into account.
Drug offences, for example, are considered especially serious and the drugs important to
the prosecution's case.234 These considerations are weighed up against the alleged illegal
methods employed by police in securing evidence against the accused. The influence that
these considerations have on the admissibility of evidence is illustrated by two cases dealing
with serious traffic accidents. In R v Dersch,235 an illegally seized blood sample was excluded
because other evidence remained to charge the accused. In R v Colarussoi'" however, an
illegally seized blood sample was admitted because it was essential to the prosecution's case.
The distinction seems artificial.
The fact that the community has a higher interest in punishing crimes of a serious nature
as opposed to minor offences is indeed a valid consideration. However, the coin has two
sides. Equally important and often overlooked is the fact that the seriousness of the criminal
charges also raises the stakes for the accused, who upon conviction faces serious
consequences. For the accused it is equally important not to be convicted upon illegally
obtained evidence if the crime charged is serious. To contend that serious Charter violations
are downplayed by the seriousness of the crime is a lopsided portrayal of the considerations
at stake. Violations of the accused's rights should not be diluted by the contention that serious
crimes need to be punished without at least some consideration for the consequences faced by
the accused.
233 R v Silveria (1995) 97 CCC (3d) 450 (SCC). The police did however apply for a search warrant once the
exigency had passed.
234 Bradley Criminal Procedure 65.
235 (1993) 85 CCC (3d) 1 (SCC).
236 (1994) 87 CCC (3d) 193 (SCC).
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However, more must be said. While it is true that the consequences for the accused are
more serious upon conviction of a serious crime, the Supreme Court in R v Collini37 was
more concerned with repute on a long-term basis:
"[E]ven though the inquiry under s 24(2) will necessarily focus on the specific
prosecution, it is the long-term consequences of regular admission or exclusion of this
type of evidence on the repute of the administration of justice which must be
considered".238
This implies that the consequences for the accused are only as a matter of necessity
considered, the real issue being the long-term consequences for the administration of justice.
In the event of contrasting interests, the Supreme Court would favour the latter, unless an
unfair trial would result.239 However, one can be sure that an accused's motivation for
applying for exclusion is based squarely on their interest in the former.
2 3 3 FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
The Supreme Court favours a wider definition of tainted fruit than in the US, with the
focus on the temporal connection rather than the causal one_240If, for instance, drugs were
found during a legal search, but while the accused was denied access to counsel, the drugs
would be tainted evidence. Whether it would be excluded depends on the discretion of the
court.
The focus on a temporal instead of causal link, when defining fruit of a poisonous tree,
provides for exclusion of evidence that is not causally linked to a particular violation, but
obtained in an investigation that was marred by a serious violation.i'" Therefore, when
deciding whether specific evidence is tainted by illegality, courts look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the investigation and no serious misconduct by the police will be
237 Supra.
238 R v Collins supra § 32.
239 R v Collins supra § 39. See also S v Madiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D). The court overlooked the seriousness of
the consequences for the accused when it upheld an illegal search because the importance of achieving the
object of the search (the criminal charge was serious) outweighed the violation of their rights. However, in view
of all the considerations favouring admission of the impugned evidence, it is not contended that the court's
judgment would have been different had the consequences of conviction been taken into account. The judgment
merely indicates that the consequences of conviction for the accused are not always taken into account.
240 See § 2 2 2 4 3 supra.
241 R v Brydges (1990) 46 CRR 236 (SCC); R v Voisine (1994) 20 CRR 258 (NB CA).
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disregarded. For example, fingerprints taken after an unlawful arrest will be excluded as
being unconstitutionally conscripted from the accused.242
234 THERESULT
The Canadian Supreme Court has reduced its discretion to a limited set of rules that leave
little room for any other considerations, severely limiting the scope of the discretion.
Especially when evidence was conscripted from the accused, has the discretion been turned
into a virtually absolute exclusionary rule, when a balancing of interests would otherwise
occur. Self-incrimination has a wider meaning than in the United States or South Africa and
includes not just testimonial communications, but all evidence compelled from the
accused_243Non-conscripted evidence would only be excluded as a result of a violation that is
particularly serious compared to the criminal charge.
24 SUMMARY
In the United States, unconstitutionally obtained evidence is excluded in criminal cases,
unless an accepted exception exists. This is done in order to satisfy the primary rationale of
the strict exclusionary sanction, namely deterrence of official misconduct. Only when
deterrence has been achieved to a satisfactory level does the Supreme Court entertain other
considerations; or when the specific unconstitutional behaviour is not worth deterring, such
as good faith behaviour on the part of police officers.
The Canadian position is common law oriented: Exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained
evidence is not automatic. Only when a court determines that admission of the impugned
evidence could (or would) bring the administration of justice into disrepute must the evidence
be excluded. The discretion to exclude is not applied uniformly, depending on whether or not
evidence has been conscripted from the accused. However, in exercising its discretion a court
may take into account certain considerations similar to the exceptions of the US Supreme
Court, such as good faith or the seriousness of the offence.
242 R v Feeney (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC). See § 2 3 2 I I supra.
243 R v Stillman supra. See §§ 232 1 1 & 2 3 2 I 2 supra.
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3 1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter Two illustrates the different views taken by the Supreme Courts of the United
States and Canada regarding the admission of improperly obtained evidence. Yet, despite the
seemingly opposing viewpoints, both countries achieve satisfactory and rather similar results.
This is the result of both Supreme Courts' tempering of the harshness of the exclusionary and
the inclusionary systems in their unadulterated forms. Be it as exceptions to the rule, or as a
discretionary exercise, both systems attempt to achieve a golden mean.
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However, it is when the admission of previously excluded evidence for the limited
purpose of impeaching the accused is at issue that the different principles underlying the two
systems assert themselves the strongest. The result is two contrary positions - one in favour
of and the other against impeachment by means of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The
US's primary concern is the deterrence of official misconduct, moderated by the need for
crime control. But the primary concern in Canada is trial fairness, in other words protecting
the rights of the accused and especially the accused's right not to incriminate himself.244
In this chapter, these differences are explored. At first glance, the deterrence rationale,
toned down by crime control, seems to be just another way of ensuring trial fairness; hence
the similar results where exclusion is concerned. Evidently, this similarity disappears when
the issue is no longer admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence in the case in chief,
but the use of that evidence for the limited purpose of impeachment.
This raises the question whether it would make a difference if the (unconstitutional)
evidence had previously been excluded from the prosecution's case in chief. It becomes clear
that even in situations where unconstitutionally obtained evidence had not previously been
excluded, but only tendered for impeachment, the difference in position still exists_245
3 2 THE UNITED STATES
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that
not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be
used at all". 246
3 2 1 WHAT LIES BENEATH?
3 2 1 1 Deterrence first ... but only if the price is right
As pointed out above, the underlying principle of the exclusionary rules247 in the United
States is the deterrence of official misconduct.i'" This is particularly clear in cases where the
244 See §§ 23 2 1 1 supra; 4 2 2 2 3 & 42224 infra.
245 R v Cook (1998) 2 SCR 597 (SCC). See § 3 3 2 3 infra.
246 Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States 251 US 385 (1920) 392. Emphasis added. See also Mapp v Ohio 367
US 643 (1961) 648.
247 Although reference is often made to the exclusionary rule, the reality is that for each constitutional right
concerned a separate rule was developed, hence the use of the plural. See generally ch 2 supra.
248 See generally §§ 2 2 & 3 I supra.
51
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OW>TER THREE IMPEACHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
Supreme Court has to consider exceptions to the "constitutionally required,,249 exclusionary
rules. In these cases, the court's approach focuses almost entirely on the deterrent function of
the exclusionary sanction and the lengths to which the court would go towards preventing
official misconduct.
When, in the opinion of the Supreme Court, the exclusionary rule has sufficiently served
its preventative purpose, the cost of its use becomes too high. This explains the Supreme
Court's willingness to allow the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment
of the accused, even when it would be, or has been, excluded from the case in chief. The
Supreme Court justifies this position with a cost-benefit analysis: The "cost" of allowing
factually guilty persons to remain in society being higher than the benefit of the additional
deterrence resulting from excluding evidence that is tendered for a limited purpose only, and
not as part of the case in chief.25o
However, when constitutional rights are at odds with other considerations important to a
particular community, the solution should not be a simple balancing of interests, or cost-
benefit analysis. Constitutional rights should be upheld above all else.25J Only in
circumstances where constitutional rights are in conflict with other constitutional rights may
a balance of some sort be attempted_252 Being costly to society in a specific instance should
not be an acceptable reason to discard a constitutional right. Not even when one is of the
opinion that a constitutional right had adequately served its purpose, should there be any
interference.
The tendency to weigh constitutional dictates against community benefit leaves the
accused in an unenviable position. As the Oregon Supreme Court in State v Hasi53 pointed
out, the police and therefore the prosecution "had nothing to lose and something to gain,,254
from infringing the rights of the accused. This is especially true in confession cases, as
illustrated by Harris v New York-55 and Hass. In most cases, if the accused were properly
informed of his privilege and had proper access to counsel, no confession or statement would
result and be available to discredit the accused during cross-examination. But infringing these
rights gives the prosecution the opportunity to cross-examine and discredit the accused with
249 Mapp v Ohio supra 648.
250 See § 2 2 2 3 supra.
251 See genereally the minority opinion in Mapp v Ohio supra.
252 See, for example, S v Aimes 1998 (1) SACR 343 (C). This case is discussed in § 4 2 3 supra.
253267 Or 489 (1973).
254 State v Hass 267 Or 489 (1973) 493. This ruling was overturned by the US Supreme Court in Oregon v Hass
420 US 714 (1975). However, the minority in Oregon v Hass supra still adhered to this reasoning.
255401 US 222 (1971).
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evidence that would otherwise not have existed. It may not be incrimination of the accused,
but it is something. And in a system where the case of the accused often depends on his
version of the facts being as believable as that of the prosecution, the prosecution might
secure a conviction by proving the accused is a liar without ever proving that the accused is
in fact guilty. Moreover, even the most carefully instructed jury would find it difficult to
distinguish and effectively apply the difference between proof of guilt and proof of
dishonesty.F" There is a difference, is there not?
322 THE FOURTH AMENDMENT OR FIFTH AMENDMENT PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION: SHOULD IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE WHICH RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED?
3221 Introduction: Real evidence compared to testimonial communications
It is clear that despite the US Supreme Court drawing analogies between the two
Amendments when excluding evidence, the right to privacy and the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination are inherently different in nature_257Moreover, they are two
separate constitutional rights. And each has their own particular exclusionary sanction. One
must bear in mind these differences when attempting to deviate from either exclusionary rule
for purposes of impeachment.
An important difference between the Fourth Amendment and the Fifth Amendment'Y is in
the nature of evidence that a violation of either would normally produce. Although the Fourth
Amendment itself does not only protect corporeal things, but all aspects of the right to
privacy, a violation of the Fourth Amendment often results in the discovery of real evidence.
In contradistinction, a violation of the Fifth Amendment leads to the discovery of
information, which in tum mayor may not lead to the discovery of real evidence.
The important difference between real evidence and testimonial communications relates to
the manner in which they do, or can, become available to the prosecution. Even more
important is their connection to the accused.
By its nature, real evidence is some object used during the commission of a crime or
resulting from the crime. The existence of real evidence as evidence therefore relates directly
to the commission of the crime. The existence of the object before the crime is not relevant
256 See § 3 3 1 3 & n 282 infra.
257 Dickerson v United States 530 US 428 (2000) 44 I.
258 Throughout this work, reference to the 5th Amendment is a reference to only the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination, unless otherwise indicated or obvious from the context that something else is meant.
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here, only its existence as evidence after the crime. Real evidence exists independently of its
creator. It is therefore, objectively speaking at least, possible for a third party to discover the
already existing evidence and make a connection to the guilty party. Importantly, this can be
done without the cooperation of the guilty party and even without his knowledge.F" The
existence of real evidence is not the result of a violation of the accused's rights, but of the
crime being committed. This has implications for its "trustworthiness" and reliability.i'" The
"objective reliability" of real evidence is also accepted in South Africa, which means that
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence is more readily admitted than similarly obtained
testimonial communications.i'"
However, the Fourth Amendment restricts the means employed in the discovery of the
evidence and its association to the accused. When a violation of the Fourth Amendment
occurs, the resulting evidence would most likely be excluded from the prosecution's case,
unless an acceptable exception comes to the prosecution's rescue. It is important to bear in
mind that a violation of the accused's Fourth Amendment rights does not create the real
evidence, but only causes its discovery and the prosecution's knowledge of its existence. And
only once the prosecution knows of its existence can they attempt to connect it to the
accused.
When the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is violated, the accused creates
the evidence as a direct result of the violation, not the commission of the crime. Although the
information resulting from the violation existed prior to the violation, it was not separate
from the accused - hence neither subject to discovery by third parties nor useable as
evidence. Therefore, the information only becomes evidence once the violation takes place.
Once the accused makes a statement, whether the result of undue pressure or not, the
connection between the evidence and the accused is evident. There is no need to prove a link
between the evidence and the accused, as is often necessary with real evidence. By making a
statement, the accused not only provides the prosecution with the evidence, but also connects
himself to whatever evidence he provides.
A comparison between the relevant sections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments reveals
that while the Fourth Amendment provides for reasonable restrictions upon the right to
privacy, the Fifth Amendment does not provide for similar restrictions upon the privilege. In
259 See § 2 3 2 1 1 supra.
260 See §§ 1 2 supra & 4 2 2 2 2 infra.
261 S V M 2003 (1) SA 341 (SCA) 362A. See also Pillay v S 2004 (2) BCLR 158 (SCA); S v Naidoo 1998 (1) All
SA 189 (D).
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addition, the Fourth protects the right to privacy, but does not refer to the legality of its use
during criminal proceedings against the accused. As explained earlier,262 this necessitated the
Supreme Court's interpretation that the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth
Amendment is not permitted either.263 The Fifth Amendment on the other hand is
unambiguous: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself'. Consequently, there can be no doubt that the use of evidence obtained from the
accused in violation of his privilege is in itself a violation of the Constitution. This relates to
the fact that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is a trial right that "enhance[s]
the reliability of the truth-determining process",264 while the right to privacy is not.265
3222 Trial rights and non-trial rights
There is another important difference. The Fourth Amendment's protection of privacy
rights concern government overreaching in general and is not specifically aimed at regulating
the criminal trial. Instead,
"evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded from a criminal trial
not as a personal right of the criminal defendant but rather as a remedy for a wrong that
is fully accomplished at the time the evidence is obtained'Y'"
As held in United States v Havenst'" evidence secured III violation of the Fourth
Amendment can be introduced for impeachment purposes, since its introduction brings about
no independent constitutional harm, subject to the condition that its introduction does not
prejudice the efficacy of the exclusionary rule in deterring future violations of the Fourth
Amendment. 268
The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination on the other hand, is
concerned expressly with criminal procedure; it is a trial right of the accused and non-
adherence to it directly affects the fairness of the trial. Moreover, exclusion of evidence
obtained contrary to the dictates of the privilege is not intended as a remedy for a wrong that
262 See ch 2 supra.
263 Weeks v United States 232 US 383 (1914); Agnello v United States 269 US 20 (1925); Mapp v Ohio supra.
264 Dressler Understanding Criminal Procedure 3ed (2002) 63.
265 Tehan v United States ex rei Shott 382 US 406 (1966).
266 Stevens J for the minority in Michigan v Harvey 494 US 344 (1990) 361, referring to Stone v Powell 428 US
465 (1976) 486; United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974) 348.
267446 US 620 (1980). See § 3 2 3 7 infra.
268 United States v Havens 446 US 620 (1980) 627-628.
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is "fully accomplished at the time the evidence is obtained".269 Rather, exclusion is integral to
the privilege in that it prevents the accused from being made a witness against himself in
violation of the Fifth Amendment. It is not the method employed in procuring the evidence,
but the use of the evidence at trial that constitutes the violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The aim of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is to protect the accused
from being "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'. Unquestionably,
the "criminal case" referred to by the Fifth Amendment includes both the prosecution's case
in chief and any attempts by the prosecution to impeach the accused. Therefore, the Fifth
Amendment's ban on compelling the accused to be a "witness against himself' applies no
less to impeachment than incrimination.
3 2 3 IT SHOULD BUT IT DOES NOT
3 2 3 1 Introduction
Many significant differences exist between Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment
cases. Therefore, no attempt to draw an analogy between Fourth and Fifth Amendment cases
should be made without due consideration of the purpose of each Amendment. In any event,
no analogy should be attempted if the facts of a case do not specifically lend themselves to
such an analogy being drawn.
3232 Agnello v United States
It is evident from Agnello v United Statei70 that the Supreme Court considered evidence
of illegal searches and seizures (in other words, violations of the Fourth Amendment) as
synonymous to compelling the accused to be a witness against himself, in other words, a
violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against compelled self-incrimination. It seems
that at that stage in the development of the exclusionary rule(s) there was no need for a
"judicially implied,,27! exclusionary rule - the Supreme Court simply applied the prohibition
in the Fifth Amendment. While in later rulings272 when the Supreme Court forged the (Fourth
Amendment) exclusionary rule as a separate sanction to enforce the Fourth Amendment the
269 See n 266 supra and the text accompanying it.
270269 US 20 (1925).
271 Mapp v Ohio supra 648.
272 Mapp v Ohio supra. See § 2 2 2 2 supra.
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Supreme Court made numerous analogies to the Fifth Amendment's prohibition, this was not
the Agnello court's intention. In Agnello, the Fifth Amendment was not the basis for an
analogy with which to achieve the desired result. It was the "exclusionary rule" protecting the
Fourth Amendment interests of the accused. According to Butler J,
"it [was] well settled that, when properly invoked, the Fifth Amendment protects every
person from incrimination by the use of evidence obtained through search or seizure
made in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment't.Y'
Compared to the Supreme Court's later position that what is "tantamount to coerced
testimony by way of unconstitutional seizure of goods, papers, effects, documents, etc,,274
should be protected by a sanction similar to the prohibition in the Fifth Amendment, it is
clear that analogies were not what the Agnello court had in mind. However, the Agnello court
accepted the notion that once evidence had been excluded from the case in chief, it may still
be admitted for another (limited) purpose such as impeachment.
3233 Walder v United States
In Walder v United Statei75 the accused's attempts at proving his good name over and
above merely denying his guilt on the charges against him ultimately proved very
counterproductive. In Walder, the accused was indicted for the purchase and possession of
heroin. However, when his motion to suppress the use of the illegally seized narcotics
succeeded, the government dismissed the prosecution. Two years later, he was again indicted
for a narcotics violation completely unrelated to the first one. During cross-examination, he
denied that law enforcement officers had seized narcotics from his home two years earlier.
He also claimed that he had never dealt in or possessed any narcotics_276
By not just denying his guilt, but by making the sweeping claim that he had never dealt in
or possessed narcotics, he opened the door to the prosecution to introduce evidence excluded
in the prior narcotics charge against him.277 The court held that any general denial or
273 Agnello v United States supra 33-34, citing the following cases: Boyd v United States 116 US 616 (1886)
630; Weeks v United States supra 398; Silverthorne Lumber Co v United States supra 391, 392; Gouled v
United States 255 US 298 (1921) 306; Amos v United States 255 US 313 (1921) 316.
274 Mapp v Ohio supra 656.
275347 US 62 (1954).
276 Walder v United States 347 US 62 (1954) 65.
277 It is submitted that South African courts should take into consideration such sweeping denials when
exercising their discretion whether or not to allow impeachment of the accused's credibility. See ch 5 infra. See
also R v Solomons 1959 (2) 352 (A).
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statement that goes beyond a denial of the elements of the cnme charged would not be
protected by the exclusionary rule of Weeks v United States.278 Statements relating to
collateral matters could therefore be impeached. The Supreme Court however carefully
distinguished the situation where the accused's testimony was a denial of matters directly
related to the offence. In such cases, the accused had to be able to meet the accusations
against him without any outside influences on his decision to do so or not, including
confrontation with previously excluded evidence:
"[T[he constitution guarantees a defendant the fullest opportunity to meet the accusation
against him. He must be free to deny all the elements of the case against him without
thereby giving leave to the Government to introduce by way of rebuttal evidence illegally
secured by it, and therefore not available for its case in chier,.279
Ironically, this pre-Miranda case became the basis for the majority decision Harris v New
York,280 which securely embedded the practice of impeachment by means of previously
excluded evidence in the American criminal justice system.
3234 Harris v New York
In Harris the accused was on trial for dealing in heroin. After his arrest, the police
questioned him, but neglected to inform him of his (Miranda) right to appointed counsel.
This omission rendered the statements made by the accused during this interrogation
inadmissible at trial.281
However, the accused took the stand and testified to his innocence. The prosecution then
introduced the prior inconsistent (and inadmissible) statements in order to impeach the
credibility of the accused. The prosecution conceded that these statements were inadmissible
as proof of guilt. However, the prosecution's aim was not to prove the guilt of the accused,
278232 US 383 (1914).
279 Walder v United States supra 65
280 Supra.
281 The discussion that follows is based on the assumption that the Miranda ruling is a constitutional ruling and
intends to show the contradiction in maintaining this notion while at the same time maintaining the holding in
Harris that a different (but also constitutional) standard applies to the impeachment process. One must not
forget that the impeachment process during cross-examination is just as much part of a criminal trial as the case
in chief. So, presumably the privilege against self-incrimination is just as applicable to this part of the criminal
trial when it states that "[n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself'.
See also § 3 2 3 8 infra.
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but rather to attack his credibility. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider these prior
inconsistent statements only on the question of credibility and not as evidence of guilt.282
The Supreme Court made short work of the comments in Miranda v Arizona283 where the
Supreme Court held that uncounseled statements were inadmissible for any purpose.i'"
Burger CJ, writing for a 5-4 majority, explained that even though the statements were
rendered inadmissible under Miranda, the shield provided by Miranda could not be
"perverted into a license to use perjury by way of defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent statements".285 The Supreme Court held that those comments were not
controlling since discussion of the impeachment issue was not necessary in Miranda.
According to Burger CJ, the only requirement for the admissibility of uncounseled prior
statements for impeachment purposes is that its trustworthiness satisfies the legal standard.286
This is ironic in light of the rationale behind the Miranda court's decision to require the
presence of counsel, which was to protect the accused against the inherent coerciveness of
the interrogation process. Furthermore, the presence of counsel, it was held in Miranda,
assures the accuracy of the statements. Therefore, unless the right to counsel was validly
waived, any statement made in the absence of counsel is made under inherently coercive
circumstances.Y' Coerced statements would generally not satisfy the legal standard of
trustworthiness.i'"
Despite the Miranda majority's concerns to the contrary, statements made without the
warnings required by Miranda can still be voluntary.i'" The traditional voluntariness test290
was not replaced by the ruling in Miranda, only added to. For admission into the case in
chief, statements therefore need to be both voluntary and in compliance with the requirements
laid down in Miranda.29J In contradistinction, statements obtained in violation of Miranda
282 It is doubtful that, even with the proper instructions, the jury would be left uninfluenced by these statements
when the issue of guilt is considered. Cleary (Ed) McCormick on Evidence 3 ed (1984) 513. See also Davies
"Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Improperly Obtained" 2002 The Australian U 170 183.
283384 US 436 (1966).
284 Miranda vArizona 384 US 436 (1966) 479.
285 Harris v New York 401 US 222 (1971) 224. See the discussion of Harris and Miranda in a South African
context in S v Makhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97; Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western
Cape 2001 (1) SACR 674 (CPD).
286 Harris v New York supra 224.
287 Miranda v Arizona supra 439.
288 This is implied in Dickerson v United States supra 433, 435.
289 Dickerson v United States supra 444.
290 Bram v United States 168 US 532 (1897); Brown v Mississippi 297 US 278 (1936). See also Davis v United
States 512 US 452 (1994) 464.
291 In practice the Miranda enquiry is supposed to ensure the voluntariness of the statements, therefore a
separate voluntariness enquiry would be unnecessary. See Miranda v Arizona supra.
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would still be admissible for impeachment purposes, provided that they are at least voluntary
under the traditional standard.292
The Supreme Court relied on Walder v United Statei93 as authority for their judgment in
Harris. However, the Walder decision differed from Harris in three important aspects. First,
the Walder case concerned the use of real evidence for impeachment. Therefore, Walder
could only really be authority for Harris by analogy.t" Second, the accused in Walder was
impeached on collateral matters. Third, the Walder decision predates both Miranda v
Arizona295 and Mapp v Ohio,296 which might explain the Supreme Court's reverting to pre-
Miranda voluntariness criteria.297
The Supreme Court in Harris laid down two requirements for inadmissible testimonial
communications to be used for impeaching the accused's credibility, neither of which
safeguards against the admission of untrustworthy evidence. First, the excluded statements
must be inconsistent with the accused's testimony bearing directly on the crimes charged.
Secondly, even though the Miranda requirements were not met, the accused must make no
claim that his prior statements were coerced or involuntary. This signalled a return to the
traditional voluntariness standard, confirming the Miranda bright-line rules as prophylactic,
despite the Supreme Court's insistence that they apply to the states and therefore must be of a
consti tuti onal nature.298
Requiring that the accused's testimony must be inconsistent with the inadmissible
statements implies that the accused must testify himself. Moreover, the testimony must be on
matters bearing directly on the crimes charged. This is the direct opposite of the requirement
in Walder that the accused may not be impeached on matters directly related to the charge,
only on collateral matters_299The minority in Harris shared this opinion.
The second requirement laid down in Harris for admitting prior inconsistent statements to
impeach credibility is that the accused must make no claim that the prior statements were
292 Mincey v Arizona 437 US 385 (1978).
293 Supra.
294 In the light if the US Supreme Court's liberal use of analogies, this is not surprising.
295 Supra.
2% 367 US 643 (1961).
297 This makes the ruling in Miranda stand out like a bright line across the whole notion of determining
voluntariness by considering the totality-of-the-circumstances.
298 Dickerson v United States supra 438 begs the question: "[F]irst and foremost of the factors ... that Miranda
is a constitutional decision is that both Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings
in state courts".
299 The court in Walder had already noted the negative impact on an accused's unfettered right to be a witness in
his own defence that results from impeachment of testimony directly related to the crimes charged. See § 3 2 3 3
supra.
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coerced or involuntary. It is strange that the court should only require that an accused make
no such claim. The Miranda judgment should be understood to mean that any statement made
during custodial interrogation without proper warnings is inherently coercive.30o To require of
the accused to make a claim of involuntariness or coerciveness is to deny exactly what was
recognised inMiranda - the warnings serve to protect the ignorant. Furthermore, no ex post
facto inquiry is to be made of the accused's actual knowledge of his rights.'?' Moreover, this
aspect of the Miranda judgment could not be so easily dismissed, had the court tried. The
reason being that the issue was whether or not such a statement is coerced - a matter that the
Miranda court was required to discuss and therefore binding on all its subsequent rulings.
When deciding whether the excluded evidence is indeed trustworthy enough to be used for
impeaching the testimony of the accused, one must be aware of the inherent differences
between testimonial communications and real evidence.302 Real evidence, as used for
impeaching the testimony of the accused in Walder, would typically have resulted from a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. However, the real evidence existed prior to the violation
and the violation only affects the government's knowledge of the existence thereof.
Consequently, the prosecution is able to demonstrate the link between the impugned evidence
and the accused in court. The trustworthiness of the real evidence is not affected by the
violation of the Fourth Amendment. It follows that generally, real evidence will relatively
easily satisfy the trustworthiness requirement of Burger CJ.303
The situation concerning statements elicited without following the procedures laid down in
Miranda, is different. In contradistinction to real evidence, (involuntary) statements -
whether obtained in actual violation of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, or
in violation of Miranda - often exposes evidence that did not exist before the violation.304
Therefore, the existence of the evidence for use by the prosecution is a direct result of the
violation of the accused's rights. And, since the court in Miranda found the lack of
procedural safeguards to be inherently coercive, it follows that the trustworthiness of the
evidence is jeopardised.
300 Miranda v Arizona supra 458, 467.
301 Miranda v Arizona supra 473. See § 2232 supra.
302 See § 3 2 2 1 supra.
303 Harris v New York supra 224. See also §§ 3 2 2 1 supra & 4 2 2 2 2 infra. In South Africa, real evidence is
similarly considered more trustworthy, or reliable, than testimonial communications. See S v M supra; Mkhize v
S (2000) JOL 6155 (W); Pillay v S supra.
304 See § 3 2 2 1 supra.
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Alternatively, it can be argued that the accused in fact waived his Miranda right to counsel
with regards the impeachment process. By not attempting to show that his statement was
coerced or involuntary, the accused can be understood to waive the rights that he had
regarding the evidence to be led during impeachment. The Supreme Court has since observed
that what will constitute a waiver will depend on the right at issue.305 Therefore, what seems
to be a waiver of rights may be treated as something else or, depending on the right at stake,
the requirements for a valid waiver may be applied less strictly.i'"
However, the Supreme Court has been "unyielding" in its insistence that an accused's
waiver of his trial rights cannot be given effect unless it is done "knowing[ly]" and
"intelligentllyj'V'" The so-called "trial rights" refer to those rights that enhance the reliability
of the truth-determining process, such as the Sixth Amendment right to counsee08 and the
right not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,.309 From this,
it is clear that what may be an acceptable waiver in Fourth Amendment cases, such as
Walder, would not necessarily constitute a valid waiver where the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is concerned. Therefore, It is dangerous to use non-trial right
cases as precedent for cases concerning the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
Interestingly, the minority in Harris also cited Walder as authority for its decision. In
Harris, the accused flatly denied material aspects of the crimes charged. Pivotal to the
minority's finding was that in the Walder case, the accused was impeached on testimony of a
general nature and unrelated to his guilt.310
In Malloy v Hogan.t" the court held that the accused is guaranteed the right "to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will".312 In this case, it
meant that no negative inference could be drawn because of the accused's choice to remain
silent. Likewise, no negative inference should be drawn when the accused does decide to take
305 New York v Hill 528 US 110 (2000) 114.
306 InJohnson v Zerbst 304 US 458 (1938), which was applied in Miranda v Arizona supra, the Supreme Court
required a valid waiver of a constitutional right to be "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege".
307 fllinois v Rodriguez 497 US 177 (1990) 183.
308 Dressler Criminal Procedure 63.
309 The 5th Amendment. Emphasis added.
310 Although the Supreme Court in Walder did not identify the constitutional basis of the accused's freedom to
meet the accusations against him without prejudice, the minority in Harris was of the opinion that the Miranda
court had identified such a basis in the 5th Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
311 378 US I (1964).
312 Malloy v Hogan 378 US I (1964) 8. Emphasis added.
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the stand. When the accused runs the risk that an illegally obtained statement will be
introduced to impeach his direct testimony, the exercise of his will becomes fettered.
The minority in Harris, however, felt that the matter had already been settled in Miranda:
"The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner. .. [S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by
the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial ... These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement".313
The only requirement that could reasonably justify admitting unconstitutionally obtained
evidence would be its trustworthiness. But even then, "[t]he objective of deterring improper
police conduct is only part of the larger objective of safeguarding the integrity of [the]
adversary system,,/14 the "essential mainstay,,315 of that system being the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Another matter was overlooked by the Supreme Court when they applied Walder v United
States316 as precedent in Harris v New York.317 Not only was Walder decided before the
decision in Miranda was handed down, it was also decided before the issue of exclusion in
Fourth Amendment cases was authoritatively dealt with in Mapp v Ohio.318 This puts the
Harris decision, and subsequent Fifth Amendment impeachment cases, in the dubious
position of having to depend on an analogy drawn to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence for
support. More importantly, the analogy to the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was drawn
far back in time to a case that was decided before the issue of exclusion of evidence in Fourth
Amendment cases was conclusively dealt with. One can hardly expect a case like Walder,
which deals with impeachment by means of previously excluded real evidence, to survive
unscathed the decision that changed the law regarding exclusion of unlawful search-and-
seizure evidence. But apparently, it did.
313 Harris v New York supra 230-231; Miranda v Arizona supra 476-477. Emphasis in Harris.
314Harris v New York supra 231.
315Miranda v Arizona supra 460; Michigan v Tucker 417 US 433 (1974) 439, citing Johnson v New Jersey 384
US 719 (1966) 729.
316Supra.
317 Supra.
318Supra. Although, exclusion in federal prosecutions had already been accepted in Weeks v United States
supra, but on the basis of the reasoning in Dickerson v United States supra, exclusion was not yet considered a
constitutional remedy.
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3 2 3 5 Riddell v Rhay
Within a year of its decision In Harris v New York,319 the Supreme Court had the
opportunity to reconsider its position regarding impeachment by means of a prior inconsistent
statement in Riddell v Rhay.320 The majority however, stuck to their guns. The minority based
their criticism of the majority's ruling on the following argument: The contested facts of
some cases, like the one at hand, often lend themselves to no more than two possibilities. In
Riddell, the accused initially told the police that his finger was on the trigger of his gun and in
court he denied having his finger on the trigger. It follows that by discrediting the accused's
testimony in court, only one possibility remains: His finger was on the trigger. Hereby the
content of the prior inconsistent statement, excluded from the case in chief, became known
even when the prosecution was barred from leading evidence about its contents. It would
indeed be tempting for a jury to take into consideration the remaining version - which
became part of the evidence in a way that can only be described as through the "back door" -
as the truth and proof of guilt.321 However, this was the version that had previously been
excluded for being obtained in circumstances described by the majority in Miranda as
"inherently compelling".322 And according to the Supreme Court in Dickerson v United
States/23 "coerced confessions are inherently untrustworthy't.Y" A judge would really have
his work cut out explaining this to the jury.325
3236 Oregon v Bass
Four years after holding that impeachment by means of previously excluded evidence was
not barred by the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule,326 the Supreme Court had
another opportunity to consider the matter in Oregon v Hass.327 However, as the minority
pointed out/28 the facts in Hass presented a different situation from Harris. In Harris, the
319 Supra.
320404 US 974 (1971).
321 Cleary McCormick on Evidence 513. See also Davies "Exclusion of Evidence" The Australian U 183.
322 Miranda v Arizona supra 467.
323 530 US 428 (2000).
324 Dickerson v United States supra 433. See the Miranda minority's use of the term "inherently coercive" in
describing the majority's fmding.
325 See n 282 supra.
326 Harris v New York supra.
327420 US 714 (1975).
328 So did the Supreme Court of Oregon. Of course, had the majority shared this opinion, the Supreme Court
would not have assumed jurisdiction to review the case in the first place.
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warnings required by Miranda v Arizona329 were only partially given, leaving out information
about the right to appointed counsel. In Hass, the warnings were given to the full extent
required by Miranda. However, despite the accused's request to phone an attorney, police
continued their interrogation, ignoring the request. This resulted in the accused giving
inculpatory information. The evidence was properly excluded from the prosecution's case in
chief.
The difference between the two cases lies in the police's compliance with their own
warnings. In Harris, the police issued incomplete warnings, but at least complied with their
own version of the warnings. In Hass, police issued the complete Miranda warnings and then
completely disregarded the warnings by continuing their interrogation of the accused after he
had requested to phone his attorney. It follows that if the police understood the Miranda
warnings at least as well as the accused, which is not such a far-fetched assumption, they
acted in blatant disregard of the rules they had just recited to the accused.
Blackmun J, for the majority, also found this "possible factual distinction" between Harris
and Hass, in that the "Miranda warnings given Hass were proper, whereas those given Harris
were defective".33o He continued:
"The deterrence of the exclusionary rule, of course, lies in the necessity to give warnings.
That these warnings, in a given case, may prove to be incomplete, and therefore
defective, as in Harris, does not mean that they have not served as a deterrent to the
officer who is not then aware of their defect; and to the officer who is aware of the defect
the full deterrence remains".
What did this distinction mean to the majority?33I In terms of proving guilt it meant
nothing - evidence resulting from defective warnings are inadmissible regardless of the
issuing officer's knowledge of the defect. Miranda was quite clear on this point. And in terms
of determining credibility? Again nothing. Because "inadmissibility would pervert the
constitutional right into a right to falsify free from the embarrassment of impeachment
evidence from the defendant's own mouth".332 The question remains: Why would a police
officer who is aware of the defect in the warnings not act to correct the defect? Perhaps he
has something to gain?333
329 Supra.
330 Oregon v Hass supra 723.
331 Or, what did it mean in practice?
332 Oregon v Hass supra 723.
333 State v Hass supra 493.
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The Supreme Court did not satisfactorily explain why the distinction between the facts of
Harris and Hass made no difference when impeachment of the accused's testimony was
concerned. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court highlighted the difference. It is submitted that the
distinction should not only be between effective and defective warnings. On top of this, one
should distinguish on the basis of the police's compliance with the warnings that were given,
to the extent that they were given. Contrary to the majority's opinion, it seems that by
admitting unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment, police and the prosecution
do have "nothing to lose and something to gain".334
It is the cases where police knowingly disregarded the warnings, either by paying them
mere lip service, or not correcting known defects that should be a cause for concern. As the
minority in Hass pointed out:
"[I]f the requirement [of having an attorney present] is followed there will almost surely
be no statement since the attorney will advise the accused to remain silent. If, however,
the requirement is disobeyed, the police may obtain a statement which can [at least] be
used for impeachment if the accused has the temerity to testify in his own defense".335
Consequently, one might tolerate defective warnings given without knowledge of the
defect and complied with to the extent given where impeachment is at issue. At least the
police acted in good faith.336 However, when the defect is known to police and they do not
correct it, or when they simply disregard the warnings they had just given, anything that they
might gain in terms of impeachment evidence would be unfair towards the accused. Even if
this does not have negative implications for the accused's right not to be a witness against
himself, which is doubtful, it seriously detracts from the accused's right to a fair trial.
In one regard the decision in Hass does appear to narrow, or at least clarify, the first
requirement for impeachment stipulated in Harris. In Harris, the Supreme Court required that
the excluded statements must be inconsistent with the accused's testimony bearing directly on
the crimes charged. After Hass, the accused must testify to his innocence knowing that the
"opposing testimony had been ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case in chief,.337 In
Harris, the accused also knew that the evidence would not be admitted as proof of guilt,
because the prosecution conceded that it was inadmissible under Miranda. This is of course
334 State v Hass supra 493.
335 Oregon v Hass supra 725.
336 The principle of systemic deterrence would probably still require exclusion, because "the courts must be slow
to indulge ignorance of the law of criminal procedure on the part of the police". Mkhize v S supra 7.
337 Oregon v Hass supra 722.
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purely academic. No prosecutor worth his salt would risk falling outside this ruling by not
attempting to use all evidence as proof of guilt, which is in any event more damaging to the
accused's case than mere impeachment according to the majorities in both Harris and Hass.
Moreover, the accused would know which evidence has been excluded, since it is the defence
who would apply for such exclusion.
3237 United States v Havens
In United States v Havens338 the Supreme Court dealt with impeachment by means of
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence. Nonetheless, the court held that its rulings in
Harris v New York339and Oregon v Hass,340 dealing with testimonial communications, were
controlling in the matter. The court added only one new but significant aspect to the "rule in
Harris,,:341 The accused may not only be impeached upon his testimony in chief, but also on
testimony given in cross-examination - if this testimony relates to a matter "that [is] plainly
within the scope of the defendant's direct examination't.t"
3238 Dickerson v United States: An ill-considered confirmation of Miranda v
Arizona
32381 Introduction
From the preceding paragraphs is should be clear that a major contradiction exists in
American jurisprudence regarding the constitutional requirements that regulate the
admissibility of testimonial communications. On the one hand is the supposedly+"
constitutional ruling in Miranda v Arizona344 in which the Supreme Court devised the bright-
line test known colloquially as the "Miranda rights". Moreover, the Supreme Court went one
step further by insisting - and this was reiterated in Dickerson v United States345 - that these
rules were the (new) constitutional standard for admissibility of statements made by the
accused while in custody.
338 Supra.
339 Supra.
340 Supra.
341 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles a/Evidence 2 ed (2002) 432.
342 United States v Havens supra 627.
343 The majority inDickerson was adamant that Miranda's "core ruling" is constitutional.
344 Supra.
345 Supra.
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On the other hand, Harris v New York346 very clearly held that the standard for the
admissibility of impeachment evidence was still the traditional standard of voluntariness, to
be determined with consideration of the totality of all the circumstances surrounding the
interrogation. And, along with other cases, the Harris court was adamant that the Miranda
rules were "not themselves rights protected by the Constitution'V" but merely prophylactic
in nature.348
32382 The traditional test
It was clear from as early as Bram v United States349 and Brown vMississippi350 that when
determining the admissibility of a statement, its voluntariness "is controlled by that portion of
the Fifth Amendment ... commanding that no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself".351 In other words, the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
compelled self-incrimination holds that no person may be forced against his will to give
evidence against himself in any criminal case. This means two things. First, the test for the
admissibility of any statement made by the accused is voluntariness as explained by the
Supreme Court in Bram v United States, and subsequently developed into the traditional
determination of whether the statement was the result of an overborne will.
Second, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination applies to "any criminal case".
This means that involuntary statements would be inadmissible in all pending criminal cases
as well as any future cases against the person who made the statement. What's more, the Fifth
Amendment uses only the term "criminal case" without distinguishing between the different
stages of a trial. This is an important omission, since Miranda dealt with admissibility of
evidence into the case in chief when evidence is mostly used to indicate guilt, while Harris
was concerned with the admissibility of evidence during cross-examination when evidence
would typically be used for the limited purpose of discrediting the accused's testimony. There
is no dispute that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination must be applicable to
both situations.
346 Supra.
347 Michigan v Tucker supra 444.
348 New York v Quarles 467 US 649 (1984). See also Harris v New York supra.
349168 US 532 (1897).
350 297 US 278 (1936).
351 Bram v United States supra 542.
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In other words, the impeachment process is still very much part of the criminal trial. It
follows that there exists a double standard for application of the privilege against compelled
self-incrimination. Being a constitutional right - at least there is no dispute about this - it
should control in the same manner the admissibility of a statement offered in evidence as part
of the case in chief and a statement offered for impeachment. The Fifth Amendment makes
no mention that it should be otherwise. However, Harris v New York?52 and its progeny353
show that this is not the case.
3 2 4 WRAPPING UP: No MORE ANALOGIES
It has been shown throughout this chapter that analogies between the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments for the purpose of excluding unconstitutionally obtained evidence is reckless. A
useful distinction could be made based on the nature of the evidence, as an indication of its
trustworthiness. Additionally, the fact that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination
is a trial right of the accused and therefore substantive in nature as opposed to the mere
remedial nature of the exclusionary rule for violations of the Fourth Amendment requires that
they be applied differently.
33 CANADA
"I conclude that the Crown's strategic choice at trial to use the evidence only for
impeachment purposes does not lessen the standard for admissibility. Acceptance of a
lesser standard would encourage Charter breach in order to achieve tactical advantage at
trial. A statement obtained in breach of the Charter for impeachment purposes, it would
be thought, is better than no statement at all".354
3 3 1 IMPEACHMENT BY MEANS OF PREVIOUSLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE: R V CALDER
3 3 1 1 General
R v Calder " was the first case in which the Canadian Supreme Court specifically had to
deicide the issue of the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence to impeach the
352 Supra.
353 Riddell v Rhay 404 US 974 (1971); Oregon v Hass supra; United States v Havens supra.
354 Berger JA inR v Whitford (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 52 (Alta CA) 62, as quoted in R v Cook supra § 77.
355 (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
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accused. The accused, a police officer,356 had been convicted in a lower court of attempting to
purchase the sexual services of a person under eighteen, extortion and breach of trust. He was
never informed of his right to counsel. In fact, the accused was under the impression that he
was subject to an internal investigation and thus obliged to answer questions.357 He
consequently made a statement, denying that he had been at the street comer where and when
the alleged transaction took place. This statement was false. The courtroom testimony of an
independent witness, the complainant and, significantly, that of the accused himself proved
this. The prosecution wanted to tender the statement as evidence of consciousness of guilt.
And, as his trial testimony contradicted his earlier statement to the police, the prosecution
wanted to cross-examine him on his earlier statement in an attempt to impeach his credibility.
The trial judge held that he was in fact detained, and should have been properly advised of
his Charter rights. The statement was consequently excluded, because its admission would
have brought the administration of justice into disrepute. Furthermore, the trial judge held
that once it had been excluded under s 24(2), admission of the statement even for a limited
purpose, would be unfair to the accused.
The parties agreed that the evidence had been properly excluded from the prosecution's
case. The appeal dealt only with the question of admission for the (limited) purpose of
impeaching the credibility of the accused.
The crown relied heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in R v Kuldip,358 which held
that the accused might be cross-examined on statements made by him during a previous trial,
in spite of the protection against self-incrimination in s 13 of the Charter. The Supreme Court
distinguished the two cases, holding that Kuldip did not concern a statement that had
previously been held inadmissible. In Kuldip, the Supreme Court only had to decide whether
the admissiorr'i" of impeaching evidence violated the self-incrimination clause360 and not
whether it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.I'" as was the case in
Calder.
356 See S v Makhathini supra; Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape supra. As a rule, even
police officers must be properly informed of their rights. See n 153 supra.
357 Internal investigations of the police force are conducted under different procedural rules than a criminal
prosecution.
358 (1990) 3 SCR 618 (SCC).
359 The crown conceded that the use of evidence for impeachment is an "admission". The Supreme Court
agreed.
360 Section 13 of the Charter.
361 Section 24(2) of the Charter.
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The trial judge in Calder had already ruled the statement inadmissible as proof of guilt.
Consequently, as was held in R v Adams,362 the only way that an order made by a court may
be revoked or altered was if the circumstances surrounding the initial order changed
materially. For a change in circumstances to be material, "the change must relate to a matter
that justified the making of the order in the first place".363 It follows that a change in the
purpose for which evidence is meant to be used does not constitute such a material change.
3312 Inadmissible in general also means inadmissible for a limited purpose
Since the submission of evidence generally constitutes submission for all purposes, unless
specifically limited, the subsequent limiting of its intended use does not bring about a
material change in circumstances that would justify varying the exclusion order. Nothing
indicated that the prosecution's initial attempt to use the accused's statement as evidence of
guilt was limited to that one use only. In fact, the Supreme Court concluded that had the
accused's statement been admitted earlier, the prosecution would have been free to use the
statement for any purpose, including impeachment. It follows that the limited purpose for
which the evidence was later tendered, formed part of the general purpose for which the
statement had already been offered and excluded.
The distinction between admitting evidence generally, as opposed to admission for the
limited purpose of impeachment, was at that time already well known in Canadian law.
Sopinka J referred to cases involving prior inconsistent statements, as early as 1947364and
more recently R v Kuldip365 and R v Crawford+" where the distinction had been usefu1.367He
continued:
"The distinction draws a fme line. When a statement is admitted, generally it is available
as positive evidence of innocence or guilt. The statement is evidence of the truth of its
contents which may be incriminating. Moreover, the mere fact that a false exculpatory
statement was made may be evidence of consciousness of guilt. On the other hand, a
statement whose use is limited to a challenge of credibility can serve only to impeach the
362 (1995) 4 SCR 707 (SCC).
363 R v Adams (1995) 4 SCR 707 (SCC) 722, as quoted in R v Calder (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC) § 21.
364 R v Calder supra 198, referring to R v Deacon (1947) SCR 531 (SCC).
365 Supra.
366 (1995) 1 SCR 858 (SCC).
367 The distinction has been eroded in some circumstances. See R v B (K G) (1993) 1 SCR 740 (SCC).
71
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OiAPrER 1HREE IMPEACHMENT IN THE UNlTED STATES AND CANADA
testimony of the [accused]. The most that can be achieved is the nullification of the
[accused's] evidence". 368
One question comes to mind: How does the prosecution justify the use of a pnor
inconsistent statement, proven to be false, to impeach the accused's testimony at trial? The
prior inconsistent statement was not merely proven false by the prosecution, but the accused
himself admitted as much. Moreover, other attempts to impeach the accused were
unsuccessful, indicating that his trial testimony at least resembled the truth.369 Should a
distinction be made between situations where seemingly truthful testimony at trial contradicts
an earlier (inadmissible) lie, and cases where perjurious trial testimony contradicts an earlier
(possibly) truthful statement? Is such a distinction at all possible?
3313 The testimony at trial: Truth vs perjury
The prosecution in R v Calder370 relied on the fact that the accused's testimony at trial
contradicted his earlier statement. The court rejected this, saying that "it would not have
escaped the Crown that the accused would likely testify and that his testimony could
contradict the statement".371 The situation in Calder is distinguishable from the American
impeachment cases already discussed, making direct comparison difficult.
In Calder, the accused initially made a false exculpatory statement to the police, which he
contradicted with testimony in which he explained his presence at the scene of the crime. In
Harris, while this is not clear from the facts, it is clear from the reasoning of the US Supreme
Court that the court dealt with the opposite situation, where the accused initially made a true,
if only partially so, inculpatory statement to the police and then resorted to perjury during the
trial in an attempt to deny guilt.
Speaking for the majority in Harris, Burger CJ clearly indicated that perjury would not be
tolerated: "[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to
perjurious testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his
credibility".372 In conclusion, he held that "[t]he shield provided by Miranda cannot be
368 R v Calder supra § 25.
369 E if i 1 hi . th fven 1 It was on y s version ereo.
370 Supra.
371 R v Calder supra § 25. Emphasis added.
372 Harris v New York supra 224, citing Walder v United States supra 65. Emphasis added.
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perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation
with prior inconsistent utterances". 373
The prevention of perjury is a worthwhile goal. Indeed, it is essential that perjury be
prevented in order to successfully determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. However,
this motivation is of no use when impeachment of truthful testimony is attempted by means
of previously excluded inconsistent statements that are known to be false. A situation could
easily develop as foreseen in R v wau-?" - a case dealing with cross-examination of one's
own witness, but not altogether irrelevant - that "[i]f ... counsel were allowed to cross-
examine ... the court might be led to doubt evidence which is really true".375
In Calder, the defence attempted to draw an analogy to the law regarding involuntary
confessions as laid out by the Supreme Court in Monette v R:376 A statement made by the
accused while in detention is either admissible, or it is not. If it is inadmissible, it cannot be
made admissible by putting it to the accused in cross-examination, because of the statement's
inherent unreliability. Although of some help, the analogy was not absolute. According to
Sopinka J, there were two reasons. First, the law regarding involuntary confessions has
evolved considerably since Monette.t'! R v Whittle378 held that although the rule against
involuntary confessions was initially motivated by the inherent unreliability of such
confessions, "a strong undercurrent developed which also supported the rule in part on
fairness in the criminal process".379 Therefore, even reliable confessions would be subject to
exclusion if the fairness of the trial were jeopardised.
Second, while both the law regarding involuntary confessions and s 24(2) take fairness
into account, s 24(2) focuses on the effect of admission on the repute of the administration of
justice as a whole. In other words, s 24(2) requires that a balance be struck between the
fairness of admission to the accused and fairness of exclusion to the community interest. 380
373 Harris v New York supra 225. Emphasis added. See also Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western
Cape supra.
374 1918 TPD 234.
375 R v Wellers 1918 TPD 234 237.
376 (1959) SCR 400 (SCC).
377 R v Calder supra §§ 26-27.
378 (1994) 2 SCR 914 (SCC).
379 R v Whittle (1994) 2 SCR 914 (SCC) 932.
380 In South Africa, the position differs somewhat. The fairness leg of the inquiry in s 35(5) of the Constitution
is ultimately concerned with fairness to the accused: If on a balance of all stakeholders' interests admission will
result in unfairness to the accused, evidence must be excluded regardless of the unfairness of exclusion to the
prosecution or other interested parties.
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Although no longer the only reason, the inherent unreliability is still an important reason
for excluding involuntary statements. Similarly, the concern for unreliability should
overwhelmingly demand exclusion of a statement that is not merely inherently unreliable, but
known to be false and therefore even more detrimental to the accused.
Where trial fairness is concerned, the situation is a little more complicated: The little, if
any, unfairness to the accused of admitting a previously excluded truthful statement, to
prevent perjury, could be exceeded by the unfairness to the community if it were excluded.
Especially if it was done for the limited purpose of impeachment, the argument that such
statements are inherently unreliable even if they resemble the truth, should be balanced
against the consideration that the "inherently unreliable" statement would not be used to
prove guilt, but its use limited to testing the truthfulness of the accused's trial testimony.
When a statement that is known to be false is admitted, even for the limited purpose of
impeachment, the unfairness to the accused is much more serious and outweighs the
unfairness towards the community that would result from the complete exclusion of such a
statement. Added to this, admitting a statement that is known to be false to test the reliability
of the accused's trial testimony serves no rational purpose. It would undermine the credibility
of the accused, regardless of whether his trial testimony is indeed false or not. Therefore,
admission of a previously excluded false statement would not only undermine the
determination of the accused's guilt or innocence, but also would be unfair to the accused.
And, in the long run, it would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
3314 Not the carefully instructed jury but the well-informed citizen
The court in Calder highlighted two important factors regarding the use of evidence for a
limited purpose in a trial where a jury is the trier of fact. First, the court
"acknowledge[ d] the concern that a jury would have difficulty in applying the distinction
[between incrimination and impeachment] but concluded that, with the benefit of a very
careful instruction from the trial judge, this difficulty could be overcome". 381
However, the court continued:
381 R v Calder supra § 32.
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"The fact that a jury carefully instructed can apply the distinction does not mean
that use for the purpose of impeachment will, in the eyes of the jury, have a less
detrimental effect on the case of the accused".382
Second, in strict adherence to R v Collins,383 the court distinguished the admissibility of
evidence, including evidence intended for a limited purpose, from its eventual weighing by
the jury at trial. The admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the Charter depends
not on the detrimental effect it may have for the accused, in the eyes of the jury, but on the
effect its admission has on the repute of the administration of justice. And the determination
of the effect on the repute of the administration of justice is not for the jury to make:
"[I]n determining admissibility under s. 24(2), it is not the carefully instructed juror who
is the arbiter of the effect on the administration of justice but rather the well-informed
member of the community. This mythical person does not have the benefit of a careful
instruction from the trial judge on the distinction. Not only will that person not tend to
understand the distinction in theory, but, in any event, will regard the distinction as
immaterial in assessing the effect on the repute of the administration of justice. If use of
the statement is seen to be unfair by reason of having been obtained in breach of an
accused's Charter rights, it is not likely to be seen to be less unfair because it was only
used to destroy credibility'v''"
The court conceded that while it would be difficult, even impossible, for a jury with proper
instructions to make the distinction between incrimination and impeachment, it would be
more so for the reasonable, well-informed member of the community who does not have the
benefit of an instruction from the trial judge. While it is proper to leave the jury to weigh the
facts before them as they see fit, the question of admissibility is concerned with the
determination of which facts should be made available to the jury without damaging the
repute of the administration of justice. It follows that involving the jury in this inquiry would
cause immeasurable prejudice to the fairness of the process, and would most probably bring
the administration of justice into disrepute.
382 R v Calder supra § 34. Emphasis added. See also Cleary McCormick on Evidence 513; Davies "Exclusion of
Evidence" The Australian U 183.
383 (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC).
384 R v Calder supra § 34, as quoted by Cory & Iacobucci JJ in R v Cook supra § 76. See also Morissette "The
Exclusion of Evidence under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: What to Do and What Not to Do"
1984 McGill U 521 538, as cited in R v Collins (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC) § 33.
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3 3 2 EVIDENCE TENDERED ONLY FOR IMPEACHMENT: R V COOK
3 3 2 1 Introduction
In R v Calder385 the Supreme Court was confronted with a situation where evidence was
initially submitted generally, as part of the prosecution's case against the accused, and
excluded. Later, when the accused testified, the prosecution again submitted the excluded
statement in cross-examination of the accused, but for the limited purpose of impeaching his
credibility. The court refused to admit it, holding that the evidence had been excluded for all
purposes, including impeachment, when it was previously excluded.i'"
Does this mean that evidence not tendered as part of the prosecution's case-in-chief may
be used in cross-examination to impeach the credibility of the accused? In R v COOk,387 the
Supreme Court was faced with such a situation. The prosecution never tendered the evidence
obtained in violation of the Charter as part of its case-in-chief, but tried to do so during cross-
examination of the accused in an attempt to impeach his credibility.
3322 R v Cook: Collins revisited388
The accused in R v Cook389 was arrested in the United States for a murder committed in
Canada. The arresting officer, a United States Marshall, read him his rights as required by
Miranda v Arizona.39o Later, two Canadian detectives interrogated the accused while he was
still in the United States awaiting extradition to Canada. They failed to inform him of any
rights that he had under the Canadian Charter. As in R v Calder,391 the accused gave an
exculpatory statement.
First, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the Charter applied extraterritorially to the
interrogation in the United States.392 Since this topic falls outside the scope of this thesis, it
would suffice to say that the Charter was applicable to the interrogation in the US.393
385 Supra.
386 See § 3 3 I 2 supra.
387 (1998) 2 SCR 597 (SCC).
388 See § 2 3 2 supra.
389 Supra.
390 Supra.
391 Supra.
392 In any event, the requirements of the US Bill of Rights were not complied with either.
393 Cory & Iacobucci JJ, for the majority in R v Cook supra thoroughly discussed the reasons for their
conclusion that the Charter applied extraterritorially in §§ 23-54.
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Having concluded that the Charter did apply to the interrogation in the United States, the
Supreme Court had no difficulty in concluding that the Charter had been violated.394
Moreover, the Supreme Court regarded the trial judge's findings as significant:
"[T]he information given to the appellant regarding his right to counsel was misleading
to the extent that ... the appellant was prevented from making a considered choice
regarding legal assistance and that this was the very effect the police officer intended".395
Consequently, the Supreme Court found the violation to be "very serious if not
flagrant".396
3323 Evidence not previously excluded
The prosecution did not tender the statement in an attempt to incriminate the accused as
was done in R v Calder.397 However, before closing its case, the prosecution made an
application that the statement be admitted in cross-examination for the limited purpose of
impeaching the accused's credibility. The trial judge greatly relied on the distinction between
using evidence for incrimination and the use of impeachment, where the statement was not
tendered as proof of its contents, but merely to impeach the accused. The trial judge allowed
the statement to be used for impeachment, finding that when used for this purpose it was not
sel f-incriminating.
The holding of the trial judge resembled the holding in R v Kuldip/98 where the Supreme
Court held that the accused might be cross-examined on a statement made during a previous
trial, despite the prohibition against self-incrimination in s 13 of the Charter. This was not
surprising, since at the time of the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court had not yet
delivered its judgment in Calder.
However, the Supreme Court in Calder held that the inquiry regarding the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of the Charter should not be determined based on self-
incrimination. Rather, under s 24(2) the inquiry must be whether the admission of such
evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. This is the case regardless
of the intended use of the evidence.
394 In fact, the parties agreed that if the Charter was applicable it had indeed been violated.
395 R v Cook supra § 56. The court referred to § 27 of the trial court's ruling.
396 R v Cook supra § 57.
397 Supra.
398 Supra.
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The judgment in R v Calder differs from R v Cook in the sense that the evidence tendered
for impeachment, had previously been excluded. In Cook, the Supreme Court had to consider
the "admission of evidence for a limited purpose where the Crown [was] not 'fettered' by a
prior ruling under s 24(2)".399 However, the Supreme Court felt that Calder also considered
the broader issue and was therefore applicable to the appeal in Cook. And, referring to the
"very limited" circumstances where the Calder majority thought that a change in the intended
use of the evidence might result in admission where it would not otherwise be admissible.l'"
the Supreme Court held that there must be no distinction based on intended use at a1.401 As
motivation for this conclusion, the court, citing R v Calder,402 held that while a carefully
instructed juror might be able to distinguish between the different purposes for which
evidence may be admitted, it is the "reasonable, well-informed citizen who represents
community values" who decides the effect of admission on the repute of the administration of
justice. Not benefiting from "a careful instruction from the trial judge on the distinction", this
"mythical person" would not understand the distinction, or in any event regard the distinction
as immaterial in assessing the effect on the repute of the administration of justice.403
Consequently, when admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is in question, the
only consideration should be the effect that its admission would have on the repute of the
administration of justice.
3 3 3 IN CONCLUSION
The position in Canada seems to be clear regarding the use of unconstitutionally obtained
testimonial communications, or, in the Supreme Court's definition, conscriptive evidence:
Subject to very rare circumstances, which have not yet materialised, prior inconsistent
statements are not admissible for impeachment. However, the Supreme Court has not had the
opportunity to decide whether real evidence (or, non-conscriptive evidencejl'" will be
admissible for impeaching the accused.
399 R v Cook supra § 74.
400 R v Calder supra § 35.
401 R v Cook supra § 76. La Forest J, concurring in Calder, also found it difficult to imagine any special
circumstances that would justify a departure from the approach set forth by the majority.
402 R v Calder supra § 34.
403 See § 3 3 1 4 supra.
404 Keeping in mind that the distinction between testimonial communications and real evidence is not based on
exactly the same definitions as the distinction between conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence.
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"[A] juror who asked not to be identified was quoted, 'I had very grave doubts as to her
innocence, yes. Unfortunately, 1 had very reasonable doubts as to her guilt.. ",405
4 1 INTRODUCTION
4 1 1 IMPEACHMENT UNDER THE COMMON LAW
In Chapter One, a short summary was made of South African courts' approach to the
admissibility of evidence in the pre-constitutional era. It was pointed out that there was a
gradual shift to a discretionary approach even before the interim Constitution was enacted. It
is now necessary to summarise the position regarding impeachment under the common law.
In short, the position seemed to be as follows: Once evidence was found to be inadmissible, it
was as a general rule inadmissible for all purposes. This meant that the prosecution was not
allowed to cross-examine an accused on inadmissible evidence in order to discredit the
accused.
405 Stephen King The Shining & Misery: Two novels in one volume (2000) 218,
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In R v Gibixegu406 the court was concerned with the use of a confession't'" inadmissible
under s 244(1) of Act 56 of 1955. O'Hagan J, in a minority opinion, held that "[a]n accused,
like any other witness, may be cross-examined upon any matter relevant to his credibility
provided that the matter is not one which a rule of law excludes from admission in
evidence,,.408 He continued that South African authority revealed that inadmissible evidence
remained inadmissible at all stages and for all purposes of the criminal proceedings
concerned, subject only to rare exceptions.f'" This position was confirmed by the
Bophuthatswana Supreme Court in S v Molautsi,410 when, with reference to Gibixegu, the
court held that the prosecutor "was not entitled to elicit inadmissible evidence in his
favour".411
The use of previous convictions for impeachment purposes seems to create some
difficulties in practice. In S v Mavuso,412 the accused appealed against a conviction for the
possession of dagga. At issue in the trial court was whether the accused knew that there was
dagga in the vehicle driven by him.413 His knowledge of dagga was therefore potentially
relevant. A previous conviction for possession of dagga was admitted in cross-examination.
On the facts, however, Hefer JA held that the accused's previous conviction did not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the appellant knew what dagga smelt like. The facts of
the previous conviction (for possession of dagga) were unknown and based upon the
extended definition of "possession". Therefore, it could not be concluded that he had
physically handled dagga before, or had any other contact with it that would indicate that he
knew what it smelt like.
Hefer JA cited R v Solomonsl'" which he regarded as a good explanation of the common
law concerning the admissibility of previous convictions:
"It is clear that evidence of criminal actions other that those laid in the indictment is
inadmissible against an accused merely to show a criminal propensity. But it is, I think,
equally well established ... that evidence which is relevant to an issue before the Court is
406 1959 (4) SA 266 (E).
407 R v Gibixegu 1959 (4) SA 266 (E) 270B. The court specifically left open the question "whether facts,
contradictory to the evidence of an accused person at his trial, short of a confession, may be used to impeach his
testimony".
408 R v Gibixegu supra 270H. Emphasis added.
409 For instance, when the inadmissible evidence is adduced by the accused in support of an aspect of his case.
See R v Bosch 1949 (1) SA 548 (AD).
4101980 (3) SA 1041(BSC).
411 Sv Molautsi 1980 (3) SA 1041(BSC) 1042£.
4121987 (3) SA 499 (A).
413 About 620 kg was found in the vehicle he was driving!
4141959 (2) SA 352 (A).
80
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OiAPTER FOUR IMPEACHMENT IN SOUTH AFRlCA
not rendered inadmissible merely because it tends to show the commission by the
accused of other crimes".415
The Criminal Procedure Act,416 in s 197(d) - cited in Afrikaans by the court in Mavusot['
- states as follows:
"An accused who gives evidence at criminal proceedings shall not be asked or required
to answer any question tending to show that he has committed or has been convicted of
or has been charged with any offence other than the offence with which he is charged, or
that he is of bad character, unless-
(a) ...
(b)...
(c) ...
(d) the proof that he has committed or has been convicted of such other offence is
admissible evidence to show that he is guilty of the offence with which he is charged".
It is submitted that, had the previous conviction for possession of dagga been relevant to
the facts in Mavuso, it might well have been admissible as evidence for the limited purpose of
discrediting the accused's testimony, but not as proof of guilt or as proof of a criminal
propensi ty.
A change of circumstances could justify reversmg a ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. It was submitted above that once evidence is ruled inadmissible, it generally
remains inadmissible for all purposes. But in R v Soiomons,418 the court was confronted with
an unexpected change in the accused's testimony, allowing the admissibility of certain
evidence to be reconsidered. The accused was on trial for murder. The prosecution had,
during its case in chief, led evidence from an eyewitness who testified that the accused was in
possession of a knife on the evening in question.l'" Over and above this testimony, the crown
also sought to lead evidence from the same witness that the accused had earlier in the same
evening committed two other knife-assaults in the presence of the witness. The defence
objected. The court excluded the testimony of the knife-assaults, because of its "extremely
415S v Mavuso 1987 (3) SA 499 (A) 504E-F; R v Solomons 1959 (2) 352 (AD) 361. Emphasis inMavuso.
416Act 51 of 1977.
417S v Mavuso supra 504G-H.
418 Supra.
419The deceased was killed with a knife.
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great prejudice to the accused,,420 and because the court had already received the testimony
that the accused was in possession of a knife on the evening in question.
However, during cross-examination by the crown, the accused denied possessing a knife
on the evening in question. This denial changed the circumstances of the case, making the
evidence previously excluded directly relevant to the accused's possession of the knife, his
alleged alibi and his contention that he was not in the presence of the witness. The trial judge
intervened and held that "the unanticipated denial by the accused of being in possession of a
knife on the evening in question caused one of the grounds whereupon the previously
tendered evidence had been excluded to fall away".421 Consequently, "[cjrown counsel was
now entitled to put questions to the accused to show that he was not speaking the truth in
regard to a knife".422 The trial judge had specifically put to the crown that it might lead
evidence to attack the credibility of the accused's testimony, but not to controvert it.423 In
other words, the inconsistency could be shown, but the contents of the contradicting evidence
could not be proved. This case illustrates another important matter: At common law, a ruling
on the admissibility of evidence is of an interlocutory nature and therefore subject to review
during the trial. There is no reason why a ruling on admissibility under the Constitution
would not similarly be susceptible to alteration during the trial.424
When comparing the Solomons case to the minority opinion in Riddell v Rhay,425 another
question is raised: Once the inconsistency is proved, which version is really the truth?426 The
aim of cross-examination is to test, or discredit the opposing party's testimony - often by
showing inconsistencies either with their own previous statements or with that of other
witnesses. And if a party is shown to be inconsistent in his testimony, it makes the other
party's version that much more believable and the court would normally accept that version
as the truth. Consider the following statement by the trial judge:
420 Ogilvie Thompson lA, citing from the record, in R v Solomons supra 357A-B.
421 R v Solomons supra 357G.
422 R v Solomons supra 357H. Emphasis added.
423 R v Solomons supra 358A-B: "Ek het gese jy is toegelaat om te kruisverhoor in verband met die
geloofwaardigheid van die meso Hy se hy het nie ['n] mes gehad nie. Ek weet van die getuienis wat voor my Ie
wat die teenoorgestelde sal bewys. U moet geregtig wees om dit aan hom te stel om te wys dat hy nie die
waarheid daaromtrent praat nie. Dit is 'n ander vraag ofly daama sal toegelaat word om dan getuienis te lei om
te weerle wat hy gese het. Dit is heeltemal iets anders". Emphasis added.
424 S V M 2003 (1) SA 341 (SeA) 361C.
425404 US 974 (1971). See § 3235 supra.
426 At this stage of the trial, this question is no longer central to the issue and therefore need not be answered. In
fact, the prosecution is precluded from leading evidence about the contents of any previously excluded
statements. But see § 3 3 1 3 supra.
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"I am ruling now definitely that the Crown can put these questions in order to show that
the witness [accused] is not telling the truth about the possession of the knife ... It will be
another matter whether it can be controverted't.Y'
This simply means that by showing someone is lying, one's own version becomes more
probable. But this is still a far cry from proving someone's guilt.428
412 SECTION 39(1)(c) OF THE CONSTITUTION: RELIANCE ON FOREIGN PRECEDENT
In Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences429
Tebbutt J made the following observations regarding the usefulness of relying upon the
experiences of other jurisdictions when applying the Bill of Rights:
"While it is indeed so that section 35(1) of the [interim] Constitution provides that in
interpreting the provisions of Chapter 3 thereof, the Court may 'have regard to
comparable foreign case law' ,430this should be done with circumspection because of the
different contexts within which other constitutions were drafted, the different social
structures and milieu existing in those countries as compared with those in this country,
and the different historical backgrounds against which the various constitutions came
into being ... [OJne must be wary of the danger of unnecessarily importing doctrines
associated with those constitutions into an inappropriate South African setting. The
South African constitution must be interpreted within the context and historical
background of the South African setting".431
It is submitted that this assertion is as applicable under the present Constitution as it was
under the interim Constitution.
Although a lot can be learned from decisions of the Supreme Courts of the United States
of America and Canada, the lesson - especially in the case of the United States - is often one
of what not to do. It is evident from discussions in Chapters Two and Three that one should
wade through the quagmire of contradictory judgments in the United States with the utmost
caution.
427 R v Solomons supra 358C-D. See n 423 supra.
428 However, see §§ 323 5 & 33 1 3 supra.
4291995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) 208.
430 The present Constitution contains essentially the same provision in s 39(1)(c).
431 Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences 1995 (2) BCLR 198 (C) 208,
citing Froneman J in Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 (3) SA 625 (E) 633F-G. Emphasis added. See
also S v Minnies 1991 (1) SACR 335 (Nm) 370g-h.
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Underlying the notion to not simply take foreign rulings at face value, are the numerous
procedural and societal differences that exist between the South African and two North
American jurisdictions. Chief amongst these is the fact that the South African criminal justice
system does not employ juries.432 In a jury trial, a judge has no control over the factual
deliberations - apart from providing limiting instructions when necessary during the trial and
a summary of the facts at the end. The jury alone deliberates on the verdict.433 In South
Africa, judges and magistrates either consider the verdict themselves, or together with one or
two assessors.F" Either way, the presiding judicial officer is always involved in determining
the guilt of the accused. This way, assessors are continually guided by the presiding judicial
officer, who ensures that they are aware of the rules applicable to the evaluation of evidence
and apply them correctly. Moreover, the presence of the judicial officer reliably ensures that
the assessors consider evidence only for the purpose for which it had been admitted.Y'
It is submitted that in the light of the above, the South African system can afford to be
more tolerant towards admitting limited purpose evidence. The risk of evidence being
interpreted incorrectly is less than in systems that rely solely on laypersons to interpret the
evidence.
In Pillay v ft36 another difference came to light. Scott lA, in a minority opinion, pointed
out that while decisions of the Canadian Supreme Court can be useful in interpreting s 35(5)
of the Constitution, the range of orders available to each court differed. According to Scott
lA, for the minority, "[i]t should also be borne in mind that by reason of the wide powers of
the Canadian Supreme Court to order a retrial, a decision by that court to exclude evidence is
less likely to result in the acquittal of a guilty person than a similar exclusion in South
Africa".437 Again, this seems to favour South African courts adopting a lenient approach
towards the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes. Either
this, or courts should generally apply a less strict regime of exclusion than the Canadian
courts.
432 Although we have retained the essential structure designed for a trial by jury. See Schwikkard & Van der
Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) 13.
433 § 3 2 3 5 supra illustrates the risk involved in letting a jury decide the facts on its own when limited purpose
evidence is involved. See also Cleary (Ed) McCormick on Evidence 3 ed (1984) 513 & § 3 3 1 3 supra.
434 The Magistrates court Act 32 of 1944 s 34. Although knowledge of the law is not a requirement, it often
happens that advocates or academics serve as assessors, especially in the High Courts.
435 Nonetheless, when two assessors are involved, they can overrule a judge. They must however furnish reasons
for their decision, which juries do not have to do.
4362004 (2) BCLR 158 (SCA).
437 Pillay v S 2004 (2) BCLR 158 (SCA) 197. The US Supreme Court similarly has a wide range of powers to
order a retrial. See SvMakhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97 3.
84
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OiAPTER FOUR IMPEACHMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA
Another important matter that must be taken into account is the fact that both the United
States and Canada, as first-world countries, have much more experience adjudicating in a
constitutional setting. South Africa, as a developing country, has had a workable Constitution
for only ten years. Moreover, South Africa suffers from a rampant crime rate,438 fuelled by
unemployment and other symptoms of "social structures" that are to a large extent not as
well-developed as those of the USA and Canada.t" This leaves South African courts with the
unenviable task of ensuring that the Constitution has the respect of the people by ensuring
due process while at the same time trying to curb the crime wave.
In time, both seemingly contradictory objectives can be obtained.44o As long as the police
strictly adhere to the dictates of the Constitution.l'" effective crime control is possible while
ensuring due process for each accused. In this regard, the US Supreme Court's analysis of the
successes of the Federal Bureau ofInvestigations is informative:
"Over the years the Federal Bureau of Investigation has compiled an exemplary record
of effective law enforcement while advising any suspect or arrested person, at the outset
of an interview, that he is not required to make a statement, that any statement may be
used against him in court, that the individual may obtain the services of an attorney of
his own choice and, more recently, that he has a right to free counsel if he is unable to
pay. A letter received from the Solicitor General in response to a question from the
Bench makes it clear that the present pattern of warnings and respect for the rights of the
individual followed as a practice by the FBI is consistent with the procedure which we
delineate today. It states: ... 'We can have the Constitution, the best laws in the land, and
the most honest reviews by courts - but unless the law enforcement profession is steeped
in the democratic tradition, maintains the highest in ethics, and makes its work a career
of honor, civil liberties will continually - and without end be violated ... The best
protection of civil liberties is an alert, intelligent and honest law enforcement agency.
There can be no alternative,,,.442
438 The Constitutional court took judicial notice of the high crime rate in Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v
Powell NO 1996 (I) SA 984 (CC) [152]. See also Pillay v Ssupra 159, 187, 198,203.
439 Park-Ross and Another v The Director, Office for Serious Economic Offences supra 208.
440 Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence: Towards a Compromise Between the Common Law
and the Exclusionary Rule" 1992 Stell LR 173 184 argues that "the crime control model and the due process
model are not necessarily rival models. Both models seek to vindicate the goals of substantive criminal law. But
they endeavour to do so along different routes".
441 See S v Makhathini supra.
442 Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) 483-484. Emphasis added.
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Additionally, the US Supreme Court analysed the experiences of other countries that "also
[suggest] that the danger to law enforcement in curbs on interrogation is overplayed't.T:'
Significantly, the Judges' Rules of England, as cited by the US Supreme Court, provide that:
"II. As soon as a police officer has evidence which would afford reasonable grounds for
suspecting that a person has committed an offence, he shall caution that person or cause
him to be cautioned before putting to him any questions, or further questions, relating to
that offence".444
It is up to the courts to watch over the activities of the police and ensure that due process
prevails.445 But at the moment, courts would probably gain the respect of the people by
letting as few criminals as possible go free because of "technicalities".446 These
considerations have all been taken into account by both the majority and the minority in
Pillay v S,447 and rightly so.
Lastly, with s 35(5) of the Constitution modelled on s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter,
extensive importing of Canadian principles into South African judgments is very tempting.
However, there is a world of difference in the Canadian interpretation of the word "would",
which Canadian courts generally substitute for "could". This interpretation is more in line
with the French text of s 24(2) and is more lenient to the accused, by requiring exclusion
when disrepute is only a possibility instead of a certainty. It is submitted that South African
courts should continue to interpret "would" as "would" - in other words, evidence must be
excluded only when unfairness or detriment is a certainty. Had the intention of the framers of
the Constitution been different, they certainly would have followed the interpretation of the
Canadian courts. This means that, ceterus paribus, exclusion will less often be required in a
South African court than in a Canadian court. Consequently, evidence would more often be
admitted into the case in chief, reducing the probability that admission of evidence for
impeachment alone will be required.
Although helpful - often as an indication of which difficulties to avoid - one should not
overly rely on foreign jurisdictions to provide answers to the specific issues in South Africa.
443 Miranda v Arizona supra 486. The countries mentioned by the Supreme Court are: England, Scotland, India,
Ceylon and the USA's own Uniform Code of Military Justice.
444 Miranda v Arizona supra 487n57.
445 See §§ 4 2 2 2 5 & 4 2 2 2 6 infra. See also n 585 infra.
446 S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W) 657G. See n 6 supra.
447 Supra 187,198.
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4 2 SECTION 35(5): IMPEACHMENT
421 INTRODUCTION: EXCLUSION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE
The enactment of the Constitution and specifically the introduction of s 35(5) did not
render obsolete the common and statutory law regarding the admissibility of evidence in
South Africa. Therefore, in principle, relevance remains the basic test for admissibility.l'" All
that s 35(5) does is to ad additional requirements for the admissibility of evidence that
resulted from violations of the Bill of Rights.
4211 The threshold
Section 35(5) is only concerned with "[ e]vidence obtained in a manner that violates any
right in the Bill of Rights". Therefore, it is only activated once a court determines that a
violation took place. This is sometimes referred to as the threshold test.449 Therefore, the
admissibility of all evidence obtained illegally or improperly.l" but not in violation of the
Bill of Rights,451 must be determined according to the common and statutory law. However,
Schwikkard and Vander Merwe warn:
"[I]n the exercise of its common law discretion, the court should ensure that the
constitutional right to a fair trial is not jeopardized by the admission of improperly or
illegally obtained evidence. It has rightly been pointed out that s 35(5) 'was intended to
add to and not to distract [detract] from the constitutional right to a fair trial ",.452
Likewise, De Waal et al "disagree with the cases in which it is suggested that s 35(5) both
defines and circumscribes the accused's right to a fair trial when the admissibility of evidence
is in issue".453
448 See § 2 3 1 supra.
449 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 202.
450 Until now the phrases "improperly obtained evidence", "illegally obtained evidence" and ''unconstitutionally
obtained evidence" have been used interchangeably in this work, all referring to evidence obtained in violation
of rights in a Bill of Rights. In this paragraph, however, "improperly obtained" and "illegally obtained" refer
specifically to evidence obtained in violation of the common law or statutory law - but not in violation of any
right in the Bill of Rights. However, it is argued that the "spirit" of the Bill of Rights requires the rights therein
to be liberally construed, effectively assimilating many, if not all, of the common law and statutory rights that
could be violated in such a way as to render the resulting evidence "improperly" or "illegally" obtained.
451 Courts must however not merely interpret the Bill of Rights to the letter when determining whether it had
been violated, but should have regard for the "spirit" of the Bill of Rights. See S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 388
(W) 39ge.
452 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 202-203, citing Trengrove in Chaskalson (Ed) et al Constitutional
Law of South Africa (1996 revision service 2 of 1998).
453 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) 658, referring to S v Mphala supra
398i-399a; S v Naidoo (1998) 1 All SA 189 (D).
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The relevant paragraph of the judgment by Cloete J in S v Mphala,454 referred to by De
Waal et al,455 reads as follows:
"Section 35(5) envisages the exclusion only of evidence obtained in an unconstitutional
manner. That is a prerequisite for its operation. If evidence could be excluded even
although it has been obtained without an infringement of the accused's constitutional
rights, on the basis that the admission of such evidence would unfairly infringe an
accused's right to a fair trial, s 35(5) would have been unnecessary. That section in my
view both defines and circumscribes an accused's right to a fair trial when the
admissibility of evidence is in issue ...,,456
Cloete J however, continued:
"I find that the failure by the investigating officer to inform the accused, before they
waived their constitutional rights:
(a) that an attorney had been retained to represent them;
(b) that the attorney was on his way to consult with them, and
(c) that the attorney did not wish them to make any statement before such consultation
had taken place,
has the effect that the evidence contained in the confessions was obtained in a manner
which violated the rights conferred on the accused by those provisions of s 35(1) and (2)
of the Constitution ... 1 do not suggest that a police officer is obliged to give advice to an
accused; but 1 do find that a police officer is not entitled to prevent such advice being
given. That is effectively what happened in this matter. In addition it seems plain to me
that when the accused were for practical purposes asked to waive their constitutional
rights, their consent to do so had to be an informed consent. They were as entitled to be
informed of facts obviously relevant to the exercise of their election, as they were of the
express provisions of the Constitution itself. There had to be compliance not only with
the letter, but the spirit, of the Constitution". 457
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe formulate the threshold test for activation of s 35(5) in
the following terms:
"[I]s the objection to the admission of the evidence based upon the violation of a
constitutional right (' any right in the Bill of Rights') or the violation of a non-
454 1998 (1) SACR 388 (W).
455 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 658. See n 453 supra.
456 SvMphala supra 398i-399a.
457 S v Mphala supra 399b-39ge. Emphasis added. See § 2 2 4 supra. But see Moran v Burbine 475 US 412
(1986).
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constitutional right (for example, where a statute has conferred 'more extensive rights,458
on the accused than those which are explicitly or impliedly found in the Bill of
Rights )?,,459
It is submitted that Cloete J's reading of the threshold test of s 35(5), coupled with that of
Schwikkard and Van der Merwe,46o leave the threshold low enough to effectively eliminate
the theoretical possibility that the constitutional right to a fair trial might be jeopardised by
the admission of "improperly or illegally" obtained evidence. In S v SOCi,461 the court
similarly gave the threshold test a very wide - if not low - application although based upon
the notion that a causal connection between the violation and the evidence need not exist. In
this way, the threshold test is interpreted purposefully to give effect to the spirit of the Bill of
Rights.
Moreover, the remaining common law and statutory rights, not assimilated into the "spirit"
of the Bill of Rights, cannot be as important as the rights found in, or associated with, the Bill
of Rights. Consequently, admission of any evidence obtained in violation of these remaining
rights will hardly jeopardise the right to a fair trial, or be detrimental to the administration of
justice, effectively rendering the issue of common law exclusion based on fairness moot.462
4212 Trial fairness
"At times fairness might require that evidence unconstitutionally obtained be excluded.
But there will also be times when fairness will require that evidence, albeit obtained
unconstitutionally, nevertheless be admitted'C'"
Once s 35(5) has been activated - the evidence in issue had been obtained in violation of a
right in the Bill of Rights - a court must determine whether admission of that evidence would
result in unfairness to the accused, or would otherwise be detrimental to the administration of
justice.
458 De Waal et al Bill of Rights Handbook 658. One should be careful not to end up in the same quagmire as the
US Supreme Court did with its Miranda prophylactic.
459 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 202. Emphasis added.
460 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 202.
461 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E) 293c-293i.
462 It is submitted that this reading of the threshold test would produce essentially the same result as that
suggested in S v Kidson 1999 (1) SACR 338 (W) 349c-e and is more in line with the intention of s 35(5).
463 Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC) 196A-B. But see the qualification
at the end of this §.
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Itmust be noted that the words "or otherwise" in s 35(5) indicate that the so-called first leg
of the inquiry in s 35(5) - "would render the trial unfair" - is actually just a specific
manifestation of the (so-called) second leg of the admissibility test - "be detrimental to the
administration of justice". In other words, if a court determines during the "fairness" phase of
the inquiry that the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence "would render the trial
unfair", it means that admission of that evidence would also "be detrimental to the
administration of justice", because an unfair trial is detrimental to the administration of
justice.l'" Even if this is not so, exclusion in terms of s 35(5) can stand on only one leg.465
Quoting from S v Zuma,466 the Constitutional Court in S v Dzukuda,467 defined the right to
a fair trial as follows:
"[A]n accused's right to a fair trial under section 35(3) of the Constitution is a
comprehensive right and 'embraces a concept of substantive fairness which is not to be
equated with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the
Constitution came into force' It also does not warrant the conclusion that the right to a
fair trial consists merely of a number of discrete sub-rights, some of which have been
specified in the sub-section and others not. The right to a fair trial is a comprehensive and
integrated right, the content of which will be established, on a case by case basis, as our
constitutional jurisprudence on section 35(3) develops'V''"
It follows that the right to a fair trial is concerned with more than just the admissibility of
evidence. But as submitted in § 4 2 I I above, when admissibility of evidence is in issue, the
right to a fair trial can only be jeopardised by the admission of evidence that was
unconstitutionally obtained. This does not mean that the right to a fair trial is only at risk
when the admissibility of evidence is at issue. For instance, being tried in absentia469 violates
the right to a fair trial and so does being tried for an offence for which the accused had
previously been acquitted or convicted.V" However, these rights in themselves, rarely, if
ever, have anything to do with the admissibility of evidence.
464 S v Naidoo supra 233-234.
465 Section 35(5) requires exclusion even if only one of the two legs of the test is implicated.
466 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
4672000 (11) BCLR 1252 (CC).
468 S v Dzukuda 2000 (11) BCLR 1252 (CC) [9], citing S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) [16]. See also
Sanderson v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1997 (12) BCLR 1675 [22]; S v Ntuli 1996 (1) SACR 94 (CC)
95i-96e.
469 Section 35(3)(e).
470 Section 35(3)(m).
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When would admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence render the trial unfair? In
S v SOCi,471 a case that dealt with the admissibility of "self-incriminatory acts", the court held
that the distinction is based upon prejudice.472 Erasmus J stated:
"[T]he presence or absence of prejudice to the accused as well as the nature and degree
thereof, impacted on the question of whether to exclude the evidence in the interests of
ensuring a fair trial. The question of prejudice is in my view inseparable from the
question of fairness, in that a trial cannot be completely fair where the accused is in any
way prejudiced; but, on the other hand, the trial can hardly be unfair where there is no
prejudice. I find therefore that the presence or absence of prejudice is relevant to the
question of a fair trial".473
What causes prejudice? In this regard; the admission of evidence resulting from violations
of the accused's trial rights would be more prejudicial to the accused than a violation of other
rights in the Bill of Rights. Rights like the right to legal representation.V" the right to
silence475 and the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.V" are all primarily aimed at
protecting the right to a fair trial. Therefore, admission of evidence obtained in violation of
any of these rights - or any other right in the collection of rights that comprise the right to a
fair trial - would seriously prejudice the accused in his defence. Depending on the nature and
degree of the prejudice, an unfair trial will be the result.
Closely linked to the nature of the right is the nature of the evidence that resulted from the
violation.477 The Canadian Supreme Court has come to the conclusion that admission of real
evidence (non-conscriptive evidence), which exists "irrespective of Charter violations", will
"rarely render the trial unfair".478 In South Africa, the courts have - correctly, it is submitted
- adopted this approach: Real evidence, which normally exists independently of the violation,
"usually possesses an objective reliability ... [that] does not 'conscript the accused against
471 Supra.
472 See also S v Nombewu 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E).
473 S v Soci 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E) 294a-b, citing S v Nombewu supra 420i-422f Emphasis added.
474 Section 35(3)(f). In America, the 6th Amendment. In Canada, s 10(b) of the Charter (Even though there is no
explicit mention of trial counsel - s I0 contains the rights of arrested and detained persons - this is surely
implied in s 10(b)).
475 Section 35(3)(h). In America the Miranda rules afford arrested persons this right with their subsequent trial
in mind. In Canada, s 11(c) does the same.
476 Section 35(3)(j). InAmerica, the 5th Amendment. In Canada, s II(c).
477 See §§ 23 2 1 & 3 2 2 supra.
478 R v Jacoy (1988) 38 CRR 290 (SCC) 298; R v Collins (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC) § 37. See also R v
Stillman (1997) 1 SCR 607 (SCC) §§ 72-80.
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himself III the manner of a confessional statement".479 Therefore, admission of
unconstitutionally obtained real evidence rarely violates an accused's (fair) trial rights.
Consequently, its admission "may operate unfortunately for the accused, but not unfairly".48o
In the terms of S v SOci,481real evidence does not prejudice the accused's right to a fair trial
like testimonial communications, which were come by as a direct result of the violation.
Finally, a court must consider the effects of exclusion. Determining the fairness of the trial
is not a one sided inquiry. The fairness towards the prosecution and the effect of exclusion on
the administration of justice should also be taken into account. These considerations are
particularly important when the charge against the accused is serious and the violation of
little significance. However, "if the admission of the evidence would result in an unfair trial
[to the accused], the seriousness of the offence [or any other factor] would not render the
evidence admissible".482
At this point, it becomes clear that the oft-cited phrase from Key v Attorney-General, Cape
Provincial Division483 that introduced this discussion of trial fairness needs to be qualified: If,
after taking into account the relevant considerations, including possible unfairness to the
prosecution, a court concludes that admission of the evidence would result in an unfair trial to
the accused, that evidence must be excluded. Any subsequent unfairness that the prosecution
suffers from exclusion would never be enough to tip the balance back towards admitting the
evidence.
4213 Detriment to the administration of justice
If a court has already determined that admission of evidence obtained in violation of the
Bill of Rights would result in an unfair trial, the evidence must be excluded. There would
consequently be no reason to continue the inquiry into the effect on the administration of
479 S v M supra 362A, citing R v Holford (2001) 1 NZLR 385 (CA) 390. See also S v Naidoo supra; Mkhize v S
(2000) JOL 6155 (W).
480 Chaskalson (Ed) et al Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (2002-) 26-19, citing R v Wray (1970) 11
DLR (3d) 673.
481 Supra.
482 S v Naidoo supra 232, citing R v Jacoy supra 298. See also R v Stillman supra § 72.
483 1996 (4) SA 187 (CC) 196A-B. See n 463 supra. Reference to this part of the ruling in Key was made in,
among others, the following cases: S v Orrie CPD 14-10-2004 Case no SS 32/2003 18; Mkhize v S supra 6;
Pillay v S supra 199; S v Dube 2000 (2) SA 583 (N) 608E; S v Khan 1997 (2) SACR 611 (SCA) 618b-c; S v
Kidson supra 352i; S v M supra 361H; SvMphala supra 399j; S v Mphala supra 657b-c; S v Soci supra 295a; S
v Thapedi (2002) JOL 9372 (T) 17.
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justice, because an unfair trial is detrimental to the administration of justice.484 In practice,
this would lead to essentially the same result as in Canada where, once it is determined that
admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence would render the trial unfair, the enquiry is
not taken any further.485
It is however not necessary for a court to determine the admissibility of evidence first in
terms of fairness and then, if necessary, in terms of the effect of admission on the
administration of justice. A court may start its inquiry by determining the effect of admission
on the administration of justice.486 And a court need not answer both questions in the
affirmative before exclusion of evidence is mandated: Either requirement on its own
mandates the exclusion of evidence.
In S v SOCl487 the court defmed the (so-called) second leg of the s 35(5)-discretion and
distinguished it from the trial fairness leg as follows:
"The court has the power (indeed duty) to exclude evidence if the admission thereof
would bring the administration of justice into disrepute, even where there is no causal
connection between the constitutional infringement and the subsequent self-
incriminatory acts by the accused. It seems to me that the question of prejudice lies at the
very basis of the distinction between the two requirements in ss (5)".488
Therefore, admission of evidence that would not in any way be unfair, could still be
detrimental to the administration of justice. This is because the detriment test is much wider
than the fairness test: Trial fairness is determined only upon the facts of the case and
concentrates on the short-term effects of admission of evidence with prejudice to the accused
the central issue;489other factors are only considered in relation to the accused's right to a fair
trial. In contrast, the effect of admission on the administration of justice requires both short-
term and long-term factors to be considered, which include more than just the facts of the
case. And the accused's position is only one of many valid considerations taken into account
alongside each other.
484 S v Naidoo supra 233-234. Even if this were not so, s 35(5) can stand on only one leg. See n 465 supra.
485 See § 2 3 2 I supra.
486 But see S v Orne supra 20: "The initial enquiry ... must, however be, whether the admission of the evidence
obtained in violation of an accused's constitutional rights, would render the trial unfair". And, "the first issue in
the present matter must be whether the shortcomings in the warning or communication to the accused rendered
his trial unfair".
487 Supra.
488 S v Soci supra 294c-d.
489 S v Sod supra 293i-294a; S v Orrie supra 20.
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The administration of justice is divisible into the seemingly opposing considerations of
crime control490 and due process. Due process, as a subdivision of the administration of
justice, has at least two facets: First, the concerns at play in a specific trial, or the short-term
facet. Second, the cumulative effect that the outcome of each additional case has upon the
administration of justice in the long term.491 This implies that these two facets are interwoven
- the manner in which a court balances the different considerations in a specific case, adds to
a trend that also has an effect on due process in the long term.
Nonetheless, the short-term considerations can be in conflict with the long-term
considerations. This is because short-term due process takes into account only those
considerations that are important to a specific case. Of these, fairness to the accused is very
important, as well as the consequences that the accused is faced with upon conviction. The
consequence faced by the accused is of course the motivation for the defence to attack the
admissibility of any evidence. However, once the inquiry focuses on the effect of admission
on the administration of justice, determination of the fairness to the accused is no longer the
ultimate goal of the enquiry and the fairness consideration takes on a reciprocal nature.
In the short term, the importance of the interest of the community and victims to have a
guilty person convicted would vary according to the nature of the crime committed.Y' But in
the long term, the importance of bringing criminals to book must be influenced by the state of
criminal activity in society and the need to effectively prosecute and prevent it. In the short
term, the conduct of the police during their investigation is also of some importance, but
mostly only in cases of serious violations on their part, which in tum affect the fairness of the
trial.
In the long term, systemic deterrence of unconstitutional police conduct becomes more
important. The disciplining function of the courts was emphasised in S vMphala.493 Cloete J
excluded the accused's confessions, because they resulted from the deliberate violations of
the accused's rights in terms of s 35(1) and (2) of the Constitution.494 It follows that the short-
term and long-term elements of the administration of justice are particularly intertwined
where the focus is on deliberate violations of fundamental rights. Exclusion on account of
490 See § 4 2 2 2 7 infra. See n 440 supra.
491 In R v Collins supra, the Canadian Supreme Court favoured an approach based upon the long-term effect on
the administration of justice. See § 2 3 2 3 supra.
492 S v Dube supra 608F. But some crimes, like not stopping at a red traffic light, do not have victims.
493 Supra 400b. See § 4 2 2 2 5 infra.
494 The court found that even though the investigating officer complied with the "letter" of the Constitution by
informing the accused of all their rights, he still violated the "spirit" of the Bill of Rights by not furnishing them
with all relevant information to make an informed decision about waiving their rights.
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deliberate violations is done on a case-by-case basis, not so much as a remedy, but as a means
of ensuring future compliance with the Constitution.l'" Nonetheless, deliberate violations of
fundamental rights often render the trial unfair, which would adequately justify exclusion in
the short term.
4 2 2 S VMAKHATHINI
422 1 Introduction: The case
At the trial-within-the-trial of S v Makhathini,496 South African jurisprudence regarding
unconstitutionally obtained evidence reached a crossroad: The question arose whether
unconstitutionally obtained evidence previously excluded may nonetheless be used to
impeach the credibility of the accused.l'" One option - to follow the lead of the United
States498 - was offered the court, but the court (perhaps wisely) declined to go down that
road.
In disallowing the impeachment of the accused's testimony, a matter that is at least
partially procedural, Hurt J pointed out that "one must bear in mind that the procedure in our
courts is somewhat different from that in the United States".499
It is not clear from this judgment exactly how the court exercised its discretion to exclude
the impugned evidence from the state case in the first place, but this much is clear: The rights
of an accused person as enshrined in s 35 of the Constitution are just as applicable to an
accused-to-be. In other words, the police may not "circumvent the rights enshrined in the
Constitution simply by deferring the decision to arrest or detain".500 Therefore, even a suspect
must be informed of his rights before any information is elicited from him. 501
By refusing to follow the rationale of Harris, the court in essence adopted the rationale, in
its strict form, of the majority in Miranda v Arizona502 that evidence excluded for being
obtained in violation of the Bill of Rights, shall not be used at all. This is not surprising,
495 S v Makhathini supra 4.
496 D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97.
497 However, cross-examining of an accused by a co-accused using inadmissible statements had already been
allowed a month earlier in Sv Aimes 1998 (1) SACR 343 (C).
498 The prosecution relied on Harris v New York 40 I US 222 (1971).
499 SvMakhathini supra 3. See also n 437 supra.
500 S v Makhathini supra 2; S v Orrie supra; S v Sebejan 1997 (8) BCLR 1086 (W) 10961-1; S v Ndlovu 1997
(12) BCLR 1785 (N); S v Van der Merwe 1998 (1) SACR 194 (0); Cheadle, Davis & Haysom South African
Constitutional Law: The Bill of Rights (2002) 631. See n 41 supra & § 4 2 1 1 supra.
501 This is also the position in England. See n 444 supra, and the text it accompanies.
502384 US 436 (1966).
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given that s 35 of the Constitution includes essentially all the rights created by Miranda.
However, even today the US Supreme Court is divided on the question whether these rights
themselves are constitutional or merely prophylactic in nature. By including these rights in
the Bill of Rights, the framers of the SA Constitution have avoided the nearly forty-year-old
debate in the United States from spilling over into our courts. Hurt J reinforced the apparent
parallel to Miranda in the following statement, which also emphasises the need to deter
official misconduct:
"It seems to me that the solution to the avoidance of contradictory statements being made
by the accused and not being admissible before the Court is in the hands of the police
themselves, and once the police get into the habit of observing the requirements of the
Constitution meticulously, the type of problem which perhaps has arisen in this case may
disappear altogether". 503
This means that, regardless of South Africa being plagued by serious crime, the police
should not expect the courts to do their work for them, or turn a blind eye to unconstitutional
conduct. At least not yet, considering that our constitutional law and the application of the
Constitution are still in relative infancy, and the "fundamental importance that must be
attributed to the requirement that accused persons [and accused-to-be] be fully apprised of
their rights".504 For the time being, when the effect upon the administration of justice is
determined, crime control takes a second place to due process.i'"
From his comments in Makhathini, Hurt J seemed to consider due process towards the
accused (short-term) both as an end in itself and as a means to ensure that police toe the line
in the long run.506
In determining the importance of the various considerations at play when applying s 35(5),
South African courts should not overly rely on the judgments of the Canadian Supreme
Court. Section 24(2) is concerned with the effect that admission of the impugned evidence
would have on the "repute" of the administration of justice in the eyes of "the well-informed
member of the community'V'" It seems that the test of s 35(5) of the SA Constitution is less
503 S v Makhathini supra 4. See also S v Soci supra.
504 S v Makhathini supra 4.
505 See § 4 2 2 2 7 infra.
506 S v Makhathini supra 4.
507 R v Calder (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC) § 34, as quoted by Cory & Iacobucci 11 in R v Cook (I998) 2 SCR
597 (SCC) § 76.
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strict, or wider:508 Admissibility of evidence is dependant on its admission not being
"detrimental to the administration of justice".509 Anything that may cause detriment to the
administration of justice, including disrepute, should be taken into account. It is submitted
that the burden of the high crime rate upon society and the need to combat it effectively must
be taken into account.
The court in Makhathini declined to "start tampering with, or restricting, the limits of
admissibility of evidence given by accused persons to police by making adjustments to the
procedures in the course of trial".510 This is perhaps in line with the Canadian position as laid
down in R v Calder.511 The Canadian Supreme Court refused to admit for the limited purpose
of impeachment, evidence that had previously been excluded. The court held that reopening
the issue of admissibility would require a material change of the circumstances relating to the
making of the order in the first place, and only in very limited circumstances would a change
in the intended use of evidence, for that reason alone, "qualify as a material change of
circumstances that would warrant reopening the issue".512
In R v Solomons'P the court held as follows:
"Under cross-examination by counsel for the Crown, appellant denied that he had had
any knife in his possession at any stage of the evening in question ... [T} his unanticipated
denial by the accused of being in possession of a knife on the evening in question caused
one of the grounds whereupon the previously tendered evidence had been excluded to fall
away, and that Crown counsel was now entitled to put questions to the accused to show
that he was not speaking the truth in regard to a knife".514
This principle, not unknown to our courts under the common law, adapts easily to the
constitutional environment we find ourselves in: If the circumstances of the case change
materially, removing the reason515 for excluding the evidence, the admissibility of the
impugned evidence must be reconsidered. In determining what may constitute such a material
change in circumstances, the common law is again useful. For instance, if the accused leads
508 See § 4 2 1 3 supra. See also the comments of Cloete J in S v Mphala supra 659h-j. He unfortunately chose
to use the word "threshold", confusing the requirements for exclusion with the real threshold test which
activates s 35(5), namely whether a constitutional right had been violated in the first place.
509 Trial fairness is not mentioned, because it is just a specific manifestation of detriment to the administration of
justice.
510 S v Makhathini supra 4.
5Il (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
512 R v Calder supra § 35. It is perhaps worth noting that these circumstances have, to date, never materialised in
Canadian jurisprudence.
513 Supra.
514 R v Solomons supra 357G-H. Emphasis added.
515 Unfairness to the accused or detriment to the administration of justice.
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character evidence inconsistent with the excluded evidence or attempts to discredit a state
witness, the shield that the accused has against attack on his own credibility falls away. In
constitutional terms, this means that the administration of justice or trial fairness might
require admission of previously excluded evidence - or at least not prevent its admission -
during cross-examination.
4222 Principles of exclusion: The rationales behind Makhathini516
"The exclusion of evidence illegally or improperly obtained has come to be seen as a
means of disciplining law enforcement officers, maintaining integrity and public
confidence in the courts, and protecting rights as well as to give effect to its original
purpose, to avoid the risk of unreliability of evidence".517
42221 Introduction
It is illustrated throughout this work that various reasons exist for a court to exclude, or
include, unconstitutionally obtained evidence.518 However, this does not mean that every
rationale will always be applicable - it is clear that the Supreme Courts of both the United
States and Canada favour some rationales to others. In the United States, the deterrence of
official misconduct is the rationale of choice, with others only applicable when a court deems
deterrence to have served its purpose. In Canada, courts are more concerned with the fairness
of the trial and general repute of the administration of justice. This seems to indicate that
every rationale can be relevant, but none on its own should be decisive. On which rationale(s)
did the Makhathini court base its decision that once evidence has been excluded, its
admission may not be reconsidered for impeachment purposes?
42222 Reliability
In this regard, it is extremely important to bear in mind the difference between testimonial
communications and real evidencer '" On the one hand, "[c]onfessions forced from the
516 The discussion is based in part on Mirfield Silence, Confessions and Improperly Obtained Evidence (1997)
ch 2. See also Davies "Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Improperly Obtained" 2002 The Australian U 170;
Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" 1992 Stell LR.
517 Davies "Exclusion of Evidence" The Australian U 170.
518 See especially ch 1& 2 supra.
519 See § 3 2 2 1 supra.
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suspect by the flattery of hope or the torture of fear ... [come] in a questionable shape and
[are] undeserving of credit". On the other hand, real evidence speaks for itself and its
probative value remains unaffected by the manner of its acquisition.l" The Supreme Court of
Appeal in SvM521 commented on the "objective reliability" of real evidence as follows:
"Real evidence which is procured by illegal or improper means is generally more readily
admitted than evidence so obtained which depends upon the say-so of a witness (see, for
example, R v Jacoy522) the reason being that it usually possesses an objective reliability.
It does not 'conscript the accused against himself' in the manner of a confessional
statement (R v Ho/ford523)".524
The evidence at issue in Makhathini was of a testimonial nature; therefore, its reliability is
closely connected to the manner in which it was elicited from the accused. However, the
court never directly referred to the risk of unreliability of the statements as a basis for their
exclusion. The only suggestion that reliability might play a role is found in Harris v New
York525 and Miranda v Arizona,526 to which the court in Makhathini refers. Both cases held
that unreliable, or untrustworthy, evidence may not be used, although both were only
concerned with reliability as a factor in deterring (disciplining) official overreaching and the
extent to which misconduct should be deterred.Y' In any event, the court in Makhathini did
not refer to these cases in such a way as to suggest that it considered reliability as the basis
for exclusion in this case.
However, reliability as a requirement for admissibility of confessions at common law528
was specifically discussed in S v Mphala.529 Moreover, the court held that, even under the
Constitution, the admissibility of evidence is still determined according to the common law.
In other words, for the confessions at issue in S v Mphala to be admissible they still had to
satisfy the requirements of s 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 530 But, the Constitution
520 Mirfield Improperly Obtained Evidence 7.
5212003 (1) SA 341 (SCA).
522 (1988) 38 CRR 290 (SCC) 298.
523 (2001) 1 NZLR 385 (CA) 390.
524 S v M supra 362A-B. Emphasis added.
525401 US 222 (1971).
526 Supra.
527 See §§ 4 2 2 2 2 & 42225 supra.
528 As regulated by s 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
529 Supra 396g.
530 Act 51 of 1977.
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added to the common law admissibility requirements when evidence is "obtained in a manner
that violates any right in the Bill of Rights". 531
This means that evidence that may be admissible under common law can still be excluded
if its admission "would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the
administration of justice".532 For instance, in S v SOd533 the court found that the pointing out
and the statement had been made freely and voluntarily by the accused.r'" and that they were
therefore technically admissible in terms of s 217 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
However, the admissibility of the pointing out and the statement was still open to a challenge
based on the Constitution. And in S v Mphala the court was satisfied "that the State [had]
discharged the onus of proving the requirements laid down in s 217 of the Criminal
Procedure Act for the admission [of the impugned evidence] ... But that [did] not conclude the
matter".535 The admissibility of the evidence still had to be tested against the provisions of the
Constitution.
The admissibility of derivative evidence is similarly governed by s 218 of the Criminal
Procedure Act536 and s 35{5) of the Constitution. Section 218 determines that otherwise
admissible derivative evidence is admissible notwithstanding the fact that this evidence
resulted from an inadmissible confession or pointing out. 537 In other words, derivative
evidence is admissible despite any violation of the accused's rights unless its admission
would have one of the consequences that would require its exclusion in terms of s 35(5). It
follows that all s 218 does is to eliminate the possibility of a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree
doctrine in South Africa and give courts a discretion to admit the evidence, subject to the
Constitution.r'"
42223 Self-incrimination
"The underlying rationale of this branch of the criminal law, though it may originally
have been based upon ensuring the reliability of confessions is ... now to be found in the
531 See § 4 2 1 1 supra.
532 Section 35(5). Emphasis added.
533 Supra 286c, 288e.
534 See also S vMarx 1996 (2) SACR 140 (W) 144a.
535 S v Mphala supra 396g.
536 Act 51 of 1977. See also Scott JA for the minority in Pillay v S supra.
537 See also US v Patane 159 L Ed 2d 667 (2004); Scott JA for the minority in Pillay v S supra.
538 Pillay v S supra 195.
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maxim nemo debet prodere se ipsum, no one can be required to be his own betrayer or in
its popular English mistranslation 'the right to silence",.539
The self-incrimination principle is closely connected to the principle of reliability.
Moreover, as with reliability of evidence, the nature of the evidence determines to a large
extent whether the accused had been compelled to incriminate himself. 540However, in this
regard the different jurisdictions take different views of the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination. In the United States, as in South Africa, the privilege protects the accused from
being compelled to make a statement or a pointing out, while real evidence found as a result
of a violation of the privilege would in most cases not be protected by the privilege.
However, the US Supreme Court has muddled this distinction to some extent through
numerous analogies between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.i'"
In contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada takes a wider approach to the question of self-
incrimination. Canadian courts do not distinguish between different kinds of evidence on the
basis of their nature (testimonial or real).542 Rather, the focus is on the question whether the
accused had been unconstitutionally conscripted to provide the evidence at issue. Therefore,
real evidence that could not have been found without forcing the accused to reveal its
whereabouts violates the privilege against compelled self-incrimination543 in the same
manner that an improperly obtained statement would. An oft-cited example is R v
Burlinghami'" The accused was unconstitutionally conscripted to reveal the location of the
murder weapon at the bottom of a frozen lake. The police would never have found it without
the accused's unconstitutional participation. Consequently, both the statement revealing the
location of the gun and the gun itself were excluded for being in violation of the principle
against self-incrimination.
In South Africa, a pointing out by the accused is regarded as a testimonial communication,
which is protected by the privilege against compelled self-incrimination. However, real
evidence that was obtained as a result of a pointing out would normally not be treated as self-
incriminatory. Consequently, even if the prosecution is not allowed to lead evidence of the
pointing out, the evidence obtained as a result may still be linked to the accused in other
539 Lord Diplock in R v Sang 1980 AC 402436, as cited in Mirfield Improperly Obtained Evidence 14.
540 S See v M supra 362A.
541 Agnello v United States 269 US 20 (1925); Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961); Walder v United States 347 US
62 (1954). See generally §§ 3 2 2 & 323 supra.
542 R v Stillman supra.
543 Often referred to as the "principle against self-incrimination", because of its wider application. See R v
Stillman supra.
544 (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC).
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ways. For example, on the facts of Burlingham, the gun may still be available to the
prosecution in a South African court. While not being allowed to connect the gun to the
accused by way of the pointing out, the prosecution would not be precluded from attempting
to establish a connection by way of other non-self-incriminatory evidence, such as forensic
evidence.
In Makhathini, the court specifically mentioned the right to remain silent545 and the right
to legal representationc" as crucial to any inquiry regarding the admissibility of evidence
used in cross-examination of the accused. In fact, the court regarded the rights enshrined in s
35 as "the starting point in relation to any inquiry as to what can and what cannot properly
and fairly be put to a witness in cross-examination". 547
42224 Protection of constitutional rights
The privilege against compelled self-incrimination is substantive in nature in the sense that
it demands that no person may be forced to incriminate himself. Therefore compelling a
person to make a statement does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination, but
admission of that statement in criminal proceeding does.548One can almost say it is a remedy
in itself,549 considering that the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is a trial right
that "enhance[ s] the reliability of the truth-determining process".550
In contrast, other fundamental rights, like the right to privacy, does not in themselves
prevent the use of evidence obtained contrary to their mandates. Rather:
"Evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment is excluded from a criminal trial
not as a personal right of the criminal defendant but rather as a remedy for a wrong that
is fully accomplished at the time the evidence is obtained'V"
The so-called "protective principle" is purely remedial (and procedural) in nature. It aims
to provide an effective remedy for violations of the accused's rights by removing the
prejudice that would result from admission of the resulting evidence. Prejudice must not be
545 Section 35(1)(a).
546 Sections 35(2)(b) & 35(3)(f).
547 S v Makhathini supra 3.
548 Mirfield Improperly Obtained Evidence 18. For this reason, a person may be compelled to make certain
information known to the authorities in certain proceedings of a non-criminal nature. The privilege only requires
that this information not be used to prosecute that person.
549 Having characteristics of both "primary" rules and the "secondary" rule. See n 553 infra.
550 Dressler Understanding Criminal Procedure 3 ed (2002) 63.
551 Stevens J for the minority in Michigan v Harvey 494 US 344 (1990) 361, referring to Stone v Powell 428 US
465 (1976) 486; United States v Calandra 414 US 338 (1974) 348. See § 3 2 2 2 supra.
102
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
0iAPTER FOUR IMPEACHMENT IN SOUTH AFRlCA
understood in the sense that the evidence tend to incriminate the accused, as state evidence
normally does. Rather, the prejudice that must be remedied exists when admission of the
evidence would impact negatively on the fairness of the trial or the administration of justice
in general, given the manner in which it was acquired.552
At this point, it is useful to mention the distinction between "primary rules" and the
"secondary rule".553 The rules regulating pre-trial police powers (primary rules), like the right
to privacy or silence, restricts the behaviour of police officials in their contact with persons
suspected of committing crime. This means that evidence - even if reliable and highly
probative - may not be sought at all costs and might consequently never be found because of
the restrictions placed on the police's pre-trial behaviour. It follows that none of these
restrictions are newly imposed by the exclusionary rule (the secondary rule). The
exclusionary rule merely enforces these restrictions. Therefore:
"A society whose officials obey the [primary rules] in the first place ... pays the same
price as the society whose officials cannot use the evidence they acquired because they
obtained it in violation of the [primary rules]. Both societies convict fewer criminals". 554
However, the protective principle only requires a remedy when a violation results III
prejudice to the accused, or would be detrimental to the administration of justice. In S v
Mphala555 the court held that even though the accused were required to take part in an
identification parade without the presence of their lawyer, his presence would not have made
any difference to their being identified as the perpetrators. Therefore, admission of the
evidence of their identification did not detract from the fairness of the trial or the
administration of justice. In Mkhize v SS56the court specifically referred to and applied the
"no difference" principle of Mphala. The court held that the police's non-compliance with the
search warrant requirement made no difference, because even if they had applied for the
warrant, nothing that the accused could legally have done would have prevented the
discovery of the evidence in issue.
552 See § 4 2 1 2 supra and the references therein to S v Soci supra for another look at prejudice.
553 Van Rooyen "Lead-in Paper: The Investigation and Prosecution of Crime" 1975 Acta Juridica 70 79.
554 Kamisar "'Comparative Reprehensibility' and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule" (1987) 86
Michigan LR 1 47-48, as cited in Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" 1992 Stell LR 194.
Emphasis in the original.
555 Supra 660c.
556 Supra 8.
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In S v Makhathini,s57 Hurt J implied that the "spirit,,558 of the Constitution extended the
rights of arrested, detained and accused persons to ''protect a person who had not yet been
formally arrested, detained or charged, but who is being questioned by the police with the
intention of arresting, detaining or charging him".559 It becomes clear that, in the opinion of
the court, effective protection against infringement of the rights in the Constitution is crucial.
For this reason, remedies as extreme as the exclusion of the "fruits" of conduct that prejudice
the accused is called for.
By siding with the minority in Harris v New York,560Hurt J galvanised the rationale that
individuals must be protected against violations of their rights. The Harris minority placed
great value on safeguarding the rights entrenched in the (American) Constitution and those
highlighted by cases such as Miranda v Arizona/'" Hurt J continued:
"[T]he minority judges [in Harris] taking the view that to allow previous contradictory
statements, otherwise inadmissible, to be put to an accused in cross-examination, would
simply be allowing inadmissible evidence 'through the back door,,,.562
The majority in Miranda shared this sentiment. However, the majority in Miranda opted
instead to base their decision on the deterrence (disciplining) rationale.i'" which, it is
submitted, is closely linked to the protective principle. Similarly, the minority in Harris felt
that allowing evidence "though the back door" would undo much of the deterrence brought
about by cases such as Miranda.
The court in Makhathini emphasised the importance of protecting accused persons against
violations of the rights incorporated in s 35 of the Constitution, which consists of the rights of
"arrested, detained and accused persons".564 Of these, the privilege against compelled self-
incrimination is paramount. In S vMphala,565 the court held that compliance with the "spirit",
rather than the "letter" of the Constitution prevents situations that would still render a trial
unfair.566 It is submitted that the "spirit" of the Constitution likewise works to protect against
557 Supra.
558 S v Mphala supra 399f
559 S vMakhathini supra 3-4. Emphasis added.
560 Supra.
561 Supra. These rights are in essence the same as those found in s 35 of the SA Constitution.
562 S v Makhathini supra 3.
563 See §§ 2 2 I supra & 4 2 2 2 5 infra.
564 These rights are primarily aimed at protecting the accused's privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
See § 4 2 2 2 3 supra.
565 Supra.
566 S v Mphala supra 399f
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violations of all the other rights contained in the Bill of Rights, and to provide a remedy at
trial if necessary.
42225 Police discipline
It was submitted above that the protection rationale is closely linked to the disciplining
rationale; the former being a remedy for prejudice against the particular accused and the latter
a preventative measure against any future overreaching by the police. This leads to two
conclusions. First, the disciplining rationale serves a wider purpose, aiming to prevent future
police conduct that might bring about prejudice to accused persons. Second, the protection of
the accused in a particular case also serves as a preventative measure against similar abuses
in future cases.
The disciplining rationale has a wider application than both the reliability principle and the
protective principle. Moreover, the disciplining rationale in its pure form is not concerned
with the reliability of evidence or protection of the accused in a particular case. Therefore,
even if evidence is reliable and the accused suffered no significant prejudice, the disciplining
rationale may still require exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence. The reason is
simple: The disciplining rationale is aimed at preventing future unconstitutional behaviour by
police that could lead to unreliable evidence or prejudice to the accused, even if it did not in
the particular case.
Furthermore, the unlawful conduct that is sought to be prevented need not be causally
connected to the evidence in question. Rather, the question is whether the unlawful conduct
could lead to the discovery of the evidence in question. If the answer is affirmative, all that
remains to be determined is whether exclusion of the particular evidence will result in the
deterrence of unconstitutional conduct in future cases. The aim of this rationale is to prevent
future violations of constitutional rights and focuses on the unlawful behaviour of the police.
Therefore, the nature of the evidence uncovered does not play such a big role in
determining when evidence should be excluded. This being the primary rationale for
exclusion in the United States, it might explain why the Supreme Court determines the
admissibility of real evidence along much the same lines as the admissibility of testimonial
communications. However, it is submitted that because the nature of the evidence is often
determinative of the degree of prejudice its admission will have to the accused, the nature of
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the evidence should be taken into account when determining what police activities could lead
to future prejudice.
The question whether police intentionally violated a basic right III order to obtain the
evidence in question is important. In S vMphala, Cloete J held:
"In such a case [an intentional violation of the Constitution] the emphasis falls on the
'detrimental to the administration of justice' portion of s 35(5) and the disciplinary
function of the Court ... becomes important: 'The object of the [Canadian] Charter is not
to make the obtaining of evidence or the getting of a conviction easier or more difficult,
it is not intended to help people get acquittals or the Crown to succeed in its
prosecutions, but rather to induce legislatures and government agents to respect the rights
and freedoms set out therein, with notice as to the consequences of invalidity that follow
any contrary action'''. 567
It follows that good faith violations of the Constitution are not considered in such a serious
light. Moreover, exclusion of evidence obtained in good faith does not satisfactorily serve the
deterrence rationale, hence the US Supreme Court's "good faith" exception to both the Fourth
Amendment and the Miranda exclusionary rules.
However, the aim is not to discipline individual law enforcement officers. Rather, the aim
is to deter violations on an institutional level. Therefore, regardless of the individual police
officer's efforts to act reasonably, in good faith and even following departmental guidelines,
evidence must still be excluded when the departmental guidelines are in violation of the
accused's rights. A good example is S v SOCi,568 where a form, drafted by the legal advisers of
the South African Police Service, contained a material oversight regarding the accused's right
to consult counsel before a pointing out. Also, in Mkhize v SS69 Willis J held that "the courts
must be slow to indulge ignorance of the law of criminal procedure on the part of the
police".57o Therefore, good faith behaviour is only tolerated where the institution as a whole
acted in the way expected of a reasonable police force.
In Makhathini, the court made it abundantly clear that prevention is better than cure:
"[O]nce the police get into the habit of observing the requirements of the Constitution
meticulously, the type of problem which perhaps has arisen in this case may disappear
567 S vMphala supra 400b-d, quoting Tarnopolsky JA in R v James; R v Dzagic (1998) 33 CRR 107 (Ont CA),
which has twice been approved by the Constitutional court - in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC);
Key v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division supra.
568 Supra.
569 (2000) JOL 6155 (W).
570 Mkhize v S supra 7.
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altogether',.571 It seems clear that the court intended to discipline the police for not adhering
to the dictates of the Constitution. On top of that, the ultimate goal of the court was to prevent
future violations. By deterring future unconstitutional conduct, the need to apply a remedy as
drastic as exclusion of evidence may not arise in future cases.
42226 J di . I . .ty572U lela zntegrz
Judicial integrity is to some extent connected to the repute of the administration of justice.
This means that courts should uphold the Constitution at least as strictly as a reasonable
member of society would - a court is not only bound by its own beliefs, but also those of the
community it serves. That public perceptiorr'F is important is illustrated by the following
argument in favour of an inclusionary approach (or against an exclusionary rule) as
formulated by Van der Merwe:
"The most important of these [arguments in favour of an inclusionary approach] is
probably the danger of creating a situation where society perceives the relevant criminal
justice system as a system which "frees" a murderer or rapist on account of a constable's
blunder".574
And the opposite, illustrated by S vNaidooi'?
"To countenance the violations in this case would leave the general public with the
impression that the courts are prepared to condone serious failures by the police to
observe the laiddown standards of investigation so long as a conviction results".576
The conflicting interests within the community are central to the issue of judicial integrity.
More important than acting according to its own conscience, a court must strike a balance
between two extremes, often referred to as social justice and individual justice. Social justice
itself consists of two contradictory requirements: Guilty persons must be brought to justice,
but not at all costs. Individual justice means that every person (criminal) must get his just
deserts. If courts exclude unlawful evidence too easily, resulting in the acquittal of factually
571 S v Makhathini supra 4. See also S v Naidoo supra 237.
572 See § 2 2 2 2 2 supra.
573 The perceptions of the public can be defined in many forms. Mirfield Improperly Obtained Evidence 23-24
gives at least three variations on the theme. R v Cook supra § 66, citing R v Collins supra 282, 288, explains
public perception as follows: "[I]n the eyes of a reasonable person, dispassionate and fully apprised of the
circumstances".
574 Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" 1992 Stell LR 183, referring to the example
mentioned by Cardozo J in People v Defore 242 NY 21 (1926) 587. See n 110 supra.
5751998 (1) All SA 189 CD).
576 S v Naidoo supra 236.
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guilty persons, the public will lose faith in the integrity of the legal system. Conversely, if
courts admit evidence resulting from illegal investigative methods, they might create the
perception that they condone police infringements upon fundamental rights of members of
the community in order to secure evidence against accused persons.577
With this in mind, the principle of legal guilt fits neatly into the judicial integrity principle:
"[A} person is not to be held guilty of crime merely on a showing that in all probability,
based upon reliable evidence, he did factually what he is said to have done. Instead, he is
to be held guilty if and only if these factual determinations are made in procedurally
regular fashion and by authorities acting within competences duly allocated to them.
Furthermore, he is not to be held guilty, even though the factual determination is or
might be adverse to him, if various rules designed to protect him and to safeguard the
integrity of the process are not given effect".578
The US Supreme Court has on numerous occasions emphasised the importance of judicial
integrity in the run-up to Mapp v Ohio579 and Miranda v Arizona580 and shortly thereafter.
However, this principle has since lost much of its appeal in American courts.581
In Makhathini Hurt J probably had judicial integrity in mind when he stated:
"Our constitutional law and the application of the [present] Constitution are, as yet, in
comparative infancy, and the Constitutional Court has emphasised, on a number of
occasions already, the fundamental importance that must be attributed to the requirement
that accused persons be fully apprised of their rights".582
This seems to indicate that, for the time being, courts must accept no compromise when
giving effect to the rights of accused persons. Therefore, the first priority of the courts is to
embed the Constitution as part of our national culture.583 Furthermore, courts must make
certain that they are not perceived by the public to apply double standards by condoning
police practices that do not conform to the requirements of the Constitution. Hurt J continued:
577See also §§ I 1& 2323 supra.
578Packer The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (1968) 166, as quoted in Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally
Obtained Evidence" 1992 Stell LR 190.
579367US 643 (1961).
580 Supra.
581See § 2 2 2 2 2 supra.
582S vMakhathini supra 4.
583Both in the minds of the public and in the practices of the police.
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"[I]t is [not] correct for this Court to start tampering with, or restricting, the limits of
admissibility of evidence given by accused persons to police by making adjustments to
the procedures in the course of trial". 584
According to the court, the balance for the time being must be heavily weighted in favour
of due process.
Pursued to its logical conclusion, judicial integrity coupled with the principles of legal
guilt and social justice, requires that the criminal justice system must be able to correct its
own abuses. The criminal trial is also uniquely placed to be able to correct abuses within the
administration of justice, almost immediately.i'" Critics would say that the principle of self-
correction - which as an integral part includes the exclusionary rule - detracts from the
primary function of the criminal trial, namely to determine the truth, by creating a
proliferation of secondary questions. But in a system where the administration of justice is
based on constitutional due process, the principle of social justice must replace the narrow
truth-at-all-costs rationale as the primary purpose of a criminal trial. And this, it is submitted,
was the essence of Hurt J's decision in Makhathini.
42227 Crime control
While all the principles discussed above have some relation to the requirement of due
process, the South African experience requires that something be said about the realities in
South Africa. The Constitutional Court586 has taken judicial notice of the crime wave
plaguing South Africa. Violent crimes are particularly rife.587
It is imperative that courts are not perceived to detract from the dictates of the
Constitution, especially so soon after its enactment. However, if ever there was a balancing
factor in the South African context, the requirement that crime be prevented and criminals
brought to justice would be it. This does not imply that police may with impunity disregard
the Constitution. On the contrary, the police themselves have the duty, and the power, to
prevent many of the problems of inadmissible evidence by strictly adhering to the
Constitution.588 However, s 35(5) gives courts a discretion to decide whether evidence is
584 S v Makhathini supra 4. Emphasis added.
585 Van der Merwe "Unconstitutionally Obtained Evidence" 1992 Stell LR 193. It also fits in with the courts'
sUfervisory function over the administration of justice.
58 Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO supra [152]. See n 438 supra.
587 Pillay v S supra 187.
588 S v Makhathini supra 4.
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admissible on the facts of the case - and probably to take into account wider principles like
the reality of serious crime in South Africa. Like the Constitution, the constitutionally
entrenched discretion is also "in comparative infancy,,589 and must be interpreted and applied
according to the needs of the South African people.
In S vMphala590 the court held that
"there must be a balance between, on the one hand, respect (particularly by law
enforcement agencies) for the Bill of Rights and, on the other, respect (particularly by the
man in the street) for the judicial process. Overemphasis of the former would lead to
acquittals on what would be perceived by the public as technicalities ... ,,591
The perceptions of the public were explained as follows by Flemming DJP in Desai v S:592
"I am not suggesting that the procedural unfairness of proceeding against an accused is
unimportant. Only that it is important to remember that in considering all sorts of reasons
why a man should be found not guilty despite evidence or admissions which establish the
commission of the crime beyond all doubt, it is necessary to strive towards balance ... [IJt
is incomprehensible that a man who clearly committed an offence should be acquitted ...
Victims and those around them and also society at large have an interest which is real
and legitimate". 593
Erasmus J, in S v Nombewut'" explained the necessity to take into account the needs of
society:
"The concept of a fair trial not only encompasses the abstract universal values of an open
and democratic society, but also - I should think - has regard to the subjective needs,
feelings and views of society at the particular time ... Public opinion will no doubt be
affected by the nature and seriousness of the infringement, as well as by the nature and
seriousness of the crime involved (S v Hammer595) seen in the light of the state of
lawlessness prevailing in the country (Melani596). The Constitution operates in a
particular society with immediate needs".597
589 S v Makhathini supra 4
590 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W).
591 S v Mphala supra 657fh. In R v Cohen (1983) 5 CCC 39 (BC CA), Anderson J wrote in a minority opinion:
"A balance must be struck between the need for firm and effective law enforcement and the right of the citizen
to be as free as reasonably possible from illegal and unreasonable conduct on the part of the police".
5921997 (2) All SA 298 (W). See also S v Nombewu supra.
593 Desai v S 1997 (2) All SA 298 (W) DJP 302b-e. Emphasis added.
594 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E).
595 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C).
596 SvMelani 1995 (2) SACR 141 (E) 191h.
597 S v Nombewu supra 422f423b. Emphasis added.
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In S v Makhathini598 the court emphasised "the fundamental importance that must be
attributed to the requirement that accused persons be fully apprised of their rights".599
Nonetheless, it is imperative that courts not lose sight of the realities of crime and the
difficulties faced by the authorities in effectively bringing the guilty to book.6oO
However, it is clear that courts, even when faced with serious crimes and the need to bring
the perpetrators to justice, will not tolerate violations of constitutional rights:
"There may be those members of the public who will regard the exclusion of the
evidence as being evidence of undue leniency towards criminals [in this case the
perpetrators of what has been referred to as the biggest robbery in the history of South
Africa]. The answer to that is that crime in this country cannot be brought under control
unless we have an efficient, honest, responsible and respected police force, capable of
enforcing the law. One of the mistakes which must be learnt from the past is that illegal
methods of investigation are unacceptable and can only bring the administration of
justice into disrepute, particularly when they impinge upon the basic human rights which
the Constitution seeks to protect".601
It is submitted that the seriousness of the crime should not be summarily dismissed in the
face of a violation of the Constitution. The seriousness of the charge should be balanced
against the seriousness of the violation of the Constitution. In this way a proportional result,
taking into account the pressing need to convict serious criminals, is possible. In S v
Madiba602 this was done - the seriousness of the offence was considered along with the fact
that the accused's rights were only violated to the extent necessitated by circumstances. Hurt
J603concluded that "the extent of the infringement of the right to privacy was such as to pale
into insignificance compared with the importance of achievement of the object which the
police had in the course of their duties".604
598 Supra.
599 S v Makhathini supra 4.
600 See S v Lottering 1999 (12) BCLR 1478 (N). See also New York v Quarles 467 US 649 (1984).
601S v Naidoo supra 237.
6021998 (1) BCLR 38 (D).
603Hurt J also delivered the judgment in S v Makhathini supra.
604 SvMadiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D) 45.
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423 S vAIMES
In S v Aimes,605 the court was presented with a novel situation in terms of exclusion under
s 35(5) of the Constitution. Counsel for accused no 2 wanted to introduce, and cross-examine
accused no lon, evidence given by the latter during his bail application. The bail testimony
of accused no 1 contained statements that were self-incriminating but also exculpated accused
no 2. Accused no 1's testimony in court was inconsistent with his testimony during the bail
proceedings, which was inadmissible for being given in violation of accused no 1's right to
silence under the interim Constitution.P'"
The novelty was in the fact that it was not the state but a co-accused who, in order to
effectively conduct his own defence, wanted to tender the unwamed bail evidence to impeach
the credibility of accused no 1. Counsel for accused no 2 relied on his client's right to a fair
trial which included the right "to adduce and challenge evidence,,.607 To give effect to this
right meant that accused no 2 had to be allowed to tender the statements made by accused no
1 in which he exculpated accused no 2. Furthermore, accused no 2 had to be allowed to
challenge the in-court testimony of accused no 1 insofar as it was inconsistent with his
statements at the bail hearing. Both these rights were elements of the right to a fair trial under
the interim Constitution and still are under the present Constitution.608 This meant that in
order for accused no 1 to have a fair trial the evidence had to be excluded. And for the trial
against accused no 2 to be fair, he had to be able to introduce the same evidence in his
defence and cross-examine accused no 1 on it. It follows that accused no 2' s right to a fair
trial, was in conflict with accused no 1's right to a fair trial.
The court, although faced with the question of admissibility for a limited purpose, still did
not face the same situation as the court in S vMakhathini.609 In S v Aimes610 the question was
not whether the prosecution could impeach accused no 1, whose right to silence was violated,
with the inadmissible evidence, but whether another accused could present that evidence in
his own favour, although it would inevitably have discredited accused no 1.
605 1998 (1) SACR 343 (C). Judgment in this case was delivered about a month before the judgment in S v
Makhathini supra was delivered.
606 Which is essentially the same as under the present Constitution. By the time that the hearing of the trial
commenced, the present Constitution had already come into force.
607 Section 25(3)(d) of the interim Constitution; s 35(3)(i) of the present Constitution.
608 Sections 25(3)(c) & 25(3)(d) of the interim Constitution; s 35(3)(h) & 35(3)(i) of the present Constitution.
609 Supra.
610 Supra.
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The judgment in Aimes indicates that evidence inadmissible as proof of guilt might still be
admitted to impeach one accused, if fairness to a co-accused requires it. Desai J did however
specifically rule that admission of the inculpatory statements in accused no l's bail testimony
"would still render the trial unfair as far as it concerns the position of Accused No 1 unless a
formula is found by the court to prevent such prejudice". Desai J continued that a formula
similar to that adopted in S v Jeniker611
"would achieve the purpose of preventing such prejudice, namely that the bail evidence
of Accused No 1 may be introduced as evidence for the specific purpose of assisting
Accused No 2 in his defence, subject to the rider that it is not admissible as evidence
against Accused No 1 and that it may be used for the purpose of cross-examining
Accused No 1 or for such other purpose as Counsel for Accused No 2 may deem fit
insofar as this does not seek to introduce the transcript as being a statement of the truth
. b d . A d AT 1" 612or Its contents to e use against ccuse iVO •
The result of the court's finding in S v Aimes613 was that admission of the evidence for
purposes of cross-examination against accused no 1 would (probably) jeopardise the fairness
of his trial. But since violations of rights occur in degrees, the degree of unfairness to accused
no 1 brought about by impeachment - not incrimination - was outweighed by the degree of
unfairness to accused no 2 that would have resulted had he not been able to effectively meet
the charges against him. However, fairness to accused no 2 did not require the contents of
accused no 1's bail evidence to be admitted against accused no 1, and therefore it remained
inadmissible for the purpose of proving his guilt.
The ruling opened the door ever so slightly for the accused's right to silence and not to
incriminate himself, to be balanced against other equally fundamental rights. However, the
fairness test in s 35(5) still rigidly protects any accused from being confronted with
unconstitutionally obtained evidence that would render his trial unfair.
The judgment in Aimes illustrates another important matter, accepted by the US Supreme
Court since Harris v New York:614 There is a difference in the prejudice suffered by the
accused when unconstitutionally obtained evidence is used as proof of the accused's guilt and
the prejudice when only the inconsistency between his trial testimony and previous
inadmissible testimony is used to discredit him.
611 1993 (2) SACR 464 (C) 467-468.
612 S v Aimes supra 350e-g. Emphasis added.
613 Supra.
614 Supra.
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4 2 4 WESSO VDIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS, WESTERN CAPE
For nearly four years after S v Makhathinii"? nothing happened to confirm or overthrow
the no-impeachment stance taken by Hurt J in that judgment. Then, in Wesso v Director of
Public Prosecutions, Western Cape,616 the issue was brought up, discussed and eventually not
decided. The court held, correctly, that the application to prevent the use of the evidence in
question was premature and that the trial court would be in a better position to decide the
admissibility of the evidence in question.I'"
The evidence that gave rise to the application resulted from an "interview or consultation"
in the offices of the director of public prosecutions where the accused (applicant) made
statements. He also pointed out certain things at the crime-scene. On the applicant's version
of the facts,618 he was invited to attend the interview as a state witness and consequently not
warned that he was a suspect. The respondent claimed that the decision to prosecute the
applicant had not been taken at that stage. Nor does it appear, from the respondent's version
of the facts, that the decision to prosecute had been deferred in order to sidestep the warning
requirements of s 35 of the Constitution as was done in Makhathini. Therefore, at worst the
applicant made unwarned statements, which the respondent in any event assured both the
applicant and the court would not be used at the trial of the applicant.
However, the respondent specifically reserved the right to use the evidence against the
applicant
"where parts of the statement were to be elicited by the defence or Wesso [second
accused] were to give evidence in his own defence and adduce a version contrary to the
said statement. The State will then seek leave to put the said statement into evidence in
d . h h di ,rUT ,,619or er to tmpeac t e ere It oj 1'1' esso .
The indication that the respondent intended to impeach the applicant's testimony in court
with the unwarned and therefore unconstitutionally obtained evidence led to the court's
discussion of the issue in Makhathini. Moreover, since the respondent had assured the
applicant that the evidence would not be used against him, a trial court would probably have
615 Supra.
6162001 (I) SACR 674 (CPD).
617 Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape 2001 (I) SACR 674 (CPD) 683d-g, 685e, citing Key
v Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division supra [14]; Sapat v The Director: Directorate of Organised
Crime and Public Safety 1999 (2) SACR 435 (C) 443c.
618 There were factual disputes that the court could not resolve on papers.
619 Erasmus AJ in Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape supra 678g-h, quoting from the
answering affidavit. Emphasis added.
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no difficulty in ruling the statements inadmissible under s 35(5) if the prosecution
(respondent) acted in breach of its promise. Would such inadmissible statements nonetheless
be admissible to impeach the testimony of the accused if his testimony conflicted with these
statements?
In discussing the question Erasmus AJ stated: "Whether or not the prosecution would in
our law be allowed to cross-examine the second accused on the statement he made to
[respondent] is not clear".620 And immediately thereafter:
"In S v Sibusiso Makhatini [sic] and Others (unreported, Durban and Coast Local
Division, Case number CC73/97, 21 November 1997)621questions aimed at discrediting
an accused by putting to him statements made to the investigating officer were not
allowed on the ground that there had not been the customary warning in terms of the
Judges' Rules and the accused had not been informed of his rights in terms of s 35 of the
Constitution".622
Does this mean that Erasmus AJ did not consider the judgment in Makhathini as
conclusive? It is not clear from Hurt J's judgment in Makhathini exactly how he exercised his
discretion - assuming that he did623 - to exclude the statement from the prosecution case in
the first place. Nonetheless, once the evidence had been ruled inadmissible, the general rule is
that it would have been inadmissible for all purposes, including discrediting the accused.
After a discussion of the Makhathini case and the American authority it declined to follow,
Erasmus AJ continued with a discussion of the Canadian Supreme Court's ruling in R v
Calder.624 The Calder case was based on a factual situation similar to Wesso: Both cases
concerned a police officer who made statements without having been warned about their
respective rights. It may be significant that Erasmus AJ highlighted the factual similarities
before emphasising the Canadian Supreme Court's position on the matter:
"The Supreme Court of Canada, however, kept the door open by holding that in some
future case a trial Judge might decide that there were' special circumstances' warranting
reception of such a statement for the limited purpose of impeaching credibility".625
620 Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape supra 684c. Emphasis added.
621Cited in this work as S v Makhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97.
622 Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape supra 684d.
623The judgment merely states that because the accused had not received any of the warnings in terms of the
Judges' Rules or the Constitution, any information elicited from his "conversations" with the police was
inadmissible.
624Supra.
625 Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape supra 684i.
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The significance of this remark is strengthened by the tendency of South African courts to
be influenced by the judgments of the Canadian Supreme Court in cases where interpretation
and application of s 35(5) is required. It is submitted that S v Makhathini626 will not be the
final case on the matter.
626 Supra.
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"The most that can be achieved is the nullification of the [accused's] evidence".627
5 1 INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter focused on the development to date of local precedent regarding the
use of inadmissible evidence for the limited purpose of impeaching the accused. The current
chapter is aimed at the future: To suggest possible guidelines or considerations to be taken
627 R v Calder (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SeC) § 25.
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into account by courts when deciding whether to admit inadmissible evidence to impeach the
testimony of the accused.
Despite the general principle that evidence ruled inadmissible remains inadmissible for the
duration of the trial and for all purposes,628 a ruling on the admissibility of evidence is only
interlocutory.F" Therefore, under certain "circumstances" a judge may be called upon to
reconsider or revise his earlier ruling on admissibility.r'"
Certain factors have been discussed throughout this work that might be useful In the
decision whether inadmissible evidence may after all be admitted to impeach the accused.
First, the nature of the right that was violated to obtain the evidence in issue could determine
whether or not the accused is prejudiced.r" Second, the nature of the evidence that resulted
from the violation and its potential probative value may affect the decision whether to
impeach or not.632Third, the distinction between the two legs of s 35(5) is important. Fourth,
the intentions of the police playa role in determining the degree of prejudice to the accused.
Fifth, the strategy employed by the accused during the trial can have a mitigating effect on
the potential prejudice resulting from admission of impeachment evidence.Y' Sixth, the
absence of juries in South African trials, frees the courts to hear otherwise inadmissible
evidence without the risk that the evidence would be misinterpreted.Y" These factors are not
mutually exclusive and, when relevant to a specific case, should all be put in the balance to
determine the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for the purpose of
impeachment.
Another matter that is crucial to the debate whether or not evidence should be admissible
for impeachment is the fact that it is tendered only for a limited purpose. Admission of
evidence for impeachment is not intended to prove the guilt of the accused, but only to test
628 See §§ 1 1 & 4 1 1 supra. See also § 3 3 1 2 supra, which explains the position in Canada.
629 See § 4 1 1 supra.
630 .R v Calder supra § 35; R v Solomons 1959 (2) 352 (A). See also §§ 1 3; 4 1 1 & 424 supra.
631 See §§ 2 2 4; 3 2 2; 3 2 3 4 & 4 2 2 2 4 supra.
632 See §§ 2 2 2 4 3; 2 3 2 1; 3 2 2 1 & 3 2 3 supra.
633 R v Solomons supra. This principle, not unknown to our courts under the common law, adapts easily to the
constitutional environment we fmd ourselves in: If the circumstances of the case change materially, removing
the reason for excluding the evidence, the admissibility of the impugned evidence must be reconsidered. In
determining what may constitute such a material change in circumstances, the common law is again useful. For
instance, if the accused leads character evidence inconsistent with the excluded evidence or attempts to discredit
a state witness, the shield that the accused has against attack on his own credibility falls away. In constitutional
terms, this could mean that the administration of justice or trial fairness might require admission of previously
excluded evidence.
634 The justified lack of faith in a jury's ability to asses limited purpose evidence for what it is worth has been
illustrated throughout this thesis. See § § 1 1; 3 2 1 1; 3 2 3 5; 3 3 I 4; 4 1 2 & n 282 supra.
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the veracity of his testimony - a distinction that a judicial officer, but not necessarily a
layperson, would normally be able to make and properly apply to the facts.
In other words, by discrediting the accused's testimony, the prosecution neutralises it
leaving the accused with nothing. It is important to note that neutralising the accused's
testimony alone does not lead to a conviction. More is needed. The conviction will not follow
merely because the accused put up a poor, or even a perjurious defence. Only substantive
evidence, proving the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, will secure a conviction.
Impeachment merely serves to illustrate that at the very worst the accused is guilty of
perjury, which on its own will never be enough for a conviction of the crime charged.
Therefore admitting the unconstitutionally obtained evidence for a limited purpose has a
limited impact on the trial: Where admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence as proof
of guilt would prejudice the accused, admission for a limited purpose would prejudice the
accused to a lesser degree, or not at all. And since the "nature and degree" of prejudice
determines whether the right to a fair trial has sufficiently been infringed to exclude
evidence,635 it is possible that admission of evidence to impeach might not infringe the right
to a fair trial even when admission in general would. Similarly, admission for the limited
purpose of impeachment might not be detrimental to the administration of justice while
admission to prove guilt might be.
5 2 THE IMPORTANCE OF STAYING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF SECTION 35(5) OF THE
CONSTITUTION636
The most important reason why courts must not stray from the framework of s 3 5( 5) is the
risk of creating precedent that would be unsuitable to the local needs. The easiest way to stray
would be to blindly follow the Canadian lead. The obvious, but sometimes superficial,
similarity between s 24(2) of the Canadian Charter and our own s 35(5) of the Constitution
makes it tempting to rely on Canadian jurisprudence, especially at a time when there is a
shortage of local precedent.
However, the underlying differences between these sections, together with the numerous
procedural and societal differences, demand a cautious and independent interpretation of s
35(5). First, the Canadian Supreme Court's replacement of the word "would" with the less
635 S v Sod 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E) 294a.
636 See generally § 4 1 2 supra.
119
OW>TERFIVE IMPEACHMENT IN SOUTH AFRICA: BEYOND MAKHATHINI
onerous "could,,637 must not be followed. The reason is obvious: If the framers of our
Constitution had intended such an interpretation they would have chosen to insert the word
"could" into s 35(5). This means that, in the context of s 35(5) exclusion of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence is mandated only when it is a certainty ("would") - and not merely a
possibility ("could,,)638 - that admission will lead to one of the results mentioned.P"
Second, s 24(2) of the Charter focuses on the "repute" of the administration of justice,
which is determined by "the well-informed member of the community't.Y'" In other words s
24(2) is moved by public perceptions. It is submitted that s 35(5) takes into account a wider
range of factors, including public perceptions, to determine whether admission of the
impugned evidence would be detrimental to the administration of justice, effectively lowering
the level for activation of s 35(5). South African courts should therefore not limit themselves
in their interpretation of s 35(5) by blindly following the Canadian interpretation.
Third, it is submitted that the Canadian distinction between "conscriptive" and "non-
conscriptive" evidence, discussed in § 2 3 2 1 above, and further discussed in §§ 5 3 and 5 6
below, takes the reliance on self-incrimination as a reason for exclusion too far. Local courts
should not follow this trend.
Fourth, the Canadian Supreme Court interprets s 24(2) within the Canadian procedural
framework, which differs from that of South Africa in two important aspects.?" Canadian
courts have a wide range of powers to order a retrial once evidence has been excluded. And
Canadian trials employ juries, which heightens the risk of evidence being misinterpreted and
potentially causing unfairness to the accused. South African courts do not employ juries.
Consequently, South African courts can afford to be less strict in their admissibility
requirements, because a judicial officer will be less likely to attach a greater value to limited
purpose evidence than it is worth. In any event, any misinterpretation of such evidence would
be evident from the reasons that a judicial officer is required to give. Juries do not give
reasons for their decisions.
Fifth, South African courts must bear in mind that Canadian courts are required to
interpret the Charter in a way that satisfies the needs of society as they exist in Canada.
637 See § 2 3 1 1 supra.
638 Th C di .e ana Ian interpretation.
639 See § 4 1 2 supra.
640 R v Calder supra § 34. See § 3 3 1 4 & n 384 supra.
641 The procedural framework in the US differs from that of SA in essentially the same two ways. See S v
Makhathini D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97 3 & n 437 supra
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Likewise, the South African Constitution "operates in a particular society with immediate
needs".642 It follows that, for example, the Canadian experience with, and need for, effective
law enforcement does not necessarily have the same priority in a South African context.
5 3 CONSCRIPTIVE EVIDENCE (SELF-INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS) AS OPPOSED TO
REAL EVIDENCE
Canadian courts distinguish two kinds of evidence: Conscriptive and non-conscriptive. This
distinction differs from the distinction used in the United States and South Africa. While the
latter two countries distinguish evidence on the basis of its physical characteristics - real or
testimonial - Canadian courts focus on which rights were implicated in the discovery of the
evidence: Conscriptive evidence is evidence, testimonial or real, that was obtained in
violation, or resulted from a violation, of the so-called principle against self-incrimination.643
If the accused was not compelled to participate in the discovery or creation of the evidence,
the evidence is classified as non-conscriptive. In other words, non-conscriptive evidence
exists independent of the violation.
In § 4 2 2 2 2 above it was contended that the risk of unreliability is considered a rationale
for excluding unconstitutionally evidence.644 However, the risk of evidence being unreliable
depends to a great extent on the physical nature of the evidence that resulted from the
unconstitutional behaviour. According to Davies: "[T]he essential difference between
confessional evidence and 'real evidence' is that in the former case but not the latter the
manner in which it is obtained may well affect its reliability".645
It is submitted that the Canadian Supreme Court places too great an emphasis on the
privilege against self-incrimination when classifying evidence. The tendency to extend the
scope of self-incrimination is evident from cases like R v Burlinghum.T" R v Stillman647 and
R v Feeney.648
642 S v Nombewu 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E) 422f-423b. Emphasis added.
643 R v Stillman (1997) 1 SCR 607 (SCC) §§ 75-82. See n 543 supra.
644 See also §§ 2 3 2 1; 3 2 2 1 & 3 2 3 supra.
645 Davies "Exclusion of Evidence Illegally or Improperly Obtained" 2002 The Australian U 170 177, referring
to R v Swaffield; Pavic v The Queen (1997) 192 CLR 15975.
646 (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC). Evidence of an unconstitutional pointing out, as well as real evidence found
as a result, was excluded.
647 (1997) 1 SCR 607 (SCC). Bodily samples taken while in police custody, in violation of the right to privacy
was excluded on the basis of being conscriptive.
648 (1997) 115 CCC (3d) 129 (SCC). Fingerprints taken after an unlawful arrest were excluded.
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To some extent, the US Supreme Court has, through its numerous analogies between the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, also implied violations of the privilege against self-
incrimination in cases where there actually only occurred violations of the right to privacy.649
It is submitted that South Africa should not follow this extended version of self-
incrimination and the resulting blurring of the distinction between testimonial
communications and real evidence. The Canadian Supreme Court - while its notion that in
such situations the accused was indeed compelled to incriminate himself may not be
completely unfounded - loses sight of the traditional reason for excluding compelled
statements: The risk of unreliability.Y" Testimonial communications emanate from the mind
of the accused and are therefore susceptible to all the imperfections of human nature such as
the tendency to lie in difficult situations. In contrast, real evidence, even when conscripted
from the accused, "possesses an objective reliability. [Therefore,] [i]t does not 'conscript the
accused against himself in the manner of a confessional statement'Y" Nonetheless, the
Canadian Supreme Court cited the historical rule against self-incrimination, based upon the
risk of unreliability, as the reason for holding that all "conscriptive" evidence would render
the trial unfair. 652
Keeping in mind that South African courts can afford to be less strict III excluding
evidence because the risk of misinterpretation is smaller653 and the specific need to
effectively combat crime greater, it is submitted that it would most probably be detrimental to
the administration of justice to follow the lead of the Canadian courts.
5 3 1 TRIAL FAIRNESS
It is clear that South African courts should not follow the Canadian definitions of
conscriptive and non-conscriptive evidence. Therefore, South African courts must not follow
the Canadian interpretation of trial fairness, which is almost exclusively based on their
interpretation of conscriptive evidence and the "principle" against self-incrimination.
It is submitted that local courts must, in their interpretation of the trial fairness leg of s
35(5), focus on two considerations: First, violations of the collection of rights that comprise
649 Mapp v Ohio 367 US 643 (1961) 656; United States v Havens 446 US 620 (1980). And see n 101 supra.
650 The Canadian Supreme Court in R v Stillman supra §§ 80-82 acknowledged this. But see the passage quoted
in § 2 3 2 1 1 supra.
651 SvM2003 (1) SA 341 (SCA) 343E.
652 R v Stillman supra §§ 81-82.
653 South African courts do not employ juries as the sole fmders of fact. See §§ 5 1& 5 2 supra.
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the rights of "arrested, detained and accused persons,,654 and specifically those rights that aim
to ensure the right to a fair trial.655 Second, the behaviour and chosen strategy of the accused,
during both the pre-trial and trial phases of the proceedings.
It was submitted in § 4 2 1 2 above that the enquiry must ultimately be concerned with the
question whether admission of the evidence would lead to the accused having an unfair trial.
It is now submitted that, because of the interlocutory nature of an exclusion order and the
importance of the matter to all parties, a change in - rather, a limiting of - the purposef" for
which admission is sought is a valid reason for the court to re-evaluate an earlier ruling on
admissibility. This is justified because the purpose for which evidence is admitted greatly
determines its impact on the fairness of the trial. If the limited use that the prosecution can
derive from the evidence sufficiently diminishes its impact on the fairness of the trial, it
follows that the reason for its initial exclusion (unfairness to the accused) can no longer be
upheld. And if admission of the evidence, in its diminished form, does not render the trial
unfair, the only other reason that could prevent its admission is that its admission might still
be detrimental to the administration of justice.
Because of the nature of the rights involved, the most likely kind of evidence to be
implicated under the fairness leg of s 35(5) is testimonial communications.P'" The nature of
the evidence also determines whether evidence can safely be used to impeach the accused.
Testimonial communications result from the mind of the accused and are therefore
susceptible to the same weaknesses as the mind from which it flowed, of which the risk of
unreliability is paramount. This means that even if the resulting unfairness is sufficiently
diminished to have an unconstitutionally obtained statement or pointing out admitted for
impeachment, it will be of little value. Unless the reliability of the impeachment evidence can
be confirmed by other evidence, there will always be the risk that the court is "led to doubt
evidence which is really true".658
The behaviour of the accused during the pre-trial phase can influence the degree of
unfairness to the accused. In this regard, local courts may take a leaf from the Canadian book.
Abusive, aggressive or generally obstructive behaviour towards the police,659 should be taken
into account when a court determines whether admission of the resulting evidence would
654 Section 35 of the Constitution.
655 Section 35(3) of the Constitution.
656 In theory, tendering evidence in general means that it is tendered for all purposes, including impeachment.
657 See §§ 5 7 1 2 & 5726 infra.
658 R v Wellers 1918 TPD 234 237. See § 3 3 1 3 supra.
659 R v Tremblay (1987) 60 CR (3d) 59 (SCC).
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render the trial unfair. Similarly, a court should take into account if, for example, the accused
was too intoxicated to exercise the right to counsel'f" or would inevitably have confessed
even ifprovided with warnings/'?'
The accused's chosen strategy in court can remove, or diminish, the unfairness resulting
from admission of the evidence sufficiently to justify admission of that evidence to impeach.
R v Solomons662 serves as an example: The accused unexpectedly changed his testimony,
causing evidence previously excluded because of its "extremely great prejudice to the
accused",663 to become directly relevant to his credibility. It follows that the prejudice
referred to by the court must have been negated by the accused's chosen strategy for it to
become admissible in rebuuali'" Another strategy that the accused may follow is to testify,
knowing that "opposing testimony had been ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case in
chief,.665 This possibility is discussed further in § 54 below.
In conclusion, the remarks of Erasmus J in S vNombewu666 are enlightening:
"The concept of a fair trial not only encompasses the abstract universal values of an open
and democratic society, but also - I should think - has regard to the subjective needs,
feelings and views of society at the particular time ... Public opinion will no doubt be
affected by the nature and seriousness of the infringement, as well as by the nature and
seriousness of the crime involved (S v Hammer667) seen ill the light of the state of
lawlessness prevailing ill the country (Melani668). The Constitution operates ill a
particular society with immediate needs".669
It is clear from the above passage that no specific rules have as yet crystallised. This is
good - local courts must leave themselves room to apply the discretion as the facts of each
case dictate and avoid reducing the discretion to a limited set of rules, as is the case in
Canada. However, some guidelines have emerged: Evidence excluded under the fairness leg
of s 35(5) would in the majority of cases have resulted from violations of the accused's trial
rights, especially the privilege against self-incrimination. The resulting evidence would
660 R v Mohl (1989) 69 CR (3d) 399 (SCC).
661 R v Harper (1994) 92 CCC (3d) 423 (SCC). The accused spontaneously declared "I'm the guy you want".
See also Colorado v Connelly 479 US 157 (1986).
662 1959 (2) 352 (A). See § 4 1 1 supra.
663 Ogilvie Thompson lA, citing from the record, in R v Solomons supra 357A-B.
664 One must always bear in mind that impeachment evidence is used only in rebuttal, never as proof of guilt.
665 Oregon v Hass 420 US 714 (1975) 722.
666 1996 (2) SACR 396 (E).
667 1994 (2) SACR 496 (C).
668 Sv Melani 1995 (2) SACR 141 (E) 191h.
669 S v Nombewu supra 422f-423b. Emphasis added.
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mostly be in the form of testimonial communications - its creation a direct result of the
constitutional violation. Testimonial communications run the risk of being unreliable.
Consequently, even when the impact on the fairness of the trial can be sufficiently
diminished, the use of testimonial communications for impeachment has little value, unless
its reliability can be confirmed by other evidence.
Therefore, local courts should admit testimonial communications for impeachment only
when it is satisfied of two things: First, the unfairness to the accused of its admission for the
limited purpose, is sufficiently reduced. Second, the risk of unreliability has been sufficiently
countered.
5 3 2 DETRIMENT AL TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
The second leg of s 35(5) focuses on both the long and the short term effects of admission
on the administration of justice. To determine the effects of admission, a court must take into
account a wider range of factors than with the fairness enquiry. There is no exhaustive list of
factors, but the following are the most common: The kind of evidence obtained, the nature of
the constitutional right infringed, the seriousness of the breach and whether the evidence
would have been obtained by other means.670 Again, the behaviour of the accused and the
nature of the crime charged also playa role.
While it is true that the consequences for the accused are more serious upon conviction of
a serious crime, the Supreme Court of Canada is more concerned with repute on a long-term
basis.67! This implies that the consequences for the accused are only as a matter of necessity
considered, the real issue being the long-term consequences for the administration of justice.
In the event of contrasting interests, the Canadian Supreme Court would favour the latter,
unless an unfair trial would result.672 However, one can be sure that the accused's motivation
for applying for exclusion is based squarely on their interest in the former. It is submitted that
the specific needs in South Africa, especially curbing the crime rate, dictate that a similar
approach is followed locally.
Real evidence, which is normally the result of a violation of a non-trial right have an
"objective reliability ... [that] does not 'conscript the accused against himself in the manner
670 S v Orrie CPD 14-10-2004 Case no SS 32/2003 20.
671 R v Collins (1987) 56 CR (3d) 193 (SCC) § 32.
672 R v Collins supra § 39.
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of a confessional statement".673 Consequently it is more readily admitted than testimonial
communications. It is submitted however that even in cases where real evidence had been
excluded because its admission would be detrimental to the administration of justice, the fact
that it is subsequently tendered for only a limited purpose should weigh in favour of
admitting it for impeachment. When real evidence is excluded, it would rarely be because of
the risk of unreliability. More often it would be excluded because courts are unwilling to
condone the particular kind of behaviour that led to discovery of the evidence.V" In these
cases the court should not deny itself the use of otherwise reliable evidence with which to test
the reliability of the accused's testimony.t" The administration of justice would be poorer for
losing a useful tool enabling it to not only determine the truth, but also to ensure that justice
is done to all interested parties.
5 4 THE "NO LICENCE TO PERMIT PERJURY" ARGUMENT
"[T]here is hardly justification for letting the defendant affirmatively resort to perjurious
testimony in reliance on the Government's disability to challenge his credibility'Y'"
In Oregon v Hass677 the US Supreme Court held that the accused may be impeached by
previously excluded testimonial communications if the accused testifies to his innocence
knowing that the "opposing testimony had been ruled inadmissible for the prosecution's case
in chief,.678 Of course the accused will know that the opposing testimony had been excluded
- it is, after all, the accused who had to object to its admission and request its exclusion!
It is submitted that the risk of perjurious testimony is a valid concern. But locally, it must
not be imparted with the same overriding significance it has been given by the US Supreme
Court. More is required for the "no licence" argument to justify admission of impeachment
evidence.
In this regard, the nature of the evidence in question, and its proven reliability, must be
controlling. It is illustrated in § 5 3 2 above that real evidence, because of its objective
673 S v M supra 362A, citing R v Holford (2001) 1 NZLR 385 (CA) 390; S v Naidoo 1998 (1) All SA 189 (D);
Mkhize v S (2000) JOL 6155 (W).
674 Mostly in cases of mala fide or other especially gross violations when less intrusive means were available.
675 See the US position, especially Walder v United States 347 US 62 (1954). This would of course be as
a~plicab1e in a South African court when faced with a similar factual situation.
66 Walder v United States supra 65, as quoted in Harris v New York 401 US 222 (1971) 224.
677420 US 714 (1975).
678 Oregon v Hass supra 722.
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reliability, is an excellent means of determining the veracity of the accused's testimony. It is
the use of testimonial communications for impeachment that causes problems.
Testimonial evidence, especially the kind obtained by unconstitutional means, comes in
many shades of the truth, with the distinct possibility that it is devoid of truth altogether. This
is of course true of the accused's trial testimony as well. Therefore, although impeachment is
not concerned with proving the truth directly, it serves no rational purpose attempting to
prove that the accused's trial testimony is perjurious by proving an inconsistent prior
statement that is itself proven to be false and consequently of no value.679
It is a different matter if the reliability of the testimonial communication, intended to be
used for impeachment, is corroborated by other evidence. In this way, the risk that the trial
judge may be led to doubt evidence that is really true can be avoided.68o And in such a case,
the same pressing reasons that demand admission of real evidence for impeachment, can
justify admission the testimonial communication in question.
5 5 LOCAL RELEVANCE OF THE MINORITY'S ARGUMENT IN HARRIS VNEW YORK
Any reference to the US Supreme Court's decisions (majority and minority) in Harris v
New York68I and its progenl82 must be seen in the proper perspective. It is therefore
necessary to bear in mind the most important procedural difference between the American
and South African criminal trials: The lack of juries. Much of the minority's argument relates
to the risk that a jury will not fully understand the difference between using evidence as proof
of the accused's guilt and using the same evidence merely to prove that the accused is giving
false testimony.
Moreover, the minority's argument must be seen in the light of the majority's ruling. It is
submitted that the majority went too far by unconditionally allowing the use of
unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment in all but one situation.683
679 See § 3 3 1 3 supra.
680 See R v Wellers supra 237.
681401 US 222 (1971).
682 Riddell v Rhay 404 US 974 (1971); Oregon v Hass supra; United States v Havens supra.
683 Mincey v Arizona 437 US 385 (1978). The majority in Harris recognises that involuntary statements may not
be used for impeachment. See § 54 where certain restrictions upon the majority's argument is suggested.
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551 INTERFERENCE WITH AN ACCUSED'S UNFETTERED RIGHT TO ELECT WHETHER TO
TESTIFY ON HIS OWN BEHALF
The accused will have to make many difficult choices during the course of his trial, but
this does not mean that every time his choice results in an unfortunate outcome his choice had
been "fettered".
The minority in Harris was concerned that the risk of impeachment by means of
statements obtained in violation of Miranda v Arizona684 would "fetter" the accused in his
decision whether or not to testify in his own defence, because:
"The privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner ... [S]tatements merely intended to be exculpatory by
the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial... These statements are
incriminating in any meaningful sense of the word and may not be used without the full
warnings and effective waiver required for any other statement".685
It is submitted that the only time when evidence, real or testimonial, used for impeachment
will be incriminating is when its purpose is misunderstood by the finder of fact. This is not to
say that a judge, or magistrate, may fail to understand that discrediting the accused is not
equal to incriminating the accused, but it is clear that the use of evidence for impeachment
will not be regarded as incriminating the accused in a South African court.686
In S v Aimei87 the court held that the right of accused no 2 to testify in his own defence
required that accused no 1 must be cross-examined on unwarned statements that accused no 1
had made during their bail application. If the argument of the Harris minority applied,
accused no 1's choice to testify in his own defence would have been fettered, because he
would effectively have been impeached with his own, inadmissible previous statements. In
reality the only choice that had been "fettered" was accused no 1's choice to put up a lying
defence. At common law, the choice that every accused has to put up a lying defence, is
exactly the kind of choice that impeachment is meant to prevent. It is submitted that in a
constitutional context impeachment similarly serves to prevent an accused from exercising
certain choices.
684384 US 436 (1966).
685 Harris v New York supra 230-231; Miranda v Arizona 384 US 436 (1966) 476-477. Empbasis inHarris.
686 See § 5 5 supra.
6871998 (1) SACR 343 (C). See also S v Sebejan 1997 (8) BCLR 1086 (W).
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5 5 2 BLURRING THE LINE BETWEEN CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND THE COMMON
LAW EVIDENTIARY RULE OF RELEVANCE
Section 210 of the CPA holds that no evidence as to any fact, matter or thing shall be
admissible which is irrelevant or immaterial and which cannot conduce to prove or disprove
any point or fact at issue in criminal proceedings. Section 210 is statutory confirmation of the
common law, stating the rule in its negative form: Irrelevant evidence is inadmissible.
However, courts prefer to state the rule in its positive form: "[A]U facts relevant to the issue
in legal proceedings may be proved".688
Relevance is the basis of the law of evidence: "The law of evidence is foundationally
based on the principle that evidence is admissible if it is relevant to an issue in the case".689
Therefore, relevance is the starting point of any enquiry when the admissibility of evidence is
in issue: "The ... rule ... is that any evidence which is relevant is admissible unless there is
some other rule of evidence which excludes it".690 One such rule of evidence is s 35(5) of the
Constitution. Consequently, an enquiry in terms of s 35(5) will only ever be concerned with
evidence that is relevant to the enquiry - irrelevant evidence is by its very nature
inadmissible for as long as it remains irrelevant to the matter at hand. It therefore follows that
even highly relevant evidence must be excluded if found inadmissible under s 35(5).
5 5 3 SAFEGUARDING THE INTEGRITY OF THE ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
"Now, it is an established principle of our law that no one can be compelled to give
evidence incriminating himself. He cannot be forced to do that either before the trial, or
during the trial ... What the rule forbids is compelling a man to give evidence which
incriminates himself,.691
What the above passage illustrates is that it is essential to afford accused persons the same
protection against violations of their rights before the trial as during the trial. Otherwise, it
would be little comfort for the accused to know that during the trial he has all the protection
of the law - the assistance of legal counsel, the right to silence and so on - but before the
trial, the police have already gathered all the evidence they need from the accused in a way
that would be contrary to the accused's trial rights.
688 R v Trupedo 1920 AC 58 62; Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 2 ed (2002) 45.
689 S v Gokool1965 3 SA 461 (N) 475G.
690 R v Schaube-Kujjler 1969 2 SA 40 (RA) 50B.
691 Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) 1030F-H, citing S v Zuma 1995 (2) SA
642 (CC) [31], which in tum citedR v Camane 1925 AD 570 575. Emphasis added.
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The minorities III Harris v New York692 and Oregon v Hass693 were both similarly
concerned with the possibility'T' that police will be encouraged to infringe the accused's
rights during the pre-trial phase. They felt that, especially in cases where no statements would
otherwise result, police would have "little to lose and perhaps something to gain by way of
possibly uncovering impeachment material,,695 by infringing on the accused's rights under
Miranda v Arizona.696
There is local authority suggesting that these rights, or at least an appropriate form thereof,
should be accorded a person merely suspected of committing a crime.697 In S v Sebejan698 the
court held:
There lS a deception in treating a suspect as no more than a witness, obtaining
information from her under false pretences in the hope and belief that this can be used to
further an investigation of and against that person. To then rely on that individual's
ignorance and use whatever has been extracted during this time of deceptive safety in
order to initiate or found or develop a prosecution of such person is inimical to a fair pre-
trial procedure ... If the suspect is deprived of the rights which have been afforded to an
arrested person then a fair trial is denied the person who was operating within a
quicksand of deception while making a statement. That pre-trial procedure is a
determinant of trial fairness is implicit in the Constitution and in our common law. How
can a suspect have a fair trial where pre-trial unfairness has been visited upon her by
way of deception? .. The constitutional right of an accused person does not only relate to
fundamental justice and fairness in the procedure and the proceedings at his trial. It also
includes the right to be treated fairly, constitutionally and lawfully by policing
authorities and state organs prior to the trial. 699
In conclusion, it is clear that the minority in Harris's concern is legitimate, but not
absolute. It is clear that local courts must practice restraint before admitting impeachment
evidence obtained during the pre-trial phase under circumstances that did not ensure the
accused (or, whatever the legal definition of his status was at the time) the appropriate and
effective protection of the Constitution.
692 Supra.
693 Supra.
694 The majorities in both Harris and Hass called it a "speculative possibility".
6950 regon v Hass supra 723.
696 Supra.
697 S v Sebejan supra; S v Orrie supra.
698 1997 (8) BCLR 1086 (W)
699 S v Sebejan supra [46]-[51]. Emphasis added. See also United States v Ttoscanino 500 F 2d 267; S v
Ebrahim 1991 (2) 553 (A) at 583G; S v Mushimba 1977 (2) 829A; S v Lwane 1966 (2) 433 (A); S v Botha (1)
1995 (2) SACR 598 (W); S v Orrie supra 8-11.
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5 5 4 UNDERMINING THE DETERRENCE OBJECTIVE
The final objection of the minority in Harris was closely connected to their contention that
the police will have nothing to lose by infringing the accused's pre-trial rights: They argued
that the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence for impeachment destroys the
deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule. In a system that has deterrence of unconstitutional
police conduct as the basis of its exclusionary rule(s), this is a scary thought.
Regarding the deterrence rationale, certain factors are important. The-US Supreme Court
recognises that the distinction between "good faith" and "bad faith" police behaviour is
pivotal to the effective deterrence of misconduct.i'"
In South Africa, deterrence of official misconduct IS only one of many possible
considerations when the admissibility of unconstitutionally obtained evidence is at issue.701 It
is furthermore important to bear in mind that the enquiry does not stop at the question
whether the individual police officer acted in a manner consistent with a reasonable police
officer. Rather, the enquiry must further determine good faith on an institutional level. The
basic facts of S v Soci702 serve as an example: If the investigating officer relies on a pro forma
document normally used by the police to notify the accused of his rights, he acts in good faith
ifhe believes that the document in question states the complete set of rights. Therefore, if this
document omits some of the accused's rights, it is not through the bad faith of the issuing
officer, but through the "bad faith" of the police force as an institution. And the consequences
to the accused are the same: He is not properly informed of his rights. Therefore, bad faith on
an institutional level, whether intentional or negligent, must meet with at least the same
consequences as bad faith on the part of the individual officer. Nonetheless, it is submitted
that although the accused suffers the same amount of prejudice, such an omission on an
institutional level is potentially more detrimental to the administration of justice than the
same omission by the individual officer, because future reliance on the same incomplete
document by other officers is virtually inevitable.
700 United States v Leon 468 US 897 (1984) 919. See also Mkhize v Ssupra.
701 See § 4 2 2 2 supra. See S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 388 (W).
702 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E). On the specific facts of the case, the court held that the accused was properly
informed of his rights.
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5 6 LOCAL RELEVANCE OF THE CANADIAN APPROACH
In the light of the numerous differences between real evidence and testimonial
communications for use in impeachment, it is imperative to note from the beginning that the
Canadian approach, set out in R v Calder703 and R v Cook,704 only addresses the use of
testimonial communications for impeachment.
Regarding usefulness of the Canadian approach locally, S vMakhathini,705 the only case in
South Africa to deal directly with the use of an unwamed statement for impeachment, is of
little use - it makes no mention of Canadian authority at all. It does however reject the
approach of the US Supreme Court in Harris v New York.706
In Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape707 the court, although not
required to decide the impeachment matter, discussed the Canadian approach as set out in
Calder, as well as the American approach already rejected in Makhathini. The only
conclusion the court in Wesso arrived at was:
"[T]he admissibility of such a statement, and the issues of principle and policy which
arise, are to be determine [sic] by the trial judge when appraised of the full factual
context within which the evidence is sought to be admitted,,.708
Wesso's case does however provide a clue to the relevance of the Canadian approach.
Erasmus Al emphasises the holding in Calder that in some circumstance unconstitutionally
obtained statements may be used for impeachment, despite citing an article by Rose,1°9 which
contends that in Canada the door has effectively been closed to impeachment.I'"
Despite there being no precedent in Canada regarding the use of unconstitutionally
obtained real evidence for impeachment, Scott lA's minority opinion in Pillay v S711 is
informative on whether any future developments in Canada can be useful locally. In refusing
703 (1996) 46 CR (4th) 133 (SCC).
704 (1998) 2 SCR 597 (SCC).
705 D 1997-11-21 Case no CC73/97.
706 Supra.
7072001 (1) SACR 674 (CPD).
708 Wesso v Director of Public Prosecutions, Western Cape 2001 (1) SACR 674 (CPD) 685a-b. Emphasis
added. For this reason - not being the trial court - the court did not decide the matter. See also Rose "Calder
Successes will be Rare and the Procedure Uncertain" 46 CR (Canada) 151; Scott "Calder - The Charter Trumps
the Truth-Seeking Tool oflmpeaching the Accused with a Prior Inconsistent Statement" 46 CR (Canada) 161.
709 Rose "Calder Successes will be Rare and the Procedure Uncertain" CR 151.
710 See also La Forest J's separate opinion in Calder, agreeing with the result but holding that no special
circumstances exist.
7ll 2004 (2) BCLR 158 (SCA).
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to apply the definition of conscriptive evidence set out in R v Burlingham/12 preferring the
position in S v M,713Scott JA highlighted an important difference between the approaches
followed in Canada and South Africa regarding exclusion of real evidence.
It is submitted that the Canadian approach is only of little use, given the different
circumstances under which South African courts must operate. The most important
differences are: First, South African courts do not employ juries, who have little or no
understanding of the difference between incrimination and impeachment. It is submitted that
this difference is especially important in cases where testimonial communications are at
issue. Second, South African courts distinguish between the kinds of evidence along lines
different from Canada, as set out by Scott JA in Pillay v s.714 Lastly, the South African reality
of a high crime rate, especially armed robberies, many of which result in no arrests, dictates a
different approach to maintaining respect for the Bill of Rights.
5 7 SECTION 35(5): THE RELEVANCE OF LOCAL DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING THE
DISCRETION715
Since enactment of the Constitution, courts have gained considerable expenence III
interpreting and applying the s 35(5)-discretion to situations where exclusion of evidence
from the prosecution's case in chief is required. It is submitted that the local experience will
be most useful in applying the discretion to determine the admissibility of unconstitutionally
obtained evidence for impeachment. It is submitted above that a change in purpose of the
evidence.I'? from incrimination to impeachment, at least warrants the matter of admissibility
to be reconsidered, taking into account all factors that are relevant at the time of the new
enquiry.
Although not all problems have been solved - either because such a situation has not
arisen locally or courts are in disagreement - some matters relevant to an impeachment
enquiry have been clarified.
712 Supra. See §§ 2 3 2 1 1; 4 2 2 2 3 & 5 3 supra.
713 2003 (1) SA 341 (SeA). See §§ 4 2 2 2 2; 4 2 2 2 3; 5 3 1 & 5 3 2 supra.
714 S c. th . .upra, lor e mmonty.
715 The discussion is largely based on Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 222-243.
716 See § 5 3 1 supra.
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5 7 1 TRIAL FAIRNESS
571 1 Waiver of constitutional rights
Despite there being a dispute whether individuals can actually waive their constitutional
rightS/17 it is common cause that accused persons may "waive the right to exercise a
fundamental right".718 Furthermore, an accused may at any time re-assert any right that he has
previously waived, but any consequence that flows from an earlier waiver cannot be undone.
If, for example, the accused opted to make a statement or consented to a search of his
house,719that statement or any evidence obtained from the search, will be admissible.
On waiver of pre-trial constitutional rights, S v Mphala720 clarifies the matter. Both
accused were properly informed of their rights under the Constitution. In the meantime, a
third party had arranged for an attorney to represent them. The accused were not informed of
this obviously relevant fact and consequently gave up the right to legal counsel and opted to
make statements to the police. Cloete J emphasised that a police officer must not just comply
with the "letter" of the Constitution; the "spirit" of the Constitution demands that an accused
must also be given all obviously relevant information for a waiver to be informed.Y'
It is submitted that, like in the US, "[w]hat suffices for a waiver depends on the nature of
the right at issue".722 In the same way, the right to privacy can be more easily waived, by
mere consent, which need not be as informed as in the case of pre-trial rights.
5712 Real evidence conscripted from the accused
Real evidence conscripted from the accused includes real evidence "emanating from the
accused,,723and derivative real evidence.v'" It has been submitted repeatedly in this thesis that
South African courts, correctly, do not extend the privilege against self-incrimination to real
evidence conscripted from the accused, as the Canadian Supreme Court does.725 Local courts
717 See Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 222. It is submitted that the dispute has more to do with
semantics and terminology than what actually happens in practice.
718 De Waal, Currie & Erasmus The Bill of Rights Handbook 4 ed (2001) 43.
719 In the USA, consent is a valid exception to the warrant requirement. See § 2 2 4 supra
720 Supra.
721 S v Mphala supra 39Ia-b. Compare to Moran v Burbine 475 US 412 (1986), where on similar facts, the US
Supreme Court held otherwise.
722 New York v Hill 528 US 110 (2000) 114.
123R v Stillman supra § 95.
724 R v Burlingham (1995) 38 CR (4th) 265 (SCC); R v Feeney (1997) us CCC (3d) 129 (SCC); R v Stillman
supra.
72S See §§ 232 I 1; 4 2 1 2; 5 2; 5 3 1 & 56 supra.
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have consistently held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects only testimonial
communications and not real evidence "conscripted" from the accused.I'"
Regarding derivative evidence, South African courts similarly do not follow the trend in
Canada. Even when real evidence results from an unconstitutionally obtained statement or
pointing out, it is as a rule not excluded merely because the violation of the accused's rights
led to its discovery. 727 In this regard, s 218 of the CPA is informative. In short, it holds that
evidence may be admitted notwithstanding the fact that discovery of that evidence resulted
from an inadmissible confession or pointing out of the accused and notwithstanding that
discovery of that evidence took place against the will of the accused.i" It was submitted
above that s 218 prevents to a large extent the so-called fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine
from applying in South Africa. In any event, derivative evidence is not deserving of exclusion
merely because the evidence it was derived from is inadmissible.Y' The admissibility of
derivative evidence must be decided in a separate s 35(5)-enquiry.
The following factors are useful in determining the admissibility of all real evidence
"conscripted" from the accused: Real evidence pre-exists any violation that can lead to its
discovery; it is not created by the violation as in the case of testimonial communications. Real
evidence is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Real evidence can
consequently be incriminating - as all prosecution evidence relevant to the issue of guilt tend
to be - but never self-incriminating.v'" Real evidence is objectively reliable.
All these factors tend to favour admission of the evidence. However, the seriousness of the
violation that led to the discovery of the real evidence, especially violations involving police
violence, must weigh against admission.i" In cases of serious violations, the court should
rely heavily on its disciplinary function732 and its duty to protect judicial integrity and the
integrity of the system as a whole.733 In instances of non-violent infringements, courts should
726 S v Binta 1993 (2) SACR 553 (C); S v Huma (2) 1995 (2) SACR 411 (W); S v Maphumalo 1996 (2) SACR
84 (N); Msomi v Attorney-General of Natal 1996 (8) BCLR 1109 (W); S v R 2000 (1) SACR 33 (W). Although
the US Supreme Court has blurred the line somewhat with its analogies between the 4th & 5th Amendments, the
position in the US is essentially the same. See Schmerber v California 384 US 757 (1966).
727 See R v Burlingham supra.
728 See the reference to s 218 of the CPA by both the majority and minority in Pillay v S 2004 (2) BCLR 158
(SCA).
729 See both the majority and minority opinions in Pillay v S supra 182, 195.
730 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 230.
731 See generally Scott JA, for the minority, in Pillay v S supra; Mkhize v S supra.
732 Sv Mphala supra 400b.
733 Schwikkard & Vander Merwe Principles 229.
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be able to rely on the independent source doctrine, the inevitable discovery principle" and
the attenuation-of-the-taint principle.i'"
5713 Identification evidence
Evidence of a positive identification of the accused, resulting from an identification parade
held without the presence of their legal counsel, will not be excluded if the presence of the
- 736legal counsel would have made no difference to the outcome of the parade. However,
police may not deliberately infringe upon the accused's right to have his attorney present.
The accused should be given reasonable opportunity to arrange for legal representation. And,
where necessary, police must inform the accused's counsel of the proposed identification
parade.737Nonetheless, identification evidence would only really be excluded where such
extreme circumstances existed that the court needs to discipline the police.738
5 72 DETRIMENT TO THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
5721 The crime wave
Much has been said, in this work and elsewhere.i'" about the extremely high level of
especially violent crimes prevalent in South Africa and the "immediate need" 740of society to
be protected from crime. Schwikkard and Van der Merwe contend, correctly it is submitted,
that "courts are - in their interpretation of the second (or over-arching) test in s 35(5) - fully
entitled to lean in favour of crime control".741
5722 Good faith
It has been pointed out that the "good faith" exception creates the risk of encouraging
police to remain ignorant of their duties and the rights of suspects, arrested, detained and
734 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 229.
735 Wong Sun v United States 371 US 471 (1963). See also -§ 2 2 2 4 3; 2 2 3 3 3 & 233 supra.
736 Sv Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 654 (W).
737 S v Thapedi 2002 (1) SACR 598 (T) 604b-c.
738 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 232.
739 See §§ 4 1 2; 422 1; 4 2 2 2 7; 5 3 2 & 5 6 supra. See also Ferreira v Levin NO; Vryenhoek v Powell NO
supra [152]; Pillay v S supra; S v Naidoo supra; S v Cloete 1999 (2) SACR 137 (C); S v Melani supra 191h; S v
Nombewu supra; Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 233-236.
740 Sv Nombewu supra 422f-423b.
741 Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 234.
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accused persons.V But it is submitted that no reasonable police officer will remain ignorant
of the law regarding his duties and therefore any police officer who does choose to remain
ignorant is acting in bad faith for that reason alone.
It is submitted that there is sufficient local authority that "good faith", both on an
individual and institutional level, is a valid consideration when admissibility of evidence
under the second leg of s 35(5) is determined.I':'
5723 Exigent circumstances: Public (police) safety and imminent destruction of
evidence
Exigent circumstances, requiring police to act without having the luxury of first observing
the "niceties" of the law, or fully considering other options.t'" is closely connected to the
good faith consideration. Situations where police have to act speedily must occur together
with the reasonable belief that the infringement is necessary under the circumstances.
Therefore, much of the authority in "good faith" cases are based on circumstances where the
police had to act speedily745 or ignore the rights of an arrested person746 in order to protect
themselves and the public from harm. Similarly, it submitted, is the imminent destruction of
evidence also reason for police to act without a warrant in order to secure the evidence. It is
submitted that these considerations must be as relevant when determining the admissibility of
impeachment evidence, and would generally favour admission thereof.
5724 Lawful or less intrusive means of securing the evidence
In Canada, this factor on its own, tend to make the violation more serious and is even
indicative of a blatant disregard for the Charter747 and bad faith on the part of the police.748
Therefore, it is submitted that this factor must be taken into consideration together with the
previous two mentioned. Especially when police in good faith commit a violation of an
742 S v Motloutsi 1996 (1) SACR 78 (C).
743 Mkhize v S supra; Pillay v S supra; S v Naidoo supra; S v Mphala supra; S v Madiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D);
Sv Soci supra. S v Soci is a good example where the police's failure to properly inform the accused of his rights
was based on an unreasonable mistake on an institutional level.
744 See § 5 7 2 4 infra.
745 Sv Madiba supra.
746 •See S v Lottenng 1999 (12) BCLR 1478 (N).
747 R v Collins supra.
748 R v Feeney supra.
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"inadvertent or of a merely technical nature",749 it is by no means conclusive that admission
of the evidence will be detrimental to the administration of justice.
5725 Seriousness of the violation
When a violation is, however, not inadvertent or of a mere technical nature, the balance
tend to lean in favour of exclusion. Depending on where on the scale - with technical and
inadvertent violations on one extreme and gross, violent, deliberate and cruel violations on
the other750 - the violation belongs, together with the abovementioned three factors,
especially institutional good faith,75J a court must determine whether admission of the
evidence will be detrimental to the administration of justice.
5726 Real evidence
InMkhize v S752 the court held, in reliance on Canadian authority/53 that the admission of
real evidence will rarely render the trial unfair. This notion was confirmed by Scott JA in his
minority opinion in Pillay v S.754 It is therefore submitted that the admissibility of real
evidence in South Africa, despite Canadian authority to the contrary, is decided under the
second leg of s 35(5) with due consideration to the factors listed in §§ 5 7 2 1 - 5 7 2 5
above.755
5 8 REMARKS IN CONCLUSION
It is submitted that unconstitutionally obtained evidence, even if previously excluded
under s 35(5), remain potentially available to impeach the accused. However, such evidence
must not be admitted as readily as in the United States. Nor must it be admitted in only the
"very limited circumstances'V'" foreseen by the Canadian Supreme Court.757
749 Mkhize v S supra 7.
750 See Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Principles 242.
751 See S v Seseane 2000 (2) SACR 225 (0); S vMark 2001 (1) SACR 572 (C).
752 (2000) JOL 6155 (W).
753 R v Collins supra; R v Jacoy (1988) 38 CRR 290 (SCC).
754 Supra 200, citing S vM supra.
755 See however, also § 5 7 1 2 supra.
756 R v Calder supra § 35.
757 La Forest J in a separate concurring opinion in R v Calder supra could not imagine any such circumstances.
See also Rose "Calder Successes will be Rare and the Procedure Uncertain" CR 151.
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Guidelines for a balanced enquiry into the admissibility of impeachment evidence are best
found in South Africa's own developments to date regarding exclusion in general under s
35(5) of the Constitution. In developing the s 35(5)-discretion, courts have already
assimilated or rejected some important foreign precedents. Only in cases where the matter has
not yet been decided may foreign precedent be more useful, subject to the restrictions pointed
out in §§ 4 1 2 and 5 2 above.
It is submitted that the conclusion in this thesis is essentially based on two notions: First, a
ruling on the admissibility of evidence is interlocutory in nature. Consequently, the question
of admissibility of evidence for impeachment may be determined in a separate enquiry from
the original s 35(5)-enquiry when admissibility had to be determined. It follows that with a
separate enquiry the results are independent of the initial enquiry, and should therefore vary
as the relevant considerations and circumstances change.
The second basis for the argument in favour of admitting this kind of evidence in South
African courts, is based on the fact that South African courts do not employ juries as the
finders of fact. This means that the accused is not at risk of being unduly prejudiced, because
the presiding judicial officer, as the finder of fact, will understand the difference between use
of evidence to incriminate and to impeach. Juries, generally, do not understand the
difference.r" In South Africa magistrates can ensure that their lay assessors understand the
difference.
The nature of the evidence plays a large role in its suitability for impeachment purposes.
In this regard, the distinction as currently employed in South Africa759 is to be preferred over
the distinction of the Canadian Supreme Court.760 Because of the objective reliability of real
evidence, it is more suitable for impeachment purposes. However, if the reliability of
testimonial communications can be confirmed, its value as impeachment evidence
increases.i'"
Because of the distinction employed in South African courts, the nature of the evidence
involved is mostly indicative of the nature of the right that had been violated to secure it.762
The nature of the right, together with the nature of the evidence, largely determines under
758 ldR v Ca er supra § 32. See §§ 1 1; 3 2 1 1; 3 2 35; 33 14 & 412 supra. See also nn 282; 433; 634 supra.
759 Mkhize v S supra; Pillay v S supra; S v M supra.
760 R v Burlingham supra; R v Feeney supra; R v Stillman supra.
761 See §§ 3 3 1 3; 5 3 1 & 5 4 supra.
762 Regarding derivative real evidence this may not be entirely accurate. See §§ 4 2 2 2 2; 5 7 1 2 & 5 2 4 6
supra. See also s 218 of the CPA.
139
Ow>TERFrvE IMPEACHMENT IN SOUTH AFRlCA: BEYONDMAKHATHfNf
which leg of the s 35(5)-discretion the matter of impeachment must be decided. In
determining whether evidence must be admitted for impeachment, a court must consequently
be guided by either the factors enumerated under § 5 7 1 above, or those under § 5 7 2 above.
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